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  Geographies	  of	  Amazonian	  Struggle.	  (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Wendy	  Wolford)	  
This dissertation examines the relationship between new regimes of governance 
and resistance in the Brazilian Amazon in the contemporary context, where the 
“progressive” government that came to power with the support of anti-neoliberal social 
movements, continues to pursue commodity-driven, extractive development as a primary 
strategy of economic growth. Given that the Amazon region holds many of Brazil’s 
natural resources, in this moment, Amazonia has once again been re-imagined as the key 
to Brazil’s future. I sketch out the contours of contemporary strategies of and struggles 
over this “neo-extractivism” through an analysis of the issues raised by one particular 
project – the proposed (and ongoing) paving of the nearly 1000 kilometer stretch of the 
Santarém-Cuiaba highway (BR-163) that passes through Western Pará State (Brazil’s 
second largest state). Embedded in issues of soy, timber, and cattle expansion, land 
zoning and property rights, indigenous, traditional, and migrant struggles, and the re-
making of all of these issues by the progressive state, the BR-163 traverses, both literally 
and figuratively, the terrain of neo-extractivism. 
I argue that this neo-extractivism is made possible by a territorial re-organization 
that re-maps the entire region according to particular spatial, social, and development 
logics. This re-mapping happens in response to and overlaps already existing forms of 
territorial organization by traditional, indigenous, and migrant smallholder communities 
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even as it partially incorporates their demands, namely through the granting property 
rights. Some Amazonian indigenous and traditional movements, however, increasingly 
recognize that attaining land rights within the field of the state does not meet their desires 
for justice or self-determination and in response are articulating new territorial strategies 
of struggle. I draw on ethnographic research from the Movement in Defense of Life and 
Culture on the Arapiuns River and the Movement in Defense of Renascer in the lower 
Brazilian Amazon to argue that their shift – from the demand for property and the right to 
economic productivity, to the demand for life and the production of subjects – is not 
simply the expression of a new form of discourse, but of new forms of territoriality that 
simultaneously invoke and transcend the categories of political economy and the state, 
giving rise to new tensions with previous forms of politics and political mediators. 	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Preface 	  
The late 1980s and 1990s in Latin America was an era of unprecedented 
privatization, elimination of trade regulations, opening of markets to foreign investment, 
cutting of social programs and an escalation in the presence of transnational corporations. 
These neoliberal measures, justified as part of an effort to counteract economic crisis, 
generated a massive increase of wealth concentration in a region already defined by 
extreme inequality. Simultaneously, it was an era of massive social mobilization marked 
by a series of uprisings across the region and the re-activation and formation of strong, 
mass social movements seeking to break with the violence of neoliberalism and construct 
“another world.” Across Latin America, these uprisings and movements forced out 
neoliberal regimes, and brought to power new governments that were “progressive” to 
varying degrees. Over the past decade or so, these governments constructed a new 
regional geopolitical architecture, both literally through regional infrastructural planning 
(Iniciativa para la Integracion de la Infrestructura Regional Suramericana, IIRSA) and 
institutionally through the formation of organizations such as the Banco del Sur, the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South 
American Nations (Unasur) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and 
holding their own alternative summits (ALBA), establishing a degree of unprecedented 
independence for Latin America (especially South America) with regard to world politics 
and economy.  
As an economic and political actor in the region, Brazil has arguably emerged as 
one of the most powerful and most politically tepid across the heterogeneous field of 
progressivism in Latin American governments. The rather spectacular rise of Brazil in 
	   ix	  
terms of economic and political power is based in its “neo-deveopmentalist” program.	  1  
That is, both the Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations, have 
pursued “change with stability,”2 by linking neoliberal macroeconomic policies and the 
expansion and consolidation of an export-oriented, industrial, extractive development 
model with a progressive social agenda based in poverty reduction and the inclusion of 
social movements in institutional politics. During this time, the Brazilian economy has 
grown to be the sixth largest in the world, Brazil has become a major international 
investor (especially within Latin America), its multi-national corporations have become 
some of the largest and most powerful, and simultaneously, social policies lifted millions 
of Brazilians out of poverty and into the middle class, all of which shored up 
administration approval ratings, which were near 90% by the end of Lula’s presidency.  
The political strength of a government that has continued an uncompromisingly 
capitalist model of development based in natural resource exploitation and exportation, or 
neo-extractivism, led by the Workers’ Party, which historically represented a more 
radical left – the left of the “new unionism” and the very mass, anti-systemic movement 
organizations that forced a rupture with neoliberalism - has complicated the relationships 
among social movements and government and led to something of a crisis for social 
movements (Zibechi 2008), or what others have called, an “impasse” (Collectivo 
Situaciones 2009; Reyes 2012). In Brazil specifically, this debate has focused on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Neo-developmentalism emerged across Latin America with the crisis of neoliberalism as a heterodox 
policy response that incorporated monetary and fiscal policies of neoliberalism along with state policies to 
nurture the growth of national firms and social programs based in economically distributive programs. 
Despite substantial modifications to the neoliberal program, neo-developmentalism does not depart from a 
programmatic focus on expanding productive capacity and increasing accumulation (Katz and Haine 2006; 
Acosta 2008; Escobar 2010; Ricci 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011a; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011b).  
    
2 The words of Guido Mantega, The minister of Planning under Lula, quoted in Bate, P. “ ‘Mudança com 
estabilidade’ no Brasil.” BIDAmérica: a revista do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento. April 2003. 
Available at http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=1959 
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phenomenon called “lulismo” or “petismo” (Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; Ricci 2010a; 
Ricci 2010b; Andres Singer 2010), which in the simplest terms is inclusion – of the poor 
into the consumer class, of marginalized actors into governance and of political 
opponents into a coalition government – as the basis for an economic program that 
includes expanding neo-extractivism. This inclusion, which was not simply implemented 
from the top-down, but rather has been crafted in response to movement demands, has 
had the effect of creating political legitimacy for progressive government at all levels 
(federal, state, municipal) while, critics argue, glossing over some of the more substantive 
asymmetries in relations of power (de Oliveira 2006; Zibechi in Hardt and Reyes 2012) 
and has had some demobilizing effects on movements.3 Scholars that favor Lula, and 
now Dilma, call the linking of anti-poverty measures and extractive intensification a 
“new social contract” (Guimarães 2004), while critics argue that it has made poverty 
“functional” to a continued neoliberal program (de Oliveira 2006). Regardless, it is clear 
that the arrival of progressive government in Brazil and the country’s rapid economic 
growth raises complex questions about the relationships among movements, civil society, 
economy and state and, in fact, the very nature of politics in this new moment. 
In this context, an examination struggles over neo-extractivism itself is 
paramount, both because it is such a key element of contemporary state and market 
strategies and because this exploitation of raw materials has increasingly brought the 
(western) developmentalist project into direct conflict with largely indigenous and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For what has arguably been the most dramatic example of this argument within Brazilian movements, see 
the “Carta de saida” (letter for resignation) written by 50 militants from some of the country’s most 
prominent social movements - the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais 
Sem Terra, MST), Unemployed Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Desempregado, 
MTD), Via Campesina and Consulta Popular. Available at http://cspconlutas.org.br/2011/11/militantes-do-
mst-mtd-consulta-popular-e-via-campesina-divulgam-carta-de-saida-de-suas-organizacoes/ [accessed July 
22, 2012]. 
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traditional people who inhabit the territories that hold these resources, making neo-
extractivism a primary site of struggle within this moment of apparent “impasse.” In 
Brazil, such an examination leads us to the Amazon, which, because of its wealth of 
natural resources has, once again, been reimagined from the symbol of Brazil’s backward 
hinterlands into the conditions of possibility for its future. Today, development enters the 
region much differently than in the colonial and recent neo-colonial past, within a 
paradigm that emphasizes sustainability, renewability, participation, broad-based 
economic growth, and corporate responsibility. Geographically, neo-extractivism reaches 
well beyond the old frontier – the  “arc of deforestation” – that skirts the edge of the 
biome and has for decades marked the slow advance of modernity and devastation into 
the region (Fearnside 2008). Today, sites that were formerly far from the circuits of 
capital have become strategically central because of their biological capacity, their 
potential to generate energy, or their location along key transport lines. That means that 
the ongoing intensification of mining, dam building, agro-industrial expansion, road and 
water-highway construction, and carbon storage, along with the re-working of property 
rights and the escalating presence loggers that precedes almost all of these processes, is 
once again re-mapping Amazonia, drawing places and people from the margins of 
development into its center.  
This developmentalist intensification has been met with a series of uprisings and 
protests both within and outside of Brazil in response to Brazilian development projects. 
The most visible of these have been the protests against the Belo Monte Dam, the 
Madeira River Dams at Jirau, the road through TIPNIS in Bolivia, controversies over the 
paving of the Santarém – Cuiaba highway and the expansion of industrial soy agriculture 
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into the Amazon, and the changes to the forest code, as well as a proliferation of smaller 
conflicts and struggles across the region as a whole.  
This dissertation attempts to sketch out the contours of contemporary political 
struggles in Amazonia around neo-extractivism through a detailed investigation of the 
wide-ranging issues – soy and logging expansion, land titling and regional zoning, 
protected areas, rights of indigenous and traditional people, and environmental 
governance – that were raised by the proposed (and currently ongoing) paving of the 
nearly 1000 kilometer stretch of the Santarém-Cuiaba highway that passes through 
Western Pará State (Brazil’s second largest state). I place a detailed knowledge of 
struggles over this development project, gained through two years of ethnographic 
research, into conversation with theories of governance, environment, and political 
change across the region in order to contextualize the specific issues encountered in the 
two primary struggles – in Gleba Nova Olinda and the Renascer Extractive Reserve – 
taken up here. My analytic is territorial. That is, I argue that in order to understand the 
stakes of these conflicts and the potentiality within these struggles we must first, 
following the work of many contemporary Brazilian and Latin American scholars,4 
recuperate the concept of territory and unhinge it from the nation-state.  
 
A substantive literature on the concept of territory in Anglophone human 
geography has done much work to de-naturalize the assumed “container”–like (Giddens 
1985) relationship between nation-states and territory (Agnew 1994; Agnew 2009; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 (See, for example, Porto Gonçalves 2001; Haesbaert and Porto Gonçalves 2006; Porto 
Gonçalves 2006; Zibechi 2008; De Souza 2006; Fernandes 2005; Ramirez 2006; Ceceña 
2012; Reyes and Kaufman 2011; Almeida 2011). 
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Crampton and Elden 2006; Elden 2005; Elden 2007).  It has worked to theorize the 
state’s “territory effect,” that is, its tendency to represent state space as given, masking its 
own transformative effects on social relationships, and its function of normalizing and 
maintaining a particular “spatial order of things” (Elden 2010b, 760). This approach has 
produced a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work geared toward analysis of 
historically and geographically specific processes of state “territorialization” 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Li 2007; Sikor and Lund 2009; 
Corson 2011) (a body of work to which this dissertation contributes).  
The major limitation of this work, I will argue, is that it proposes hegemonic 
conceptions of territory as the only conception of territory. For example through his 
historical analysis of the etymological and genealogical history of the term “territory” 
itself and the co-evolution of conceptions of both territory and the nation-state, Stuart 
Elden has done much work to build a theory of territory that frees it from its “politically 
fixed and conceptually static” condition (Elden 2010b, 760). Yet, within this conceptual 
framework, “territory,” however contingent, dynamic, and produced, remains a form of 
state space, constituted through mechanisms such as law, measurement techniques, and 
property. Territory is political space, but only according to a narrow conception of the 
“political” as co-extensive with the “state,” which is itself a liberal, western concept, and 
thus a rather colonial notion of the political. Even work in this vein that explicitly de-
links state and territory, such as Saskia Sassen’s (2006) Territory, Authority, Rights, 
which provides a genealogy of the relations among these three elements pre, and arguably 
post (e.g. globalization) nation-state, maintains the concept of territory as an expression 
of the dominant organizing logic. In other words, territory may be produced by 
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something other than the state, but always from the position of “authority,” or what other 
authors have called “from above” (Porto Gonçalves 2006).  
This conception of territory belies a particular understanding of politics as located 
in, and only in, the realm of the state. That is, these arguments re-produce the very 
“territorial trap” that they are trying to escape. Although they may shed light on the 
“processes through which territorially configured political-economic formations have 
been produced and transformed historically” (Brenner and Elden 2009, 354), the final 
point of arrival is always already decided. It is always pre-determined as state space.  
Following from this, territorial struggle can only be understood as a struggle over the 
terms of incorporation into the state. In other words it can only be either a struggle “from 
above” to tame and integrate the “frontier,” or “from below” to access property (a 
subdivision of the state), to control the state itself (take the position of power), or, in its 
most radical form, to destroy the state.  
An alternative conception of territory begins from the premise that that 
territorialization is not only a process of producing space, but it is also one of producing 
subjects (e.g. one does not precede the other). That is, following Reyes and Kaufman’s 
(2011, page 519) elaboration of Porto Gonçalves’ “triadic notion,” we can understand 
territory is as physical location, territorialization as the way of taking hold of that space, 
and territorialities as the subjectivities created in the process of that taking hold. 
Following from this, “state” territorialization takes on the significance not only of making 
resources calculable and controllable (Scott 1998; Elden 2007), but also of creating 
subjects through its process of creating and maintaining a given order (Foucault 1982; 
Foucault 2009). However, this dissertation will demonstrate that the process of subject-
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making through everyday, grounded practices of creating and maintaining a spatial and 
social order is not (or not only) defined by the structures of the state. The making of 
territory, and of territoriality, through both everyday practices of living and social 
relations and struggles for territorial control also happens from below. Following from 
this, territorial struggles are not only struggles over land and resources, or over meanings, 
but struggles over subjectivities (territorialities) (Guattari and Rolnik 2008) (of which 
“state,” “civil society” and “citizen” are only one of many possible configurations).  
Once we recognize that we cannot separate territory from the society that creates 
it, and thus, cannot reduce it to the state, we have a concept that nonetheless is also more 
useful for helping us to understand the state. That is, the state is arguably the hegemonic 
construction of territory, but there are moments when the link between state and territory 
become tenuous, (e.g. moments of territorial crisis of the state, see Port Gonçalves 2009). 
This dissertation will explore the ways that what Brazilian geographer Bernardo 
Mançano Fernandes (2005) calls socio-territorial movements both force these moments, 
become visible within them, and are made through them.   
The overarching argument of this dissertation is that an analysis of conflict over 
neo-extractivism in Amazonia today must understand it as fundamentally territorial. I 
explore the multi-faceted contours of neo-extractivism as an expression of tensions 
between what we might call a territoriality of “above” (Porto Gonçalves 2001; Becker 
2005) that is re-constituting itself to maintain the given order and a territoriality (or 
territorialities) of “below” or resistance that is also strategically re-constituting itself to 
break with that order at a historical moment when relationships among, and in fact the 
very categories of, movement, civil society, state and capital have become unclear.  
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The introduction foregrounds the moments of confrontation, using an 
ethnographic description of two moments of rebellion to move through a history of 
Amazonian development and to frame the more specific arguments that will be made in 
each chapter that follows. The rest of the dissertation is divided into two sections that 
delve more deeply into the content of two different forms of territoriality. Part Two 
begins by outlining the key elements of neo-extractivism, and then chapters two and three 
each explore in more depth the practices and mechanisms through which it manifests. 
Part Three explores each of the struggles presented in the introduction in more detail. 
Chapter Four focuses explicitly on the shift, in movement strategies, from what I call a 
struggle for land to a struggle for territory, through a discussion of this history of struggle 
in an area in the Arapiuns River Basin called Gleba Nova Olinda. Chapter Five recounts 
the struggle for the Renascer Extractive Reserve in order to look more closely at tensions 
among movements, historic movement organizations, and government. Together, these 
chapters work together to sketch out the processes that constitute the territories and 
territorialites of below.  	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 Chapter One. Introduction. Born in Fire 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 12, 2009, the Santarém Rural Worker’s Union (STTR) sponsored a 
coordinated symbolic action, mobilizing union members to block rivers, roads, and air –
the flow of commerce – to draw attention to the struggles of rural people and to urge the 
state to speed the process of land regularization. At the end of the day, at the Praia de 
Pedrão (Big Rock Beach), in the community of São Pedro on the Arapiuns River west of 
the city of Santarém, the indigenous and traditional communities that had participated in 
the action ignored the union’s directive to re-open the river and instead embarked in 
their rabetas (canoes with outboard motors) and took hostage two barges hauling 
millions of dollars worth of illegal timber from their territory.5 They held these barges, 
with the river closed to commercial traffic, for 45 days. During that time, a revolving 
group of between 80 and 1200 people remained camped at the riverside, fishing, cooking, 
creating nightly entertainment, and guarding the wood and the river. They demanded an 
end to industrial extractivism on their lands, vast indigenous and traditional territorial 
rights in Gleba Nova Olinda to the west, self-determination, and above all, the protection 
of their life and culture. Despite a series of requests by the movement for audiences with 
state and federal officials at the riverside encampment, the government agencies refused 
to negotiate. The movement set fire to the barges. They burned for four days.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The first day, participants came from the traditional communities of Atodi, Bom Futuro, Cutilé, Curi, 
Novo Gurupá, São Francisco, Atrocal, Santo Antonio, São Pedro, Pascoal, São José I, São José II, Monte 
Sião, Mentái, Mariazinha, Prainha, São Marcos, Piquiá, and the indigenous communities of Aminã, 
Aningualzinho, Arapiranga, Braço Grande, Nova Vista, São José III, Novo Lugar, Cachoeira do Maró. 
Eventually participants came from over 100 communities.  
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Figure	  1:	  Burning	  Barges	  of	  Wood,	  Arapiuns	  River,	  December	  2010 
A month later, and two hundred kilometers to the east, in the early morning 
hours of November 27th, two groups of ten people each set out by rabeta from opposite 
ends of the recently created Renascer Extractive Reserve (Reserva Extractivista in 
Portuguese or, more commonly, Resex).6 Silent and tense the small group met at the 
entrance to the reserve, cleared a small area on the river bank to sit, and waited, 
planning to block the descent of two barges of illegal wood leaving the reserve. As 
dawn approached, word arrived that the barge pilot had feared confrontation and 
returned to port. Elated, the small group set up camp. More people began to arrive and 
over the next few months the small group on the muddy bank grew into a village 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A Resex, or Extractive Reserve, is a conservation area dedicated for use by traditional, populations whose 
subsistence is based in small-scale extractivism and complementarily, in subsistence agriculture and small 
animal husbandry, [created] with the basic objective of protecting the way of life and culture of these 
populations and securing the sustainable use of the natural resources of the Unit [of Conservation].” 
(Article 18 of Federal Law 9.985 of 2000, National System of Units of Conservation defines an Extractive 
Reserve) 
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encampment. They demanded only what they had already been granted in law – control 
over their territory, expulsion of armed loggers from their lands, the closure of the 
illegal lumber mill inside of the Resex, and the establishment of the community 
association that would govern the area. For almost three months, although the loggers 
unleashed violence and intimidation on the leaders and on the encampment, no 
loggers’ barges passed the mouth of the Tamuataí River where they were camped. 
Then, just before dawn on January 11, six barges descended from the upriver mill. As 
they approached the encampment, they opened fire. Two people were wounded, and the 
rest fled into the forest. The next day, the community assembly met in the camp for the 
last time. They decided it was time to disband.  
 
Figure	  2:	  Shooting	  victim,	  Renascer	  January	  2010	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From Land Conflict (through place) to Territorial Struggle 	  
For the past several decades, Amazonian scholars have proposed a series of 
explanations for the seemingly endemic and enduring violent “land conflict” between 
rich and poor, landed and landless, latifundia and camponês or developers and “people of 
the forest” in the Brazilian Amazon, particularly, the state of Pará (Amazonia’s most 
violent state). Such violence, rooted in colonialism, is not limited to the Amazon. The 
1850 federal land law -- which linked property ownership to the financial ability to 
develop it and created a sizeable landless peasantry who initiated a national “struggle for 
land” (Scott 1976; M. Watts 1984; Mallon 1995; Sayer 2004) – intensified the already 
endemic conflict and violence over land nationally. Scholars generally theorize the 
particularly Amazonian land conflict as a product of the “frontier,” and thus as part of the 
violence of incorporation into capitalism (Foweraker 1981; Cleary 1993; Maryanne 
Schmink and Wood 1992; Fearnside 2001a; Perz, Walker, and Caldas 2006; Simmons et 
al. 2007).  
Although representations of Amazonia as a place with infinite land are 
exaggerated in the national imaginary of the region, it is also true that Amazonia does 
have an abundance of land as compared to the south or northeast of Brazil. The problem 
of land in Amazonia is better understood in terms of constraints on access rather than 
land concentration per se (Simmons 2004). As a result, Amazônia has always fit 
somewhat awkwardly into a national narrative of resistance that defines land 
concentration and the corresponding landlessness as the material expression of relations 
of exploitation and inequality endemic to Brazilian society. Simultaneously, the vast and 
varied peoples of Amazonia have also fit somewhat uncomfortably into the socio-
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political category of “peasant” that was so central to the articulation of a national struggle 
of marginalized rural people. That is not to say that there has not been a “struggle for 
land” – in fact struggles over land access, control, and use are the primary form of 
conflict in the region - but that in Amazonia, they tend to take on a different form, which 
will be explored in this dissertation. 
Some Amazonian scholars have thus traced a somewhat different but not 
unrelated genealogy of particularly Amazonian “land conflict” that finds its roots in the 
Cabanagem revolt of 1835-41, where thousands of gente de cor (people of color that 
included ex-African and African descendent slaves, indigenous people, mestiços and 
others) rose up against their oppressors in the longest, largest, bloodiest, and most 
successful rebellion (the rebels held the regional cities of Belém and Santarém for several 
months), followed by the most violent suppression – in Brazilian history (Di Paolo 1986; 
Cleary 1998; Simmons et al. 2007; Harris 2010). This history continues most visibly, and 
in popular memory, in the slaughter of the Maoist rebels of Araguaia (1972), the empates 
of the rubber tappers in Acre (1980s), the murder of Chico Mendes (1989), the massacres 
at Corumbiara in Rondonia (1996) and of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem 
Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement, MST) demonstrators at Eldorado de Carajás 
(1997), the murder of Sister Dorothy Stang (2006), and more importantly, although 
perhaps less visibly, in the everyday conflicts and violence pervasive in the region (see 
for example the Commissão Pastoral da Terra’s annual publication, Conflitos no Campo, 
Brasil, now it its 27th edition).7  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Pará is the Brazilian state with the largest number of deaths and conflicts related to land conflict. 
According to the CPT (2004) between 1994-2004 there were 837 conflicts, 173 assassinations and 501 
death threats. Historically, much of this conflict has been along roads and also concentrated in the region 
known as the “South of Pará,” located in Pará’s southeast between landless migrant farmers and ranchers. 
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This “perennial” (Little 2001; Simmons et al. 2007) violence became the subject 
of intense research beginning in the late 1970s/early 1980s when it became a focus of 
government intervention (Almeida 1992; Sauer 2005). At that time, the environmental 
devastation wrought by the military government’s modernization programs was also 
becoming a national and international preoccupation and consequently, much of the land 
conflict literature is concerned in one way or another with the intersection of violent 
conflict and environmental issues. Analyses of Amazonian land conflict variously 
attribute its causes to the absence of the state, the effect of economic actors competing to 
capture rents (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999), or the intersection of a series of  
mechanisms in particular places (Simmons et al. 2007). Most Earlier work in this vein 
points to antagonistic relations between large landholders and (landless) peasant farmers 
(Foweraker 1981; Schmink 1982; Wood 1983). For these authors, land conflict is an 
expression of class struggle, but it is a class struggle that results explicitly from 
contradictory state policies – policies that on the one hand stimulate capital accumulation 
by incentivizing peasant migration, and that on the other hand, seek to maintain the 
dominant class structure by incentivizing large-scale capitalist investment – that have 
made the same land desirable for two opposed classes, a proposition further explored in 
Chapter Four (Schmink 1982; Schmink and Wood 1992).  
More explicitly institutionalist accounts of land conflict within the “frontier” 
literature point to failures or inconsistencies within land tenure institutions themselves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This dissertation examines conflict in Western Pará, a newer horizon of conflict. It would be a very 
interesting research project to theorize why some of these deaths (Chico Mendes, Dorothy Stang) have 
taken on such international significance when their circumstances do not differ substantively from other 
incidents.  
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(e.g., property rights) as the cause of violent conflict over land. This argument suggests 
that the failure of land tenure assignment to keep pace with “frontier” development 
creates conflict as people compete for access to valuable land (Alston, Libecap, and 
Schneider 1996; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 2000). 
It also suggests that these conflicts lead to deforestation because people deforest land in 
order to claim it. Competing tenure policies (namely agrarian reform and the right of 
posse) incentivize both “squatting” and forced eviction. Violence thus emerges as a result 
of independent actors, through their own “cost-benefit analyses,” deciding that violent 
action would work to their advantage (assumedly because the non-violent, legal options 
are nearly non-existent). Following from this logic, rapid and expansive assignment of 
private property rights would ameliorate conflict by reducing incentive to deforest along 
with enforcement costs, providing collateral for long-term investment in land, and 
promoting the development of land markets, thereby producing wealth (Alston, Libecap, 
and Mueller 2000). This philosophy undergirds most contemporary titling initiatives 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  
The most recent analysis of Amazonian land conflict by geographers is one of the 
few to demonstrate the limitations of the frontier concept as an explanatory framework, 
which they do by developing quantitative measures for identifying the actual location of 
the “frontier” and demonstrating even as the frontier passes through places such as the 
South of Pará, violent land conflict continues (Simmons 2004; Simmons 2005; Simmons 
et al. 2007). They propose, instead, a “place-based” theorization of Amazonian land 
conflict, based in a Masseyian conception of place as “the site where economic, social, 
and political processes interact across scales, creating the conditions of daily life, where 
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meanings and values crystallize, creating community identities and resistance 
performativity” (577)  - to generate an explanatory framework of the different 
mechanisms that condition and constrain “contentious” (e.g. extra-legal) social 
movement action.  
This work draws on a comprehensive literature review of Amazonian land 
conflict to map out various processes that intersect in the “place” known as the South of 
Pará, schematizing them into categories based in the “contentious politics” literature 
(Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow 2001). The authors argue that cognitive (e.g. individual 
identity-based) relational (individuals connect to larger groups of individuals) and 
environmental (natural and institutional context) mechanisms intersect in place (the south 
of Pará) to create enduring conflict. In other words and more specifically, they argue that 
in an ambiguous and violent context creates, frustrated, scared and even violent 
individuals, who make the decision to link up to larger forces – either social movements 
or latifundia networks – in order to better their individual situation.  Place, they argue, is 
a “product” of the interaction of these processes and a “medium” for their interaction 
(582).  
This analysis provides an excellent overview of the many processes that intersect 
within land conflict, however, their superimposition of a contentious politics framework 
onto the concept of place merges two philosophically opposed frameworks and results in 
a very structural analysis that theorizes conflict as the outcome of rational, individual 
actors making decisions, based in a logic of comparative advantage, to link up to more 
powerful forces. In this analysis where, in their words “populations of landless 
individuals [create] a community of interest” (582), their conception of “relational 
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mechanisms” is quite literal – individuals join, thereby relating to, a group, or, the MST 
“possesses” a network that allows it to link up to interested parties in the developed 
world.  
This is substantively different from Massey’s (2004; 2005) conception of 
relational, which is foundational to her theorization of place, as mutually constitutive 
(e.g. places, processes, and subjects are constituted in and through each other). It is what 
makes place, for her, a site of “becoming” and for the formation of subjects, rather than 
for the linking of objects (Massey 2005). Ultimately, and likely as a result of this, their 
overall argument, while significantly more nuanced and complex, does not depart 
significantly from the previous causal accounts, with their overall assessment being that 
at the conjuncture of these mechanisms is a “tragic” and perennially violent place.  
This raises a second and more substantive issue for the geographic analysis of 
struggle around the usefulness of the concept of place and specifically, what many 
authors a “politics of place” (Escobar 2001; Escobar 2008; Moore 1998; Moore 2005; 
Gibson-Graham 2002), as a theoretical framework for analyzing what I am calling, 
following the movements’ conceptualization, “territorial struggle.” An expansive and 
careful literature on the relation between space and place and on place more generally has 
undone what was a rather pervasive place-space dichotomy (place as grounded, local, 
lived, and particular and space as abstract, global. and universal). This literature (most 
centrally Massey 1994, 2004, 2005) poses these two concepts as different, but not 
opposed, nor as expressions of scale. Place here tends to be represented as a 
“sedimented” site for the “articulation” or “assemblage” of disparate trajectories, 
practices, of processes, of social relations (both Moore 2005 and Escobar 2008 use some 
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combination of these two concepts), or as a node in a network (Raffles 1999; Latour 
2005). These are processes and relations that must be “negotiated”, and it is within this 
often conflictual negotiation where we encounter a “politics of place” (Massey 2004, 6). 
These authors understand the politics of place as a struggle over the identity of a given 
place, that is, over its “hegemonic identity” (Massey 2004) or what Escobar (2002, 2009) 
and Gibson-Graham (2002) call the defense of a particular construction of or “imaginary” 
of a given place. Thus, we have a place as constituted through myriad, intersecting, 
sedimented, processes and politics as the struggle to imbue it with meaning.  
Territorial struggle, on the other hand, as was briefly outlined in the introduction 
and I will argue in this dissertation, is not (or not only) a struggle over meaning but over 
the construction of a new reality – that is, over the creation of new forms of organization, 
subjects, and spaces. This is a substantive difference. The conception of place-based 
struggle as a struggle over meaning is based in a philosophy of politics that assumes that 
discourse shapes our perception, which affects our ways of being (e.g. following Laclau 
and Mouffe 2001). In other words political struggle in this vein proposes that change in 
the modes of classification, or signification has the effect of changing relations of force. 
The territorial approach locates the power of such meanings in the fact that they are 
expressions of particular forms of social organization, practices of exclusion, relations of 
power, et cetera, of which meaning-making is but one. Thus it is the content of a space 
that manifests its expression, and not vice versa. In that sense, territory is the space of the 
political, its construction does not precede struggle; it happens through it. 
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Finally, returning to the existing body of work on Amazonian land conflict, there 
are two further limitations in terms of the applicability of existing frameworks to 
contemporary Amazonian struggles for two primary reasons. First, with a few exceptions 
(Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn, 2011) this theorization is derived from analyses of 
relationships between recent migrants to Amazonia (both landless farmers and capitalized 
developers, usually from struggles in southeastern Pará), and extrapolated as an 
explanatory framework for smallholder/capital conflict across Amazonia. This is not, I 
will argue in this dissertation, an analytic failing per se. Rather the peasant/latifundia 
opposition was an analytic and strategic framing of struggle adequate to a particular time 
and place  (largely from peasant struggles elsewhere in Brazil), but over the past few 
decades (particularly the last decade) there has seen a substantive shift in both the 
mechanisms of exploitation and the relations and subjects of struggle. In other words, 
there is a conjunctural shift that requires an analytic shift.  
Second, the environmental turn in Amazonian studies in the late 1980s and 1990s 
was pervasive (Nugent, Harris, et al. 2004) and as a result, the environmental effects of 
conflict have constituted central questions of recent studies. As a result, much of the more 
recent research on conflict remain bound in a largely technocratic analysis of conflict and 
violence that locates their source in bad policy and the issue as largely an environmental 
one.8 As such, they tell us a lot about environmental change and its relation to social 
process, but little about the encounter of differences, strategies of struggle, or the 
potential for social-political change expressed in those conflicts. They are descriptions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is less true of the earlier literature on the contradiction between peasant/latifundia, which I find more 
useful and explore in greater detail in Chapter Four.   
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social relations as seen from above, and as a result they make visible only solutions that 
emerge from and within that perspective (e.g., policy solutions).  
On Method 
My broad aim in this dissertation is to examine recent Amazonian conflicts 
through a wider lens that draws into view not simply the institutional, economic, and 
environmental drivers of conflict (the usual explanations), but also the political – and, I 
will argue, territorial – practices and strategies of the social movements involved. This 
requires a methodological shift away from much of the recent literature on land conflict 
and social movements in the Amazon, which, because of its technocratic and 
conservationist focus, tends to mandate a particular set of questions and methods to 
describe, explain, and predict the relationship between conflict, social movements, and 
conservation. This literature largely evaluates social movements in term of their ability 
achieve conservation and to affect the state, to ask whether or not they effectively move 
“to conservation from chaos” (Schwartzman et al. 2010), from incoherent to articulated, 
from uncivil to civil (Kolk 1998; Perz 2002; Scholz 2005; Campos and Nepstad 2006; 
Simmons 2005; Alencar 2005; Cronkleton et al. 2008; Shanley, Da Silva, and 
MacDonald 2011; Machado 2009; Kröger and Nylund 2011).9  
Rather than evaluating movements in terms of their capacity to engage with the 
dominant political logic, I draw on work generated on and from Brazilian and other Latin 
American movements and movement scholars that engage in a debate on how to think 
and understand political struggle (de Souza 2006; Porto Gonçalves 2009; Almeida 2011; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There are also, of course, exceptions to this generalization and there has been excellent recent work on 
Amazonia published in English, largely in Anthropology, that departs from this framework (Raffles 1999; 
Raffles 2002; Harris 2010; Campbell 2009), although not necessarily focused on political struggle (with an 
exception here being some of David Cleary’s work 1993). There is also a largely Portuguese-language 
body of work that departs from this technocratic, conservationist claim and that my work engages with 
more directly, discussed in more detail here and cited throughout this dissertation.  
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Fernandes 2005; Cecena 2005; Reyes 2012; Zibechi 2010; Ornelas 2012; Cusicanqui 
2012; Alcoreza 2012; Ceceña 2012; Gutiérrez 2012; de Paula and da Silva 2008). 
Broadly, these scholars shift the study of social movements from an objective and 
temporal description and assessment of social movements (e.g., as in the above cited 
literature) to a study of “movement” from a particular location within relations of 
domination (See especially Porto Gonçalves 2009; Zibechi 2010; and Reyes 2012 on 
"societies in movement"). Following this line of thinking, this dissertation is an attempt 
to forge what Raquel Gutierrez calls a “theoretical strategy,” (2012, 53) that makes the 
acts of insubordination described above (and below) intelligible and theorizes the 
possibilities that they open up, offering not an objective account of events but a “practical 
comprehension” (53) of them. This means generating an analysis of the situation that 
movements are responding to, presenting a detailed description of the events and forms of 
struggle enacted, and providing concepts that help us to critically reflect on their 
meanings and potentials.  
That is not to imply that this research does not engage “traditional” research 
methodologies. This research is based on nearly two years of primarily ethnographic 
fieldwork in the city of Santarém and three sites near the city (Belterra, Gleba Nova 
Olinda, Prainha, see Figure 1). I also travelled up and down the BR-163, visiting roadside 
communities and agrarian reform settlements as well as the cities of Itaituba and Novo 
Progresso, and I made several trips to the state capital of Belém. In the settlements, which 
were largely colono communities (migrant or descendents of migrant subsistence farmers 
from the south and northeast), I spoke with people regarding the paving of the BR-163, 
community histories, and conflicts. In the urban centers, where I interviewed NGO, 
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church, Rural Workers’ Union representatives, and government representatives on the 
same topics.  
 
 
Figure	  3:	  Location	  Map 
Overall, I conducted 164 semi-structured or open-ended interviews, 
approximately half of which were recorded, and approximately one-third of which were 
transcribed. Early on, my position as a white foreigner provided relative ease of access to 
government officials and even to soy farmers and loggers, an access that became less 
possible as I began working more closely with the Pastoral Land Commission 
(Commissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT), my partner organization, and with the social 
movements. The Pastoral Land Commission is an organization within the Catholic 
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Church that documents violents surrounding land conflicts and facilitates the struggles of 
social movements for land rights across the country. In Santarém, they function as a key 
site and key people in social movement organizing. I developed my research plan in 
partnership with the CPT and accompanied much of their work for my entire time in 
Santarém. During hundreds of hours of boat rides, I engaged in innumerable informal 
conversations on the topics discussed here. I conducted focus groups in three 
communities who had the majority of their residents displaced by soy farming to 
determine the process of displacement, where people had gone, and did follow-up 
interviews with 21 displaced families. I spent several months, usually in one or two week 
visits, living in indigenous aldeais (indigenous communitiy) and traditional communities, 
in order to gain a better understanding of everyday life. I traveled frequently with agents 
from the CPT and accompanied and participated in meetings with them in different 
communities. I read and analyzed dozens of government planning documents regarding 
soy development, road development, territorial planning, as well as assessments and 
surveys of traditional and indigenous communities. At the request of the two movements 
that I was working with, I mapped illegal logging in two locations and produced reports 
on the findings that were submitted to the relevant government organization.10 I 
generated maps and wrote a pamphlet on industrial extraction and its relationship to 
community-based struggles, conducted community meetings to discuss research 
questions, took photos, video, wrote press releases, engaged in strategy sessions, and 
gave public presentations at CPT and University-based workshos. I was part of and often 
acted as a delegate for the Frente em Defesa da Amazonia (Amazon Defense Front, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These maps are not included in the dissertation because they belong to the movements and legal battles 
continue over this logging. 
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FDA), a movement network organization based in Santarém (not an NGO). I sat in on 
confidential meetings and closed judicial appearances between movements, government 
agencies, and loggers. I reviewed and summarized the logging the management plans 
approved for Gleba Nova Olinda at the request of the Movement in Defense of Life and 
Culture on the Arapiuns River (Movimento em Defesa da Vida e Cultura do Rio 
Arapiuns, MDVCA), and I witnessed and documented human rights abuses, acts of 
insubordination and rebellion, and protest rallies for MDVCA and in the Renascer 
Extractive Reserve, in Santarém and Iatituba.11  
TERRITORIAL STRUGGLE IN BAIXO AMAZONAS  
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining Amazonia’s “land 
conflict” in the contemporary moment by contextualizing the two moments of rebellion 
in the encampments described above. I begin from the premise that insurrectional 
moments are particularly revealing of the intention and capacity of movements to break 
with the given order, that they are based in existing practices and that they, following 
Ana Ester Ceceña (2012), “add new features and possibilities to the struggle,” as they are 
literally “moments of movement” (Reyes 2012) that shift the order of relations of power. 
I examine these moments to draw out several key concepts articulated in and through 
these rebellions regarding the contours of the current, neo-extractivist, political moment 
in Amazonia, contemporary technologies of governance and ordering, the relationship 
between territory, ecology, and political subjectivities, and the overlaps and disjuncture 
between and among social movements, political organizations, and government. Each of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that this dissertation is treating two different and opposed forms of “extraction.” Industrial 
extraction is the extraction associated with large-scale, commodity producing, mining, timber industries, 
agro-industry, energy production etc. The word “extraction” is also used in Amazonia to refer to people 
who depend on forest products for their livelihood. These types of livelihoods, based in subsistence-
oriented extraction are protected in “Extractive Reserves.” 
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these topics will be broadly outlined through this discussion and taken up more 
substantively in the rest of this dissertation. I argue that the existing frameworks 
discussed above that theorize these acts of rebellion as desperate cries for help from the 
state, strategies of accumulation, or as the conjunctural effects of “tragic” situations 
provide us with only a partial understanding of these conflicts. Rather, the argument of 
this chapter is that such moments of rupture indicate the need to reframe an analysis of 
Amazonian politics from the given notion of “land conflict” to a processual analysis of 
antagonisms and “territorial struggle.” Far from being tragic effects of frontier or place-
based processes, these conflicts are protaganized by actors who through struggle are 
cultivating both a different social and territorial order, as well as themselves as 
(collective) subjects.  
In what follows, to make this argument, I first trace some of the key events that I 
witnessed at each of these encampments over the course of their several months in 
existence.12 While the genealogy of territorial struggle in Amazonia extends historically 
for centuries, this chapter provides an overview of the regional, national, and 
international contexts of the past four decades, when such conflict has been most intense. 
I begin with the military government’s modernization projects, because these projects 
intentionally, drastically re-territorialized the region, re-composing political realities in 
ways that are central to understanding these contemporary struggles. I interweave the 
micro-level events in the encampments with a broader discussion of the shifting regional 
and national relations among resistance, development, and governance in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I move back and forth between the two events. For the reader to more easily follow the thread of each 
story, they are both italicized, but the conflict at Renascer is represented in bold and at Gleba Nova Olinda 
in italics. I also include the name of each in parantheses at the beginning of each section to help guide the 
reader.   
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highlight, on the one hand, how both past histories of struggle and the experiences in 
these spaces of resistance constitute contemporary political strategies, and on the other 
hand, to locate within these micro-level experiences some of the themes that are being 
expressed on a larger level across the region and explored in this dissertation.  
After offering up a detailed account of the facts events of these rebellions, and 
discussions of the broader issues that they raise, I will draw on the work of several 
movement scholars to elaborate concepts expressed in these spaces of resistance that help 
us to better understand them. This will entail an analysis that explores, on the one hand 
how these rebellions express and intensify ongoing processes and dynamics – both in that 
they force pre-existing tensions to a greater level of intensity, and that they are based in 
and sharpen and strengthen pre-existing forms of collectivity. On the other hand, I will 
argue that events that occur in these spaces and moments open new horizons of struggle 
(e.g., they create new forms of politics and political subjects). In the final section, I will 
provide a brief outline of the remaining dissertation chapters. 
The Myth of Development  	  
(Renascer) Alcilene’s13 daughter called on November 26th instructing me to get 
on the next boat to Santa Maria and to bring recording equipment. “What’s 
happening?” I asked. “Just come” she responded. After nearly a year of accompanying 
the struggle for Renascer Extractive Reserve, I had become the movement’s default 
documentarian – taking pictures and doing audio and video recording of rights 
violations, violence, and resistance. I called Judith, my friend and colleague from the 
CPT, and we ran home to collect our things and rushed to the boat. It was well into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 All individuals throughout this dissertation who are named, other than people who hold official 
(governmental, non-governmental, etc.) positions, are given pseudonyms.  
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dry season and the rivers were low. Our boat ran aground so many times that we lost 
count, and I laid for hours in my hammock wishing that sometimes, things in Amazon 
moved just a little bit faster. When we finally got to Santa Maria (a logging town on the 
periphery of the reserve), Alcilene (a social movement militant and leader) was 
distraught. “The barges passed already, two hours ago” were her only words. This 
meant that the loggers’ barges had descended from the sawmill upriver, passed our 
meeting place in Santa Maria, and were headed for a confrontation with the small 
group assembled at the mouth of the Tamuataí. It also meant that some of the most 
fearless militants were not there (as they had been waiting for us), and that we had no 
way to know what was going on.  
We scrambled to find a rabeta (canoe with outboard motor) to take us the four 
hours up the Ururará River to its junction with the Tamuataí where two groups made 
up of people from communities from two different sides of the Resex were converging 
to confront the logging boats. The streets of Santa Maria – a town whose entire 
economy is based in the logging industry - grew silent as we walked by, except for three 
young girls who came up behind us to pick a fight with Alcilene. After what seemed 
like hours but was likely only about 45 minutes, we found a boat and a boat driver, 
loaded up our backpacks and hunkered down for four hours of a wet, freezing, and 
tense ride to the meeting point. After three hours, from under the towels where Judith 
and I were huddled for warmth, I heard Rosa give a hoot and start to laugh. “Well 
would you look at that!” she yelled pulling our soaked towels off of our heads, “I told 
you they were afraid of us.” Two barges loaded with timber were docked on the 
riverbank. We pulled out our cameras and started to snap pictures of them as they 
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snapped pictures of us. It was clear that they had stopped in order to avoid 
confrontation with the protesters ahead. Miraculously and appropriately, the sun came 
out, and laughing, we dried off and, relieved, began recounting the events of the last 
several hours over and over to each other. 
 Soon we came upon the small clearing that the two groups - who had already 
heard the news themselves from a passing boat - had begun to construct at the mouth 
of the Tamuataí. Exhausted, we stumbled out of the rabeta and collapsed on the shore. 
Someone handed us plates of fish and farinha (the region’s staple grain) and we begin 
to exchange stories. There were only about 20 muddy, exhausted but elated people 
there and I wondered how they would have held up against the loggers’ hired guns, but 
didn’t ask.  
Somehow – in ways I often cannot understand - word travels fast in this world 
where everything else seems to travel so slow. Hearing that the danger of immediate 
confrontation had passed, people start arriving from the communities of the Tamuataí 
and the Uruará. Some brought nothing more than a few mangos for the boat ride. 
Others were equipped with hammocks, salted meat, and bags of farinha. Someone 
spread a tarp and started to play the guitar. Others cleared a small area on the shore 
and people debated what would happen next. The atmosphere was quite festive.  
As night fell, a speed boat pulled up to the shore and Manoel do Pão (a.k.a 
Manoel Viegas, advisor to the Mayor Sérgio Pingarilho, the PMDB candidate who had 
partnered with the Worker’s party to win the mayorship which had been held by the 
Hage famirly of the PSDB for 40 years ), stepped out. Manoel was a logger himself, 
but “a good logger” who had run a small operation out of Santa Maria for decades, 
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had supported the actions that residents of Santa Maria and the traditional 
communities of the Renascer Extractive Reserve had made against the logging 
corporation three years prior – acts that had galvanized the movement for the reserve, 
as well as inspired similar actions across the region. He was not associated with the 
recent wave of speculative development. He reprimanded the people on the shore, 
telling them that what they were doing was dumb, unreasonable, and overly absolutist. 
Everyone has to negotiate with the logging companies he said. Even the Mayor, who 
was on their side, he said, had taken 230 thousand reais from the loggers in order to 
win the election. Even he himself (Manoel) had management plans outside of the 
Resex that he used as a ruse to take wood illegally from within it. That is simply how it 
is, he insisted. That is how everyone survives here. I turned on a video camera. His 
demeanor changed. He told them politely that the mayor would be out tomorrow to 
negotiate their departure from that spot. He left. Someone started re-strumming a 
guitar. People settled into their hammocks for the night. 
By the morning assembly, there were approximately 170 people on the 
riverbanks and it quickly became clear that people’s expectations varied wildly for what 
this occupation might mean or what resolution might look like. Those closest to the 
sindicato argued for a compromise with the loggers – splitting the felled wood with 
them in exchange for their departure from the Resex. Others demanded the loggers 
leave immediately and the wood be returned to Resex communities. Most hoped that 
the mayor or managers from the federal agency responsible for the reserve, ICMBio 
(the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation) would arrive and resolve 
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their problems. After all, all that they wanted was enforcement of existing laws and the 
demarcation of the reserve. No one expected to be there for more than a week. 
 
 “The first interaction that most Amazonian peasants had with modernity,” (the 
concept of “peasant” will be further explored in Chapter Three) says Brazilian sociologist 
José da Souza Martins, “was the electric shock of torture” (quoted in Porto Gonçalves 
2010) referring to the effects of the military governments’ (1964-1985) modernization 
project, which made territorial integration of the Amazon a key regime policy. It was 
thought, following modernization theory in vogue at the time, that technocratic, statist 
interventions would catapult this “backward”, “empty,” “land without men” into the very 
center of the modernizing project and Brazil into the modern world. The “National 
Development Plans” (1971) re-ordered Amazonian territory, organizing it around 
“development poles” linked by “integration corridors.” They cut roads through primary 
forest, nationalized millions of square kilometers of land along those roads and along 
national borders, offered fiscal (tax credits) and institutional (land rights) incentives to 
draw state and national developers and to stimulate foreign direct investment in mining, 
cattle production and logging and created massive “colonization” programs that offered 
Amazonian homesteads to hundreds of thousands of landless peasants from Brazil’s 
south and northeast in order to bring “men without land” to a “land without men.” Land 
values skyrocketed as land became a vehicle for capturing incentives, credits, and 
speculative cash gain (rather than, say, used for agriculture) (Schmink and Wood 1992; 
Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn 2011; Foweraker 1981; Becker 1995).  
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It turned out that Amazonia, however, was not a “land without men.” The 
encounter of the military government’s colonization project with regional inhabitants, as 
well as the encounter of highly capitalized developers with the new migrant landless 
peasant population erupted into a series of what looked like land wars but what are 
actually more like culture wars or, more aptly, territorial struggles. The myth of 
development – a myth that promised that Amazonia would be the salvation and 
redemption for the country, a resolution for both the misery of generations of 
dispossession and national underdevelopment – could only be realized through near-total 
regional re-organization. It was a re-organization explains Brazilian geographer Carlos 
Walter Porto Gonçalves (2001) that transformed Amazonia from a region oriented in 
countless micro-territories around rivers to a single state-space integrated through roads, 
made legible (Scott 1998) and colonized through new property regimes (land 
nationalization, agrarian reform, and grilagem [land grabbing through fraud]) and thus re-
organized according to the logic of mineral, timber, and ranching-based extraction.14 The 
superimposition of new property regimes on existing, collective ones is necessarily a 
violent process of exclusion (Blomley 2003). Their institution through the introduction of 
hundreds of thousands of landless peasants, the advance of timber, ranching, mining, and 
integrating infrastructure, and the infiltration by developers onto traditional lands, meant 
that the processes of structural violence grew deep roots, “geo-graphing” (Porto 
Gonçalves 2001) a new Amazonian territory that was rife with contradiction and conflict.  
 By the early 1980s, the destruction wrought by the advance of industrial 
capitalism into the Amazon was increasingly clear – deforestation rates were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is also important to note that national integration of the Amazon was never simply a national project. 
All of this was implemented with the support and funding of multi-lateral organizations and international 
businesses. 
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skyrocketing, levels of rural violence were at an all-time high, and the great development 
programs, suffering from a lack of funding due to the continent-wide and in fact global 
economic crisis had ground to a halt, marking another retreat of the state (Bunker 1985; 
Cleary 1993; Kohlhepp 1992; Simmons et al. 2007). The intensification of conflict over 
land was met by a reconfiguration of the forms of resistance. Across the region, 
Amazonia’s diverse peoples engaged in direct and violent confrontations with developers 
expanding into their territories (Hecht and Cockburn 2011; de Paula and da Silva 2008). 
In the interest of building a movement adequate to face the existing threat of the 
expansion of extractive industries and the corresponding land takeovers by southern 
Latifundia and national and international corporations, the practice of subsistence 
agriculture, overwhelming shared by most regional inhabitants (including new migrants 
and historical residents) became an intentional, strategic, objective category around 
which the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers’ Unions (Sindicatos dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais or STR) constructed a political category, the “rural worker” (a 
remnant category of the corporatist state re-imagined by social movements but never 
divorced from a state-making project – see Chapter Four for a more substantive 
discussion of this category). Nationally, rural workers organized broadly into a 
multifaceted “struggle for land,” as part of the rural component of the “new unionism,” 
which was key to the formation of the Workers’ Party in rural areas) (Grzybowski 1990; 
Leroy 1991; Houtzager 2001).  
 Of course, the “struggle for land” had existed since colonization. In this moment, 
it was re-articulated as a struggle for agrarian reform, which itself most commonly 
indicated a struggle for the expropriation of Latifundia’s land and its re-distribution to the 
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landless (Fernandes 1999). In much of Amazonia, however, this struggle was largely for 
collective and/or individual land rights by posseiros seeking to defend their territories 
from incursion by loggers, ranchers, miners, et cetera. The actions taken in defense of this 
land took on two different forms. The first was direct and often violent confrontation with 
developers, embodied most emblematically in the Rubber Tappers’ empates, where the 
tappers first tried to reason with the employees of developers and then, if that failed, 
forcibly expelled them (Keck 1995). The second, and more common form, organized 
more often through the union, was demand-based direct action – occupying streets, 
buildings, rivers, or roads until their demands for land rights were met. Land rights thus 
became, and to this day remain, the strategic focus of struggles for rural stability (Leroy 
1991; Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn 2011). The overlaps, tensions, and disjunctures 
between struggles that sought redistribution and those that sought to protect existing 
occupations, which, I will argue led to new and explicitly territorial forms of resistance 
will be further explored in Chapters Four and Five.  
Territorial Struggle Goes “Green”  	  
(Gleba Nova Olinda) We walked in a single file line through the forest for hours. 
There hadn’t been any food to take with us from the village, so we snacked on palm fruits 
and small sips of the two liters of water that we had brought for seven people. Our 
stomachs growled. It seemed like we were walking in circles. Even with my GPS I 
doubted that I could have found my way back to the village, but they didn’t call our guide 
“bicho do mato” (a play on words that means both shy person and creature of the forest) 
for nothing and I wasn’t worried. People that make their lives in the forest know the 
forest much better than I know the streets of my town.  
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The forest was littered with signs of loggers – felled hardwood trees, roads, 
clearings, signs saying “keep out” or with permit numbers from the state government, 
and stakes - lines of stakes that went on and on - marking out the loggers claims and 
designating which trees to fell. The stakes, bicho do mato told us, hadn’t been there the 
day before. They were topped with red paint that was still wet. It was one week into the 
occupation at São Pedro and the loggers may not have been moving timber out of the 
Gleba, but they were clearly speeding up their work in the forest. We speculated that they 
were likely feeling unsure of the repercussions of the protest and thus felling as much 
wood as possible. According to the law as everyone understood it, loggers would have 
the right to all of the wood that they had felled prior to the time that the area was 
designated as “protected.” In other words, everything on the ground would be 
considered to be theirs. By the end of our two days, everyone had learned how to use the 
GPS, I had learned every type of edible palm in the forest, and we had grown bold, 
unafraid of the loggers.  
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Figure	  4:	  Mapping	  Logging	  in	  Gleba	  Nova	  Olinda 
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Figure	  5:	  Mapping	  Logging	  in	  Gleba	  Nova	  Olinda 
The day after we finished, I was back at the Praia de Pedrão and another day and 
a half later I was in Santarém, downloading our points and mapping the logging activity. 
The area where we had done most of our mapping in a community called Vista Alegre, a 
traditional community that had petitioned ITERPA, the state land agency, to grant them a 
collective land claim in the form of an Agroextractive Settlement (PAE) that covered 
25,000 hectares. When the settlement was created in law, contrary to the agreement, the 
area was diminished to 5,000 hectares along the river (most of the forest was eliminated). 
When I downloaded the points, it became apparent why. The new settlement line 
corresponded perfectly with the periphery of the area staked out as the loggers’ 
“management plan”.  
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 One week later, back on the beach at Praia de Pedrão, in a meeting with the 
Ministerio Publico, the MP gave the people a usual line – we know that you say the 
loggers are working in the Gleba, but there is nothing we can do for you without proof. 
“You want proof?” yelled one of the movement leaders, “Here’s your proof,” he said, 
throwing our report and maps on the table. “Who made this?” she asked. “Bicho do 
mato” someone yelled out and everyone laughed. It felt like victory. But it would quickly 
become apparent that victory could never be that easy.  
  
 (Renascer) One month later, I found myself trekking through a different forest 
with another group of people. This time, we were in the Resex Renascer, outside of the 
community of Floresta, near the edge of the Reserve, where loggers were felling trees 
as fast as they could, working on the assumption that by the time ICMBio (the federal 
agency responsible for conservation areas) got around to demarcating the reserve 
boundaries, they would have the right to all already-felled wood. The Jaraú logging 
company was logging in Floresta’s common lands and Floresta’s residents had been 
not-so-gently warned that they should stay away. We had to visit the community two 
different times to find a guide to take us to the logging area, because no one from the 
community had wanted to enter the area, except, eventually, for a young man named 
Edival whose great-grandparents had founded the community.  
 This time, no one was chatting or joking. The leader of the line gasped as he 
almost stepped on a snake. Bad omen. We stopped and watched him break its neck and 
toss it into the woods and took sips of water. With the sounds of our legs moving 
through the understory momentarily quieted, we realized that we could already hear 
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the distant buzz of chainsaws. Ten more minutes along the path and chainsaws were 
working all around us. Moving as silently as possible through the forest, we could see 
and hear massive trees falling not 75 meters away.   
 
 Figure	  6:	  Mapping	  Logging	  in	  Renascer 
There is a time lapse between the fall and the thunder-like crash of the 
snapping trunk of the rainforests’ massive trees and it is incredibly disorienting to not 
be certain which voluminous crack is related to which tree. We stood, paralyzed in awe 
for a few minutes before it occurred to me to flip on the audio recorder to try to capture 
the sound of the saws working and trees falling (it didn’t work). The spaces that these 
giant trees leave empty provide perfect access to a clear sky for the 3rd rate hand-me-
down GPS that I had thrown in my luggage as an afterthought when packing for my 
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“fieldwork” and that had now turned me into the lower Amazon’s unofficial mapper of 
illegal logging. With the saws working so close, it was tempting to try to get a photo of 
a man with a chainsaw in his hand, but we thought better of it and left quickly.  
 Adrenaline propelled us back to Floresta in what seemed like minutes. We had 
a cafezinho, took a quick “bath” in the crystal waters of the upper Uruará – as yet 
uncontaminated by logging boats and cattle - and loaded into our rabetas for the six-
hour ride back to the encampment. We were exhausted and starving, but the euphoria 
of success made the ride fun rather than tedious, and our successful endeavor had 
even inspired a few of Floresta’s residents to come and join the encampment.15  
 
Since colonization, the Amazon has been a repository for outsiders’ dreams, but 
these dreams were generally of wealth gained through control over land and raw 
materials. It was only as recently as the 1980s that environmental activists, NGOs, 
international agencies, and government policies began to target this region as an 
environmental resource needing conservation (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler and 
Keck 2007). The re-signification of the Amazon as environment changed the nature of 
Amazonian politics in two substantive ways. First, it gave the entire nation, and in fact 
the entire planet, a stake in Amazonian preservation, nationalizing and internationalizing 
regional governance. Second, it shifted the content of debates over land and resources to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The movement used the maps that we compiled to pressure the forest enforcement agency IBAMA to 
implement an enforcement operation. It led to what was at that time the largest bust of an illegal logging 
operation in Brazilian history. For English language press on this story, see 
http://www.wwf.org.br/?26243/Historic-seizure-of-illegal-timber-at-Renascer-Extractive-Reserve 
[accessed 7 July 2012]. 
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debates about environment – on all sides of struggle, valid claims to Amazonian space 
had to be made in terms of the greater environmental good.  
Northern environmentalists, led by the major international Environmental NGOs 
(what Alcorn [2005] calls “Big Conservation” – Conservation International, The Nature 
Conservancy, and World Wildlife Fund, and, with a slightly different mission, 
Greenpeace) launched national and international campaigns targeting “tropical 
deforestation,” a concept that had not even existed in name prior to the 1970s (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). In the Amazon, forest-dwelling traditional people, most famously the 
rubber tappers, forged strategic alliances with the international environmental 
community. The assassination of rubber tapper leader Chico Mendes in 1989 set off a 
chain of events that initiated new collaborations between the Brazilian state, national and 
international environmentalists, multilateral development institutions, foreign 
governments, and localized civil society organizations. International funding for 
conservation and conservation-oriented development flooded into the region (most 
notably through the World Bank, G-7, Brazilian government partnership called the Pilot 
Program to Conserve Brazilian Forests, PPG-7) firmly entrenching the new “sustainable 
development” model, professionalizing social movements (Buclet and Leroy 2002) and 
thus effectively moving their engagement with the state “from conflict to cooperation” 
(Kolk 1998), shifting development strategies in the Amazon to focus on conservation 
through protected areas on the one hand, and increased efficiency of expanded production 
on the other (Keck 1995; Hecht and Cockburn 2011). Nature became “the environment” 
and “the environment” central to any (institutional) political conversations about the 
region.  
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The rise to hegemony of the sustainable development paradigm and what would 
come to be called “environmental governance” did not entail a simple re-orientation of 
discussion, but the strategic deployment of a particular, positivist, conception of nature 
that posits nature as external, pre-given, knowable, and thus, manageable (Smith 1984; E. 
Leff, Valenzuela, and Vieira 2001; E. Leff 2005). This rendering of regional issues as 
environmental and technical (e.g., management-based), meant the prioritization of 
technical – as opposed to say, political – solutions (Porto Gonçalves 1989; Porto 
Gonçalves 2006; Pinton 1997; Mitchell 2002; Tsing 2005).16 The high level of 
international funding for conservation and the shrinking of the state under what was then 
the neoliberal 1990s meant that many of these techniques were increasingly outsourced to 
NGOs. Chapter Two will examine an example of this NGO-led environmental 
governance in an examination of the responsible soy and soy moratorium programs that 
fit within the sustainable development paradigm and embody more specifically the 
phenomenon increasingly called “Green Capitalism” by regional social movements. 
The primary state-led strategy for resolving the contradictions of 
developmentalism and conservation was through re-territorialization. State projects 
geared toward developing the Amazon historically focused on imposing order through 
industrial extracivism, infrastructure construction, and to a lesser extent, land rights. The 
re-signification of Amazonia as environment required new forms of territorialization. 
This was, I, will argue in Chapter Three and have argued elsewhere (Baletti 2012), 
largely achieved through Ordenamento Territorial, a technology of ordering that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I include citations to authors writing on other parts of the world to gesture to the fact that this is not 
simply an Amazonian issue, although the Amazon is a key place where many of these strategies were 
devised.  
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integrated different forces (repressive, economic, administrative), techniques (scientific, 
calculative, legal), and devices (property titles, development credits, conservation 
payments) to regulate territorial relationships. While Ordenamento Territorial is a 
primary mechanism for constructing Amazonia’s contemporary political reality, it is not 
simply an idealized concept imposed by “the state” onto space, but a technology 
employed by a range of actors including, in Western Pará, state federal and local 
government organizations, private actors, NGOs, and historically grassroots actors.17 An 
effect of this was that communities struggling against territorial appropriation 
increasingly made their claims in terms of deforestation and environmental destruction 
and articulated them in the language of the state – GIS maps and denunciations through 
the federal attorney (ministério publico).   
Challenging the Multicultural Territorial State  	  
(Gleba Nova Olinda) Since loggers first arrived in the lower Tapajós-Arapiuns 
region in the 1980s, the people there, largely working with and through the Rural 
Workers’ Union had been seeking collective land rights to protect themselves from 
predatory industry. They had fought for, and gotten, an extractive reserve – the Tapajós-
Arapiuns Resex – and an agrarian reform settlement – the Lago Grande Agro-extractive 
Settlement. These acquisitions were considered to be great successes, but they also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Specifically, in Western Pará, government actors include the National Institute of Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(IBAMA), the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio), the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), the State Environmental 
Secretary (SEMA), the Institute for Forest Development of Pará (IDEFLOR), and the Land Institute of Pará 
(ITERPA). Examples of private actors include Vale do Rio Doce and Cargill. The primary NGOs involved 
are Conservation International (CI) The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the Worldwide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), The Institute for Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM) and the Health and Happiness 
Project (PSA). Grassroots actors include the Rural Workers’ Union (STR). 
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brought great change – the historically fluid modes of inhabiting a specific, but not 
bounded, territory gave way to a property regime that was still collective, but also clearly 
demarcated, usually bounded by rivers. Cartographically, rivers are logical natural 
boundaries for territorial movements, but socially, they are problematic because river-
dwelling communities always straddle rivers, and thus these new regimes cut divided 
river-dwelling communities down the middle.  
Each time one of these protected areas was created, loggers were expelled (if not 
immediately, eventually). This did not end logging in a given area, it simply displaced it 
to a nearby one. Loggers, excluded from one area, simply jumped the boundary and 
moved into the unprotected areas. In what residents characterize as a government 
compromise with developers, Gleba Nova Olinda 18, a state-held area repeatedly “left 
out” of the boundaries of the protected areas, was effectively opened to loggers and soy 
farmers through a series of government land agreements (complex property rights 
negotiations further explored in Chapter Four) as well as a zoning plan that encouraged 
“expansion” of extractive development. As is common practice, the loggers bribed some 
of the families and communities of GNO, providing them with small cash payments, 
motors for electricity, and short term work, in exchange for permission to build roads, 
remove timber, and to seeking private (rather than collective) property (which would 
allow them to sell their land or logging rights), creating tension among communities. 
That several communities within Gleba Nova Olinda were demanding an 
indigenous territory also created tension. Three of the Gleba’s 13 communities, all of 
whom share lives and histories that are overlapping and in common, had initiated a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 A “Gleba” is a name for an undesignated territorial unit held by the state.  
	   36	  
movement to re-claim their indigenous identity – an identity destroyed by centuries of 
repression against the region’s indigenous communities.  This “resurgent” indigenous 
movement was contentious – and press manipulation of public opinion, differential 
economic incentives, and age-old racialized prejudices fostered tension not only between 
those who sided with the loggers and the indigenous communities, but also between the 
indigenous and traditional communities, who, through their different identity claims had 
access to different sorts of rights and resources.  
For several years now, the people of the Arapiuns region had watched barges of 
wood – up to 30 in a single week according to inhabitants—descend the Arapiuns River 
from Gleba Nova Olinda. According to the many stories repeated nightly in the 
encampment, despite years of organizing themselves as part of the Resex or part of the 
Agro-extractive Settlement (essentially a Resex that is managed by a different 
government agency) or part of the Indigenous Movement, watching the barges pass and 
meeting and talking together, it became clear that their territory, as one of the beach 
protesters explained to me, “did not have any relation to the lines on the maps [of the 
extractive reserves, the logging permits in the Gleba, etc.]” Rather, the hundreds of 
communities of the Arapiuns River share “a life and a culture,” to which Gleba Nova 
Olinda is essential. “Gleba Nova Olinda” another inhabitant said, echoing similar 
statements by many others, “is ours - all of us who live on the Arapiuns, and we needed 
to protect our patrimony, our land, our life.” They waited for the right opportunity, and 
they decided to mobilize. They called their movement, the Movement in Defense of the 
Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River (MDVCA). 
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People came from inside and outside of the Gleba, from indigenous and 
traditional communities. Those that couldn’t come followed the events intently on the 
local low power radio station “Radio Rural,” sent fish, farinha, gas, or messages of good 
will. During its more than one month-long duration, the group on the beach swelled to 
1200 people at its largest. State agencies came immediately as well – not to negotiate 
their demands, but to obtain the release of the wood. First the State Environmental 
Secretary came (notoriously logger-friendly) with police escorts to order the wood 
released. Then ten police officers came alone. Then other state environmental 
enforcement agents (Ideflor) came. During each appearance, they tried to force the 
movement to take an action. First they simply ordered the barges released, then they said 
they would take them elsewhere to determine the wood’s legality, then they threatened to 
arrest people. Each time, the movement refused, and the officials left in frustration.  
In the beginning, the movement demands were quite specific and oriented around 
what was possible within the law – that state and federal agents work together to inspect 
the ongoing management plans in the Gleba, that the two traditional settlements (Vista 
Alegre and Aruã), be enlarged to their originally negotiated size of 25,000 hectares, that 
the indigenous territory be demarcated, that current management plans be suspended 
until they could be checked for legality, that the wood auctioned and profits distributed to 
the communities, and that illegal activities in the Gleba be ended. By the end of the 
protest, their demands had become more expansive – an end to extractivism in all of the 
Glebas (there are three), a return of the stolen resources to the communities, and the 
establishment of the indigenous/traditional territories – the areal size of which grew with 
every government audience.  
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 1985 marked the return to democracy in Brazil and the official end of the military 
dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1964. On the one hand, this time tends to be 
characterized as one of political opening that saw the rise of New Social Movements and 
the emergence of a cultural politics in Brazil that opened the door to a valorization of 
difference (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998). On the other hand, it is also the point 
of departure for tracing the rise of the neoliberal state, with its aggressive structural 
adjustment programs and the wealth concentration and the associated increasing poverty 
and inequality (Amann and Baer 2002). Among the fruits of the counterhegemonic 
struggle waged throughout Brazilian civil society was the “pluralist” state, which 
provided new openings for “citizenship” for previously disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups - new forms of inclusion in the re-articulated/re-articulating state. This 
“pluralism” was enshrined in the preamble to the 1988 constitution, a constitution that 
also formally recognized the rights of indigenous people, the social function of property, 
and even had a chapter dedicated to “the environment,” creating several legal avenues to 
rectifying that emblematic expression of inequality in Brazil – land concentration.  
As a result, the 1990s and early 2000s saw the development of a new property 
regime granting recognition to these different identity categories and legally formalizing 
a particular relationship to land for each (largely under the banner of Agrarian Reform), 
either through land re-distribution or through the granting of collective land rights. In the 
Amazon, this has led to new mosaics of conservation areas and indigenous territory (even 
if often only on paper) - and a proliferation of new land claims for groups such as 
quilombolas, indigenous peoples, rubber tappers, river-dwellers, babaçu breakers, and 
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others. Scholars have argued that legal solutions, however, tend to recognize difference 
and incorporate it into the given system, not to rethink that system itself and that this 
“neoliberal multiculturalism” (Hale 2005) has often served the purpose not of 
recognizing and protecting difference, but of (re)drawing it in a way that is legible to and 
thus subsumed into state logics.  
Thus, state pluralism, functions as what Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) calls an 
“aggregating meta-discourse,” that renders difference equivalent and exchangeable and 
gathers it into the single, organizing logic of the state, maintaining the status quo, albeit 
with the appearance of “inclusion.” In this vein, we see a now well-documented process 
of re-subjectification when groups render themselves legible to the state as particular 
kinds of subjects, according to state criteria, as part of a process to access particular kinds 
of rights, often to land (e.g., traditional people seeking Resex present themselves as 
environmental stewards) which itself leads to myriad, complex problems, not the least of 
which are struggles over management or governance of these spaces, criminalization of 
key livelihood practices and/or destruction of resources (further discussed in Chapter 
Five).19 
Twenty years of neoliberal multi-culturalism, however, has also given movements 
time to assess its impacts and increasingly, we see recognition by movements that simply 
attaining land rights within the field of the state does not meet their desires for justice. As 
a response, I argue in Chapter Four, movements are shifting their demands for land, to 
demands for territory – from the demand for property and the right to economic 
productivity to the demand for life and the production of their world. This shifting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For examples of different analyses of these phenomenon, see, for example, Hale 2005, French 2009. 
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demand is not only expressed in new forms of discourse (e.g., in the name – the 
movement in defense of life and culture), but in new kinds of territorial claims that break 
with linear notions of traditional and modern (that we see, for example, in descriptions of 
indigenous people who “still” speak their indigenous language or “still” practice 
shamanistic rituals), and redefine the concept of the “authentic” indigenous or traditional 
subjectivity. They do this not by claiming territory through a simple reference to a 
primordial past, or to kinship networks, but rather the re-forging of explicitly collective 
subjects as explicitly socio-political (Castro 2008), territorial (Porto Gonçalves 2010a), 
and constantly produced.  
These new claims that have emerged over the past two decades move away from a 
construction of struggle in terms of economic production and toward a struggle organized 
around the concepts of ecology, ethnicity, and collective self-determination. In Chapter 
Four, I will argue that these new forms of struggle challenge the administrative 
(technical) categories of the state and thus the political economy of state order that they 
express and also the paradigms of sustainable development and green capitalism that this 
ordering makes possible.  
The Contradictions of Neo-extractivism  	  
(Gleba Nova Olinda) On the morning of November 4th, 2009, before the sun’s first 
rays struck the snow-white sand on the beach of the Arapiuns river community of Sao 
Pedro, most of the 200 or so people camped out on the beach were already staring east 
down the river, scanning the horizon for signs of a motorboat. As the cooking crew began 
brewing the coffee and rationing out crackers – four per person – rabetas from nearby 
communities packed with families began to arrive. The usual near-festive atmosphere of 
	   41	  
what was now a 42-day protest was strained as people whispered their predictions as to 
whether or not representatives of the federal government would show up to negotiate. 
For over a month now, the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns 
river had been blocking the river to commercial traffic and holding two barges with what 
was estimated to contain at least one million reais of wood that they believed had been 
illegally taken from their land - the as yet un-demarcated indigenous and traditional 
territories up the river in Gleba Nova Olinda.  
 
Figure	  7:	  Movement	  in	  Defense	  of	  Life	  and	  Culture	  of	  the	  Arapiuns	  River 
 Despite previous demands and promises, the first time the government had come 
to negotiate, they had sent only the Ministerio Publico and the meeting had not gone 
well. The Ministerio Publico believed they were acting in good faith, there to support the 
movement, but many people on the beach saw only more government bureaucrats 
delivering the ambivalent message that their hands were tied. A revolving group of 
leaders had spent the past few weeks going back and forth to the Santarém to register 
complaints and demand attention from the numerous government agencies that should 
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have been able to address their concerns, but who, one by one claimed that GNO was 
somebody else’s responsibility. The movement had given a public ultimatum – meet our 
demands or the barges would burn, but the last word that they had gotten was that no one 
was coming. A frustrated contingent of us, who had been engaged in these negotiations in 
the city had arrived from Santarem the night before with this news and now, as some 
people stared tensely at the horizon, others began to set off in canoes and rabetas for the 
opposite shore to begin collecting kindling.  
At around 11 o’clock someone gave a shout. Looking east we could make out a 
speedboat headed for the encampment. Three government representatives arrived, but it 
was clear that they were not people with decision-making power – the Ministerio 
Publico, a representative from the municipality, and a functionary from Ideflor, along 
with two marina police. They disembarked looking disheveled, nervous, and sweating in 
the near mid-day sun. Everyone huddled into the shaded tent in the center of the beach 
and after introductions, the Ideflor representative began to talk. His statements were 
vague, but the questions that he received were pointed and when pressed he responded 
that he had no decision-making power but was there to take people’s complaints back to 
his superiors. No surprise. With that statement, the entire crowd jumped angrily to their 
feet and walked away. A contingent, composed of many different people, but largely those 
not identifiable as leaders and whose participation surprised me, piled into rabetas and 
set off to where the barges were being guarded. Within twenty minutes, one million 
dollars worth of wood was going up in flames. The barges burned for four days. 
Back on the beach, people sat for a long time and watched the blaze, and then 
slowly began to break down the camp, pile into their rabetas and head back to their 
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communities. Sitting beside Seu Francisco, one of the members of the MDVCA current 
representative body I asked, “How do you feel?”  
“What do you mean?”  
“Now that this has all ended.”  
“Ended?” He asked, “No, my dear, now it has begun.”  
                                
(Renascer) After 45 days, the muddy, precarious, temporary 
encampment on the banks of the Uruará River had grown into a small village. 
It was organized like any rural village, but composed of people from all across 
the reserve. There were several different “streets” (small paths) running 
through different “neighborhoods” (groups of makeshift tents) organized 
according to the communities that people had come from (so there was the 
Espirito Santo neighborhood, the Santo Antonio neighborhood etc.). There was 
a shared encampment barracão in the center, where different groups took turns 
cooking, fishing, and holding watch. There were daily school lessons for the 
children, and even energy – a boat motor used to power a light and occasionally 
a TV for a soccer game or novella screening. Aside from a visit from the Mayor 
on the second day of the encampment, government officials never came, 
although several representatives from the group were constantly going between 
the encampment, Prainha, and Santarém for meetings and audiences with 
various state agencies. 
Passenger boats passed, and there were often harsh words or nasty looks 
exchanged between the encampment and people from Santa Maria connected to 
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the logging industry. The loggers also intimidated the encampment, for 
example, by buzzing their assemblies with low-flying planes, and paying some 
of the newer participants for information when they returned to Santa Maria. 
They threatened violence against the members of the encampment that came 
from Santa Maria (the logging town), threatening their lives, their children, 
their jobs, and even setting fire to Rosa’s house. In the everyday life of the 
camp, however, a certain rhythm was established that was not colored by fear, 
but rather by the heightened sense of interconnection that comes from 
struggling together, and also the connection that comes from sharing the more 
mundane aspects of life – passing the time through conversation, card games, 
and watching the river go by.   
 
Figure	  8:	  Meeting	  at	  the	  Encampment	  at	  Renascer 
In the early morning hours of January 11, Edival, the lookout, saw some 
disconcertingly large boats making their way down the river. He rubbed his eyes 
	   45	  
and looked again. There were six barges loaded with timber making their way 
towards them. He grabbed his rifle, shouted to wake the encampment, jumped 
into a rabeta and headed upriver. When the barges came into range, their 
gunmen opened fire. Edival was shot in the chest and Ivanaldo coming up in a 
canoe behind him was shot in the leg (photo here). As they passed, they 
continued to fire on the camp, but most of the unarmed group fled into the 
forest. No one else was hurt. The barges passed.  
The next morning, after a visit from the Prainha police and politicians 
who promised that the situation would be taken care of, the encampment 
assembly decided that their action had served its purpose and it was time to 
disband. They discussed what they had learned in this process. Over the 45 days 
of the encampment, it had become clear to everyone that neither the mayor, nor 
the union, nor the ICMBio were going to come and solve their problems for 
them, that in their words “the reserve was not a solution to [our] problems, but 
a tool we can use to meet [our] goals”  – the goal of living the lives that they 
wanted to live in the place that they considered to be their own. The goal, we 
might say, of self-determination. 
They formed a 12-person group of delegates who would represent what 
they called “the Movement in Defense of Renascer” (MDR). This group, it was 
decided would spend the next few months visiting every community in the Resex 
to discuss how a Resex-wide democratic governance might be structured, how 
rules could be agreed on that would suit everyone’s needs and more broadly, the 
meaning of democracy. At the end of the process, all would be invited to an 
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assembly where a Resex-wide association (called the Associação Mãe) would be 
formed. At that point, MDR would be dissolved and the association would carry 
out the will of the people. The next phase had begun.  
 
After decades constructing a nationwide base, largely through the building of they 
syndical (both rural and urban) movement,20 the Workers’ Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, PT) took the presidency in 2002 with the election of Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva. Over this past decade, the party also won a significant number of municipal 
mayorships, seats on city council and in state legislatures, and governorships. Along with 
these elected positions came a host of appointed positions and many former social 
movement militants moved into government. Over the decade or so that saw the workers’ 
party gain significant power and space within the field of electoral politics, the rural 
syndical movement held in tension its function to, as one syndicalista described, “[bring] 
together many different leftist politics who debated each other to set the party line” with 
another function increasingly “organized around the office, the group of deputy X or 
councilman Y, pursuing strategies only to secure the next term.” The tension expressed in 
both of theses struggle between the rural workers union and emerging political actors 
outside of the party speaks to the fact the movement of the PT into government was not 
an unqualified victory of the movements, but a historical shift that gave rise to new 
tensions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Beginning in the mid-1970s and becoming firmly entrenched in the 1980s, the rural workers’ union 
(STR), and by extension the workers’ party had become practically synonymous with political 
representation for rural people. The STRs were not only the primary place to access government benefits 
(from health to retirement to small loans through FNOs, the program to finance sustainable rural 
development, and then PRONAF, the National Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture), but they were 
the mediators who helped people to secure their access to land. The vast majority of people interviewed 
across the greater Santarém region were union members (even if their reasons for being members were 
largely for the economic benefits). 
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An analysis of progressive government and its tensions and contradictions in 
Brazil is an extremely complex topic that cannot be adequately addressed in any single 
text; however, as stated in the introduction, one of the arguments of this dissertation is as 
one of the primary sites for the intensification of extractive, commodity-oriented 
development, Amazônia it presents an particularly key location from which to examine 
some of the most significant tensions that have emerged along with the progressive state. 
The neo-extractive model embodies a developmentalism reminiscent of the military 
dictatorships’ projects, which the Workers’ Party and syndical movement founded itself 
explicitly in opposition to (and which evolved to an opposition to neoliberalism more 
generally). Although there are similarities to previous developmentalisms, the structure of 
neo-extractivism is also substantively different – funded through public private 
partnershipts and the Brazilian Development Bank rather than multi-lateral organizations, 
environmentally sensitive, and linked to anti-poverty programs (Dilma even calls her 
Accelerated Development Plan, or PAC, the PAC against Misery) – based in a 
“progressive” or “neo-extractivism” that holds within it new or re-deployed conceptions 
of nature, development, and politics that will be explored in the following chapters. 
While Amazonia is certainly not the only site of industrial extraction in Brazil, it 
is one of the regions that these contradictions are particularly evident for a number of 
reasons. The Amazon houses the vast majority of extractive wealth (other than petroleum 
and including bauxite, gold, iron and other minerals and precious stones), as well as 
potential sources of energy to fuel that industry or itself to be sold internationally (in the 
form of hydroelectric dams), and ports for the transport of agro-industrial products 
produced in Brazil’s remote center-west region, and a road network that has the potential 
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to link Brazil to the rest of South America (The BR-163 is also part of the IIRSA 
development). The growth in soy production to the south along with the development, in 
the early late 1990s, of heat and moisture tolerant varieties of soy has pushed soy 
production into the region, inspired the production of massive infrastructure projects, and 
also displaced cattle production further into the region. The cattle industry itself has also 
grown substantially. In 2003, cattle illness outbreaks in Europe, the eradication of foot 
and mouth disease in much of the Amazon, trade liberalization in beef markets and a 
devaluation of Brazilian currency all combined to set the conditions for Brazil to became 
the world’s largest beef exporter and beef production expanded into the Amazon. These 
combined processes resulted in a rapid expansion of the logging industry in the region 
and especially in Western Pará (deforestation rates spiked there after 1997 and into the 
early 2000s) (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006). This development stimulates the 
expansion of the logging industry, which is usually the first form of extraction (forest 
clearing precedes almost all other forms), and as a result is often the first industry to 
move into more undeveloped territories. That these newer development areas are already 
inhabited by traditional people and migrant smallholders who have also been making new 
demands for self-determination means that we see a new wave of struggles emerging 
over this New Extractivism.21 Conflicts that appear to be, in their most immediate sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Pará State is the largest timber producing and exporting region in the Amazon, accounting for 40% of 
production and 60% of international exports. Imazon reported that in a one-year period between 2009 and 
2010, 65% of the wood in the state of Pará was harvested illegally (Pereira et al. 2011). International 
exports go primarily to the US, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, France, and Japan. Logging is the second most 
lucrative state export (next to mineral extraction),21 45% of which comes from Western Pará, an area 
encompassing approximately 1/5th of the state in a “buffer zone” around the Santarém-Cuiaba highway (the 
BR-163). Because it controls such a large and shifting territory, is deeply imbricated with all other 
extractive industry, and generates so much income itself, Politicians from all parties are deeply tied to the 
logging industry (this will be further addressed in Chapter Five), which has direct effects on loggers’ ability 
to attain permits in areas where they should technically be illegal, to have their areas prioritized for access 
creation (through various forms of property rights creation, see Chapter Three), and to avoid enforcement. 
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over logging are actually inextricably intertwined with all of these processes and thus an 
important window onto contemporary territorial struggles.  
These new struggles occur on a macro and micro political level – from the 
national and international controversies that pit developmentalism against 
environmentalism discussed above (an oversimplified and misleading dichotomy, I will 
argue in Chapter Three), to localized breaks between movement, social mediator 
organizations, and party. Traditional social mediator organizations, which have opted for 
more conciliatory positions toward government, find themselves in a complex position. 
On the one hand, they are seen by people as movement leaders, and yet are reluctant -- 
and by this I mean there is an institutionalized reluctance -- to take oppositional positions  
(for an excellent discussion of these same tensions within the Rubber Tappers’ movement 
in Acre, see de Paula and da Silva 2008). Actions are beginning to be taken across the 
region, such as the ones discussed here, independent of these traditional social mediators, 
which themselves, I will argue in Chapter Five, have begun to function, in some cases as 
the state, as they are deeply invested in maintaining given order, namely hierarchical 
relations of control. Chapter Five will explore this complex, shifting relationships among 
social movements, social mediator organizations historically aligned with social 
movements, and the state in a context where these very categories have become 
uncertain.  
BORN IN FIRE 
Moments of rupture, which appear in various forms and go by many names – acts 
of insubordination, deinstitutionalized revolt, insurrection, and spontaneous rebellion, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Heads of government agencies that have tried to intervene in unethical processes have been summarily 
dismissed (Daniel Cohenca, former head of IBAMA being a case in point).  
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name a few – have been alternatively dismissed as reactionary or overemphasized for their 
revolutionary potential. As an alternative and following recent work in and on Latin 
American social movements,22 in this chapter I have privileged an examination of these 
moments in order to, in the words of Raul Zibechi (2010), “encounter what lies behind and 
below the established forms,” treating them as “lightening rods” to illuminate the specific 
issues and concepts that become visible within them. In this last section, I analyze these 
moments along three different horizons – the issues that they embody, the pre-existing 
relations that make these moments possible and the political potential that they in turn 
open or make visible. First, the events recounted above bring into sharp relief the stakes of 
contemporary political conflict and help us to understand its historical and geographical 
specificity. As such, these particular struggles have much to tell us about the continuities 
and discontinuities that the current Neo-extractivist moment in Amazonia has with prior 
historical periods, about the dynamic relations among territory, ecology, and political 
subjectivities, and about the overlaps and disjunctures among social movements, political 
organizations, and government, all of which will be elaborated in turn in the remainder of 
this dissertation (see chapter summaries below for these specific arguments). 
It is not that these issues were fully formed, yet latent or unspoken and in these 
moments it is as if we shine a light on them in the dark. Rather, within these moments of 
explicit oppositionality, ongoing tensions and contradictions present within the current 
socio-political relations are forced to a greater level of intensity. In both of these struggles, 
we see the argument made explicit that the intensification of extractive industry simply 
cannot occur in these areas without the destruction of the already-existing form of life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See, for example, the Winter 2012 issue the South Atlantic Quarterly on Autonomy and Emancipation in 
Latin America. 
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there. We see that over the course of the occupations, there is a growing recognition that 
only making demands on government would be insufficient to meet movement demands. 
In consequence, there is a shift in the nature of movement objectives from, we might say, 
those directed primarily outward (that the government might meet), to those directed 
inward (that the people might develop a strategy to meet themselves). We also see, as 
discussed above, increasing tensions between older forms of political organization and the 
new strategies and voices that protagonize these struggles.  
Next, we can also read these events as expressions, and intensifications, of ongoing 
processes and dynamics within the communities that participate in them.23 EP Thompson 
(1970, 1971, 1990), James Scott (1976, 1985, 1991),  Ranijit Guha (1988, 1997, 1999) and 
Ana Esther Ceceña (1995, 2012) have all illuminated the existing structures of 
organization and the more subtle expressions of resistance hidden in the every day. EP 
Thompson’s work has taught us that while “riots” may be triggered by specific, 
conjuntural events, they are not reducible to those events alone. They have their origin in 
historical, culturally specific, structural relations of force on the one hand, and, in what he 
called the crowd’s “moral economy” on the other.24 James Scott’s (1990) work has taught 
us to be attentive to the “infrapolitics,” or the daily struggles that are “invisible by design,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Chapters Four and Five will both briefly treat the concept of “community” more substantively, both its 
political history in Amazonia as related to the Catholic Church (Chapter Four), and conflicts and 
contradictions among groups that self-identify as communities (Chapter Five). I would like to flag here that 
I do not mean to present “community” as a unified whole (in fact, one of the primary effects of these 
conflicts is to exacerbate pre-existing tensions). People engaged in these struggles will often invoke their 
communities and speak for their communities as communities precisely because of the concept’s vague yet 
powerful referent to a collective political subject. That does not mean that any particular community 
representation is not uncontested. (On the complexities of “community” see for example Li 1996; Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999; Schroeder 1999; M. J. Watts 2004). 
 24	  Several scholars have taken up a more substantive analysis and extension of the concept of moral 
economy. For examples see (Scott 1976; Watts 1984; Mallon 1995; Sayer 2004). For a review of all of these 
authors and a re-theorization of this concept, see Wolford 2005.  
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of subordinate groups that he argues make such acts of rebellion possible. These everyday, 
often symbolic, acts of resistance, for Scott, are the infrastructure (e.g., form the basis for) 
the visible acts of political action that receive more attention. Thus, the conditions of 
possibility for open rebellion is the accumulation of smaller acts of transgression that 
slowly shift the relations of force by creating an opening for more confrontational and 
visible rebellion.25 Rebellion is a question of intensity and it is an accumulation of 
negative, transgressive force that leads to a moment of rupture.  
The limitations of this framework are that it supposes that there is a structure of 
domination, and subordinate subjects who reject or resist that structure. It lacks an analysis 
of the production of subjects (as Thompson certainly would have argued for). Guha on the 
other hand, highlights the fact that there is a creative or productive element to the 
subaltern domain located, he argues, in autonomous spaces for the construction of 
resistance and rebellion. Ana Esther Ceceña (2012) engages all of these authors to argue 
that it is not only intentionally resistant practice but rather the daily strategies of survival, 
the practices and exchanges of everyday life, and also spaces of struggle from which “the 
new world springs.” (118). 
Within the episodes outlined above, we can see that the very existence of these 
moments and spaces of rebellion – temporary spaces outside of the rhythms of daily life – 
at Renascer and São Pedro were only possible because they were based in the dense 
networks of existing relationships and the ongoing practices of community life. The 1200 
people who arrived at São Pedro with almost no resources, could create an encampment 
that could feed, house, entertain, guard, negotiate, and, in fact, re-forge themselves as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In his words, “the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like snowflakes on a steep mountainside, set off 
an avalanche (192).” 
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movement. Similarly, the small crew on the banks of the Tamuataí could erect a village 
that was a microcosm of a 150,000 hectare reserve with little more than fishing lines, 
hammocks, farina and some wood-cutting tools, because of the existing social relations 
that provide the capacity to self-organize. The near seamless establishment of these 
encampments demonstrates that the organization and relations crafted through the 
functioning of daily life is what I would call another form of pre-figurative 
“infrastructure” (a la Scott) that creates the conditions of possibility for such acts of 
insubordination. In Chapter Four, we will further explore the way these forms of 
organization is a key element (what I will call there production of “convention”) in 
processes of territorialization.  
Finally, while these events are made possible by ongoing relationships and social 
organization, the changes that we see within the demands and strategies of the people 
engaged in or inspired by these events is evidence that they open new horizons of 
struggle. They are key spaces of political subject formation. The occupations on the 
beach at São Pedro or on the banks of the Uruará disrupted the rhythms of daily life, 
creating time and space to reflect on conflict itself, forcing actors on both sides to act, and 
as a result, analyze and adjust the strategic and tactical objectives of resistance. The 
adrenaline of conflict, the euphoria of victory, however temporary, along with the daily 
practices of community life within a temporarily constituted community on the beach at 
São Pedro, or on the banks of the Uruará, as well as the stories of these places and events 
that traveled throughout the region, galvanized hundreds, if not thousands, of people to 
participate in both of these movements after the dispersal of the camps.  
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The value of these spaces and events is not simply catharsis, but also the 
opportunity for innovation that is based in forms of struggle. For several weeks and 
months, at both of these encampments, residents of the region organized themselves into 
a temporary community and different forms of organization supplanted and exceeded the 
organizational and territorial categories of the state (e.g., traditional and indigenous 
people became a movement for life, people inside and outside of the reserve became a 
movement in defense of its territory). The traditional political organizing structures and 
hierarchies were sidelined or adapted (namely the community presidents, religious 
leaders, and union representatives were not prominent). Most significantly the sindicatos 
(unions), at the center of “grassroots: mobilization for decades, played no central role and 
in some ways played an antagonistic role to these rebellions. Instead, the non-
institutionalized organization that exists within communities formed the basis for the 
organization of the occupations themselves.  
An element of spontaneity became a strategy for intervening in the status quo. 
Such acts of resistance must be unanticipated if they are not to be crushed by loggers or 
law enforcement, or discouraged or obstructed by social mediators and NGOs whose own 
position within the relations of force is such that they discourage any act of open conflict. 
The people at São Pedro, for example, turned their participation in the union’s symbolic 
action into an act of concrete oppositionality using resources – both the organizing that 
had been done, and the literal resources such as gasoline and food – from the Rural 
Workers’ Union and NGOs to initiate a mobilization that was only ever allowed to occur 
in the first place because it was pre-coded as symbolic, as not truly adversarial, and as 
existing within the field of state politics. From this position, they were able to build the 
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momentum to force a rupture with the given order, from which the new possibilities of a 
current and future politics became visible, both to those directly involved in these events 
and to their spectators. 
 While the title “born in fire” refers to the literal fact that the act of setting fire to 
loggers’ barges was a galvanizing moment for both the struggle for Renascer (an event 
that had happened several years prior to the ones described above) and for Gleba Nova 
Olinda, it is not meant to suggest that this particular tactic is necessarily central to these 
struggles. Rather, to argue that these movements are “born in fire” is to suggest that the 
categories and actors of political change are not pre-given, but rather that struggle is 
central to the formation of political subjects and their territories of resistance, as will be 
further elaborated in subsequent chapters.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 This dissertation is an analysis of territorial struggles over neo-extractivism, 
arguably the phenomenon defining contemporary Amazonian politics. I ground this 
analysis in a study of some of the wide-reaching effects of one of the decade’s most 
controversial development projects – the paving of the BR-163, the “soy highway”. That 
both the road and soy production itself, are somewhat de-centered in much of this 
analysis is testament to the way that Amazonian development proceeds. The effects of 
mega-projects are incredibly far-reaching (in this case the BR-163 paving project re-
worked territory in the entire western portion of the state of Pará) and in areas that have 
standing forest, logging precedes or works in conjunction with most extractive 
development, especially agricultural. The state of Pará and the territorial re-organization  
associated with the BR-163 are particularly key sites for analyzing neo-extractivism for a 
number of reasons. Pará is Brazil’s second largest state – twice the size of France – and 
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the “area of impact” of the BR-163, also known as “western Pará” is vast, encompassing 
what the federal government identified as “one of the most important regions in the 
Amazon, from the point of view of economic potential, biological diversity, natural 
wealth, and cultural and ethnic diversity” (Brasil 2005). Further, the development of the 
region in anticipation of this road paving is the first attempt to operationalize the 
“Sustainable Amazon Plan,” (Brasil 2006) addressed in Chapter Three which, explicitly 
brings together extractive development, conservation, and anti-poverty programs, which 
is precisely the neo-extractive model that the first half of this dissertation will sketch out 
more substantively.   
This introduction (and preface) should be thought of as a presentation of the 
themes and concepts that organize this dissertation and an argument for how their 
analysis should proceed. The following four chapters are divided into two sections. In a 
brief introduction to Part One I briefly outline the primary elements that I argue constitute 
Amazônian neo-extractivism. Chapters Two and Three each explore different aspects of 
the governance structure created to address the arrival of soy into Amazônia and its 
“dragging effects,” namely the proposed paving of the BR-163. Chapter Two, examines 
two voluntary certification programs for soy produced in the Amazon, to analyze the 
emergence, functions, and effects of what I call, following Urlich Brand, “business-as-
usual neoliberal governance,” itself part of what regional social movements are 
increasingly calling “Green Capitalism.” I argue that such programs actually make soy 
production in the region possible and produce new networks and relations among social 
mediator organizations like the rural workers unions, regional and international 
environmental NGOs, corporations and the state. At best, I argue, they have questionable 
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environmental benefits. At worst, they work to re-enforce the hegemony of international 
Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), to legitimize agri-business multinationals such as 
Cargill, and to destabilize strategies of resistance—reproducing the very dynamics of 
inequality and domination that governance seeks to eradicate. 
I then turn to an analysis of the re-territorialization of the entire western half of 
the state of Pará implemented through what I call the ordering technology of 
Ordenamento Territorial in order to facilitate the paving of the BR-163. While Chapter 
Two examined the immediate policies that made the territorial expansion of soy 
agriculture possible, Chapter Three turns to the question of state (broadly conceived) 
ordering. I argue that although the mechanisms for ordering have changed substantively 
over the past several decades, the rationality – to reproduce a given order and relations of 
power – has not. The majority of the chapter is dedicated to a detailed study of the 
mechanisms for re-producing that order and a characterization of the substantive shifts in 
state territorialization within the current moment.  
Part Two, examines the way that the changing dynamics of state and market in 
Amazonia meet changing strategies of resistance. My overall argument is that struggles 
have become explicitly territorial and that this shift is not simply a shift in the framing of 
movement struggles, but in the production of a different kind of collective subject. This 
has implications for the kind of claims that are made and for the nature of movement 
representation. Chapters Four and Five treat these two facets of shifting strategies of 
resistance through a recounting and analysis of the two struggles introduced in this 
chapter.  
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Chapter Four, examines the concept of territory as articulated by the Movement in 
Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River (MDVCA) by sketching out a sort of 
genealogy of the shift, in the lower Amazon, from the enunciation of struggle as a 
“struggle for land” to a “struggle for territory” over the past few decades. I argue in this 
chapter that this concept of territory, as conceived by the movement, actually marks a 
substantive and strategic shift from previous strategies of struggle that unhinges both the 
concept of territory from the territorial state and control over land and resources from the 
idea of property. In doing so, they simultaneously transcend the categories of state and 
political economy, while also deploying them in order to meet their strategic goals. At the 
core of this argument is a conception of territory created in and from below, that treats 
particular territories and subjects as co-produced and that, as a practice of resistance, is 
forged through a combination of everyday practices and struggle.  
The politics of the progressive state and the emergence of “socio-territorial 
movements” (Mançano 2005) explored in Chapter Four will raise the questions explored 
more explicitly in Chapter Five, of how these changing dynamics of power and resistance 
manifest in the relationships between social mediator organizations (namely the rural 
workers’ union), movements, and progressive government. I delineate how the 
intertwining of clientalist and counterhegemonic strains within the rural workers’ union 
manifests in their tendency to perform the work of the state (albeit a re-constituted one). 
That is, they function as the state both institutionally, in that members of Rural Workers’ 
Union (STR) leadership simultaneously hold municipal and state offices, and effectively, 
in that they are deeply invested in maintaining given order, namely hierarchical relations 
of control. I highlight, in contrast, the nascent emancipatory impulses of the Movement in 
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Defense of Renascer (MDR) to break with institutional politics-as-usual and how those 
impulses are acted on by these organizations to fold them back into the dominant political 
logic. 
While Chapter Four explicitly explores the concept of territory in the emergence 
of the Movement for the Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River, and Chapter 
Five explores the tensions between traditional mediator organizations and emerging 
movements in the struggle for Resex Renascer. Although I focus on the question of 
territory more explicitly in the chapter on the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture 
of the Arapiuns River and the question of tensions between movements, mediators and 
the state more explicitly in the chapter on the struggle over Renascer, this separate 
treatmeant is not meant as a comparison, nor is it meant to suggest that MDVCA only 
embodies this territorial shift and Renascer the tensions of progressive government. 
Rather, both struggles express multiple and overlapping aspects of the shifts explored 
here, but I found the elements of these struggles to be particularly expressive of the 
specific dynamics discussed in each respective chapter and developed them accordingly. 
More broadly, I argue that these two movements together express a larger shifting 
regional dynamic and, further, they are linked. They are part of a loose regional network 
of movements that has included anti-soy mobilization, the growing mobilization against 
the damming of the Tapajós, among others. They are connected, in part, through their 
relationships with organizations such as the Pastoral Land Commission, the movement of 
those affected by Dams (MAB), and the Amazon Defense Front in Santarém and their 
participants frequently meet, support each others struggles, and remain in ongoing 
conversation.  
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I will conclude by returning to the proposition put forward in this introduction 
that a research program adequate to the complexities of the new political moment in 
Amazonia requires a processual notion of antagonistic struggle. This means, I will argue, 
a move away from technocratic assessments of conflict, from a frame of analysis that 
measures the effectiveness of movements purely by their capacity to affect the state or to 
protect “the environment,” and requires a shift in methodologies, including a more 
substantive engagement with the work of Brazilian scholars.  
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Part One. Neo-extractivism: Capital, Nature, Difference, Territory 	  
The re-emergence of commodity-oriented industrial extractive development as a 
primary strategy for economic growth, justified on a national level through links to anti-
poverty programs, is a key element of the neo-developmentalist program among 
“progressive” governments across Latin America.26 This section traces the parameters of 
this “neo-extractivism” (Gudynas 2010) in Brazilian Amazônia. The argument is that 
Amazônia’s vast wealth of extractive resources (timber, minerals, agricultural land, 
water-based energy) and its large, economically depressed population makes it the 
emblematic site for neo-extractivism. The potential environmental devastation associated 
with the exploitation of  “natural resources” necessary for this extractivism, however, 
means that it encounters concerted resistance from the global environmental community 
as well as from traditional, indigenous, and migrant smallholders (the latter is addressed 
more substantively in Part Three). As a result, in addition to the links to anti-poverty 
programs that justify industrial extractivism in much of the country (e.g. that render it 
socially progressive), for these projects to be implemented in the Amazon, they must also 
be “greened.” Further, because of the historical links forged between local social 
movements and international environmentalists (an assumed alliance that these chapters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Neo-developmentalism emerged across Latin America with the crisis of neoliberalism as a heterodox 
policy response that incorporated monetary and fiscal policies of neoliberalism along with state policies to 
nurture the growth of national firms and social programs based in economically distributive programs. 
Despite substantial modifications to the neoliberal program, neo-developmentalism does not depart from a 
programmatic focus on expanding productive capacity and increasing accumulation (Katz and Haine 2006; 
Acosta 2008; Escobar 2010; Ricci 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011a; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011b).  
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seek to de-naturalize) into socio-environmental movements on the one hand and 
sustainable development policies on the other, this “greening,” I argue, not only 
incorporates environmental concerns into the dominant development model, but also 
functions to capture or coopt many of the more emancipatory impulses of regional 
movements.  
This section identifies and explores what I argue are the three primary strategies 
for neo-extractivism in the Amazon through the particular case of industrial soy 
expansion and its associated infrastructure development, namely the paving of the 
Santarém-Cuiabá Highway (the BR-163), through Western Pará State. Rather than 
arguing that neo-extractivism marks a definitive break with a prior development period or 
model, in this section I identify both the continuities and discontinuities that 
contemporary approaches to “managing” environment and development have with 
previous approaches and explore their implications.  
First and most centrally, as described above, there is an intensification of 
extractive development. This intensification is driven by state policies, specifically the 
Lula and Rousseff administrations’ various Accelerated Development Programs 
(Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC) that focus on investment in energy, 
transport, infrastructure to support extractive industry through direct public sector 
investment, significant lending through the Brazilian National Development Bank 
(BNDS),27 	  and public private partnerships (with Brazilian and multi-national 
corporations), along with tax rebates and credit rate controls and monetary and other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 According to a personal communication from Katherine Hoschstetler (April 26th 2012), BNDS gives 
over 95% of its funding to development that is within the national boundaries of Brazil itself. In the year 
2010-2011 BNDS lent more money than the IMF and the World Bank combined.  
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policies to open export markets in order to stimulate private sector investment in industry 
and infrastructure (Barbosa and Souza 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011; Morais and 
Saad-Filho 2011).28 Across Latin America and perhaps most successfully in Brazil, this 
development is linked to (and justified by) anti-poverty social programs, such as Bolsa 
Familia, Fome Zero, and more recently, Bolsa Verde. The sheer number of new 
development projects in western Pará alone is striking and include, most prominently, the 
paving of the BR-163, the recently opened Alcoa Bauxite mine in Jurutí, and the eleven 
planned dams for the Tapajós River basin, among many others. 29  
The second component is what Urlich Brand (2009) calls a business-as-usual 
neoliberal approach to conservation, which proposes to resolve the contradiction of 
perpetual growth and preservation of the basic means of production (and survival) 
through some institutional innovation, and by incentivizing efficiency in production and 
consumption through the production of “green” markets. This approach, is based in the 
“sustainable development” model established at the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992 and institutionalized in Amazônia during the 1990s when Amazonian policy was 
largely driven by international funding under the UN Pilot Program for the Conservation 
of Rainforests (PPG-7, 1994-2005) (Lemos and Roberts 2008). It is based in ecological 
modernization theory (Leff 2001; McCarthy and Prudham 2004), which assumes that the 
economic system can internalize all economic and social costs, and therefore looks to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
29 In emerging literature on New Extractivism, scholars, and namely Eduardo Gudynas (2010) argue for ten 
features of this project, which include the following: extractivism remains the pillar of development 
projects in South America; the appearance of a progressive purpose; state captured surpluses fund poverty 
programs;  “trickle down” economic assumptions; a more active state; export oriented production; 
geographic fragmentation through the creation of enclaves; the externalization of social and environmental 
costs; the weakening of resistance; and that this approach is the central version of development. My 
analysis builds on his broad argument regarding continent-wide trends to more fully explore specificity and 
implications of neo-extractivism in Brazilian Amazônia. 
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market to increase efficiency in production and consumption largely through the 
development of “green” markets, conservation incentives etc., processes largely that have 
largely been outsourced to environmental NGOs. One example of these types of practices 
is explored in Chapter Two’s discussion of the Responsible Soy and Soy Moratorium 
initiatives. Other similar initiatives in this vein across the region, although not addressed 
in this dissertation, are timber certification programs, the creation of carbon markets and 
other forms of payment for environmental services. Although these practices are largely 
continuous with a neoliberal logic, I argue that they must be understood within a larger 
context that includes the re-territorialization that is explored in Chapter Three. Taken 
together, we see one of they key differences between these “business-as-usual” practices 
under neo-extractivism and the Donor-led period, is that that previously, market-oriented 
conservation was coupled with a territorial strategy that focused on creating protected 
areas (e.g. taking land out of the market). Today, in Western Pará state, the creation of 
protected areas is diminishing, and existing areas are being reduced in size and opened 
through legislation to exploitation so that these types of market-based approaches are 
becoming the primary conservation mechanism.  
The territorial re-organization associated with this extractive development, and 
explored in Chapter Three, combines new and old state territorialization strategies to, in 
the Ministry of National Integration’s words, “re-instate the [developmentalist] State in 
new places” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006). In the wake of re-democratization 
and the emergence of strong, new socio-territorial actors, an attempt at a simple return to 
developmentalism (e.g. top-down appropriation of land and resources) generated 
conflicts that indicated a certain “loss of control” by the state over national territory, and 
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especially territory containing the resources vital to national economic growth. In 
response, territorialization re-emerged as an explicit state strategy in the early 2000s, but 
now operating with a new situation with new actors and demands (namely justice and 
environmentalism).  Thus, old forms of territorial organization such as road and dam 
building, mining etc. are accompanied by the new property and territorial regimes that 
prioritize the creation of private property, limits sizes of protected areas and opens both 
protected resources and private property to managed exploitation (e.g. resources, be they 
mining, timber, carbon etc. can be sold whether on private or protected public land), 
thereby de-linking land rights from resource (and territorial) control and facilitating 
resource access on all land by capital and the state.	  30   
Finally, these three elements of neo-extractivism stand in contrast to a fourth. 
That is, while the first three strategies tend toward the recognition and incorporation of 
the elements that challenge or disrupt the functioning or legitimacy of the given 
development model, there are also emerging strategies that more fully reject that model, 
and/or move beyond it, as expressed in the rebellions explained in chapter one. The final 
section of the dissertation will explore these in more detail.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I would argue that these components are not only true of the particular case explored here, but region-
wide. Regionally, there is also arguably a fourth, repressive, component. This has been seen in the rapid 
police action taken against larger revolts against particular neo-extractive projects at the Belo Monte dam 
on the Xingu River and the and Jirau dam on the Madeira River, but this element is not explored in this 
dissertation. Criminalization of movements may be a secondary element of such repression, and is explored 
to a limited extent in Chapter Five.  
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Chapter Two: Saving the Amazon? Responsible Soy as Green 
Governance 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 14th 2010, one thousand people gathered in Santarém’s Yacht Club for a 
public audience regarding the soy port that multi-national agricultural corporation Cargill 
built on the Amazon River in 2000. The meeting, a mandatory part of the federal 
environmental compliance process, was held to solicit public feedback on the Port 
Environmental Impact Assessment that Cargill had just completed. Protocol dictates that 
such assessments be completed prior to licensing major construction, although in this 
case, the assessment was being considered nine years after ground was broken for port 
construction and six years into its operation. In 2000, the federal court in Santarém 
mandated that Cargill comply with Brazilian federal law and complete the environmental 
compliance process, which it had not implemented prior to construction and which, by 
2006, it still had not begun. In 2006, on appeal, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça—
Brazil’s second highest court—upheld this decision. Despite the federal mandate, Cargill 
continually avoided completing the assessment through a series of provisional 
agreements with the notoriously corrupt and industry-friendly State Environmental 
Secretary, who, regardless of the sentiment expressed at the public audience, remains the 
regulatory agency responsible for final approval of Cargill’s license.  
 Outside of the Yacht Club, people from the Amazon Defense Front (Frente em 
Defesa da Amazônia, FDA), the Pastoral Land Commission (Commissão Pastoral da 
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Terra, CPT), and the general public protested the public audience, arguing that it made a 
farce of the process of participation. Protesters preferred to make their statement from 
outside of the public audience, arguing that their presence inside such events gives the 
appearance of their participation in a decision-making process about development where 
their views and positions have no possibility of changing the real nature of the project. It 
is, they argued, the social version of “green-washing”—making private development 
decisions appear democratic. In other words, by “participating” in the public audience, 
they would be sanctioning their own elimination from the democratic process. Rather 
than doing so, they remained outside, to express that which had no space inside. 
 Amazonian neo-extractivism, manifest in the advance of the Cargill Corporation, 
soy production, and its wide range of what “dragging effects” (Fearnside 2007a), namely 
the energy, port, and road construction developed to serve the industry, into the region, 
began in the late 1990s. Initiating a return to a developmentalism within the region (and 
the country), then-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s multi-year (2000-2007) 
development plan, AvançaBrasil (Forward Brazil, discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Three) promised to invest US$43 billion to support extractive development in Amazonia 
with US$20 billion of that earmarked for infrastructure, primarily roads. AvançaBrasil’s 
Amazonian components encountered vehement opposition because of the potential 
environmental effects of such large-scale development (Fearnside 2001b; Soares-Filho et 
al. 2006; Steward 2007), generating a series of ecological studies predicting massive and 
widespread environmental destruction and sparking debate in academic journals, national 
and international press, and outrage in the international environmental community.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31In 2001, two conservation organizations (INPA, and IPAM/ISA) released results of predicted scenarios 
for Amazonian deforestation associated with Forward Brazil. IPAM’s estimates, limited to major road 
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These debates coalesced around the advance into the region of industrial soy agriculture, 
a new form of “extractive” industry, and its “dragging effects,” primarily associated with 
the infrastructure development necessary to transport soy (See, for example, Veja, 
November 12, 2003, Steward 2007). The most controversial of these programs was by far 
the paving of the Santarém-Cuiaba Highway (the BR-163), a road built but never paved 
by the military dictatorship in the early 1970s. Paving this “highway” would effectively 
connect one of Brazil’s major soy-producing regions in Mato Grosso to a port on the 
Amazon River (a port which Cargill quickly built), during a worldwide commodity boom 
that meant that industrial agriculture was poised to (and subsequently would) expand as 
one of the major economic bases for the country. Proponents argued that road paving 
would reduce high commodity transport costs, the primary obstacle to Brazil’s agro-
industrial expansion. However, the BR-163 passed through the largely undeveloped 
region of western Pará state often referred to as “outside the rule of law” (Fearnside 
2007a, 601) and ecologists argued that paving the road under the given socio-political 
“business-as-usual” scenario would lead to rapid and widespread environmental 
devastation (Laurance et al. 2001).  
Responding to this criticism made by communities, academics, and 
environmentalists, Amazonia’s conservation policy advisors (namely Dan Nepstad and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
paving, projected 120,000-270,000 square kilometers of deforestation (4.2% of the Amazon) in twenty to 
thirty years following the plans’ initiation (Nepstad et al. 2001). The INPA team’s analysis covered forest 
impacts for all planned Forward Brazil infrastructure projects in an “optimistic” scenario that predicted 
28% of the Amazon would be destroyed or heavily damaged by 2020 and a ‘non-optimistic’ scenario 
predicted 42% (Laurance et al. 2001). This was hugely controversial with the national and international 
press jumping on the controversy (see, for example,Jacquacu 2001) and both Nepstad et al. and government 
officials severely criticized INPA’s predictions, even, it is rumored, urging Science not to publish the 
results. The negative press forced the government to act, and the Ministries of the Environment and of 
Planning decided to integrate new protective measures into the development project—namely 
environmental impact assessments. 
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his team, formerly of the environmental NGO IPAM—the institute for Amazonian 
Research—who are also the scientists who made the most conservative predictions for 
future deforestation in the public debates over AvançaBrasil) posed the region’s 
“emerging governance” as the “most promising” solution to the conundrum of 
Amazonian soy (e.g. soy is good for the economy but bad for the environment). They 
argue that governance can “insure the conservation of most of the forests…while also 
fostering sustainable development.” The formalized relationships being instituted among 
“government agencies, private enterprise, and civil society” are, for them, “evidence of 
an expanding political will in Brazil to manage Amazonia’s abundant natural 
resources...” These relationships, if adequately supported, will “defend public interests in 
the region’s natural resources” and by default, eliminate the violence and injustice 
associated with a lack of government presence in the area (Nepstad et al. 2002).32 
 Alongside the links that the Lula administration was making between the growth 
of agro-industry to anti-poverty programs as well as to the nation’s overall economic 
growth on a national level, I argue that conservation-oriented governance thus became 
another necessary, prerequisite for neo-extractivism to form part of a program of 
progressive government. This “greening” happens through a variety of mechanisms. 
First, multi-stakeholder participation has been legally formalized as part of the 
environmental review process through a mandate for public audiences. This is combined 
with a series of NGO-led initiatives to incorporate “grassroots” positions into regional 
development projects by organizing localized forums for communities to express their 
opinions, or through “partnerships” where local organizations sign onto conservation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32This position, while dominant, is controversial. See the debate between Amazon conservation scientists 
in the Policy Forum in the April 2002 issue of Science.  
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development projects with corporations, often mediated by NGOs, one example of which 
will be discussed in this chapter (Hall 1997; Perz et al. 2008; Alencar 2005). 
 This participation-oriented governance, which hinges on direct incorporation of 
previously marginalized actors into the development planning process, coincides with a 
second instance of governance—the devolution of government functions to (NGOs), 
where NGO’s “help” (in their own language) the government to implement already-
existing laws, based on the assumption that such NGOs are working for the “public 
good.” In other words, such interventions are in the public good both in that they seek to 
uphold the law (e.g. provide justice) and that they are implemented by an NGO, a non-
corporate, not for profit entity. In reality, as this chapter will demonstrate, the relationship 
between law and justice is tenuous and the interests that many mainstream environmental 
NGOs may serve, intentionally or unintentionally, are not those of a vaguely defined 
public, but rather of the private actors with whom they work. 
 In this chapter, I use the case of Amazonian soy to analyze the emergence, 
functions, and effects of what I referred to in the introduction to this section as “business-
as-usual neoliberal governance.” I argue that the effect of Amazonian soy-related 
governance is not to create more inclusion and justice, but rather to render “the public 
good” productive for private interests. I focus this argument on two separate but related 
programs designed to mitigate the effects of Amazonian soy: Responsible Soy and the 
Soy Moratorium. I argue that such programs actually make soy neo-extractivism 
possible, that they have questionable environmental benefits at best and at worst work to 
re-enforce the hegemony of international Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), which then 
legitimize agri-business multinationals such as Cargill, and that they work to destabilize 
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strategies of resistance—reproducing the very dynamics of inequality and domination 
that governance seeks to eradicate. 
 My premise is that governance, which has been defined as “a search for consensus 
among all those with a distinct opinion on the matters at hand” (Verweij and Josling 
2003), presents a technical solution that should serve as a mechanism for creating power-
neutral relationships (Borras and Franco 2010). Yet inequality is endemic to, and indeed 
the very basis for, contemporary liberal capitalism, prohibiting the effectiveness of such 
an approach (Smith 1984; Harney 2006). Put differently, bringing multiple actors to the 
table and letting them speak does not negate the unequal power relationships that underlie 
and determine the terms of contemporary development (Escobar 1995).  
 Governance, implemented either from above or for above, in other words, does 
not exit the logic of the given political economy of power, where subjects participate in 
the (re)production of inequality. Following Foucault (2008), this power is diffuse, not 
emanating only from the location of the “state,” but through these very procedures, 
existing in a capillary-like fashion immanently. This governmentality is the mechanism 
by which contemporary governance operates so that subjects implement discipline on and 
through themselves.33 Governance, then, functions as the coming together of these self-
disciplining subjects (individuals, NGOs and other civil society, state agencies, 
multinationals etc.) to fabricate the public good—in the case of Brazil poverty alleviation 
and environmental sustainability—that nonetheless remains inextricable from the goals of 
accumulation. Governance agreements, such as those that are aimed at “sustainable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33The “neoliberal governmentality” literature explores more specifically how both the devolution of state 
functions to non-state actors and the extension of market-logic to state functions constitute a particular form 
of Power (Rose 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Hart 2004; Li 2007). An extensive and explicitly 
geographic literature also elaborates on the concept of neoliberal environmental governance (See, for 
example Castree 2008; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; McCarthy 2004; Heynen 2007; Mansfield 2004). 
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development” then, should be understood not as the creation of power-neutral 
participatory spaces, but rather as a particular exercise of power where actors and objects 
come into new political relationships modeled on the principles of a market economy 
(Foucault 2008). Rather than functioning as a method for dispersing or decentralizing 
power, representation in governance, in this re-worked political relationship, becomes 
another manifestation of domination (albeit a rather sophisticated one) (Zibechi 2010). 
 Environmental, or “green” governance, especially surrounding issues of land and 
land use, increasingly focuses on the promotion of individual private land rights 
(addressed in Chapter Three) and certification of sustainable extractive methods 
(Klooster 2005; Oliveira 2006; Akram-Lodhi, Borras, and Kay 2007). Although justified 
through the language of participation and democracy, environmental governance focuses 
more on the processes by which “the environment” (both the fictitious commodities that 
constitute it and the socialities that produce and govern it) can be brought into the process 
of capital accumulation than on the democratization of environmental access and control. 
The underlying assumption is that any solution to ecological problems lies in liberalism, 
with its focus on “frugal government,” the market as a site of justice, and liberal 
economics—emphasizing the ability of the individual consumer to direct the market 
through her consumptive practices. In other words, environmental governance presumes 
that elements of capitalist modernity can be harnessed to solve environmental problems 
(McCarthy 2004). 
 In this chapter, I argue that in posing the market as a neutral site of regulation and 
democracy as its method, such environmental governance effectively defuses opposition, 
creates new (green) markets for commodified nature, and secures the position of the 
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ENGOs and corporations that enact it. I offer a detailed analysis of how the emergence of 
a particular governance regime in the lower Brazilian Amazon has reconstituted political 
relationships. I use the example of agribusiness (Cargill), International Environmental 
NGOs (The Nature Conservancy or TNC, Conservation International or CI, and WWF) 
(henceforth ENGOs) and Amazonian soy specifically to underscore the intimate 
relationship between market-oriented conservation, neo-extractivism and governance. In 
the final section, I use empirical data from the highlands near Santarém, Pará, to 
demonstrate that this new political configuration has questionable effects for 
conservation, but concrete and deleterious effects for rural life. By examining governance 
in its capillary form—in the actual programs and practices through which it works—I 
illuminate how the broad construct of governance is mediated through the categories of 
participation and conservation. 
THE EMERGENCE OF AMAZONIAN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 In Amazonia today, the most common argument for “environmental” governance, 
which fit within the larger framework of “participatory,” “pro-poor,” or “good” 
governance, is that development is inevitable and therefore must be done “sustainably.”34 
Further, nearly everyone, from developmentalists to development critics, argue that 
Brazil has sophisticated, progressive laws regarding both citizenship and the environment 
that are simply not enforced because the state lacks the capacity to do so (Benatti 1998; 
Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Holston 2008). Many of these “perfect laws,” however, were 
written into the Brazilian constitution as the result of compromises struck between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34 For examples of these governance models, see the FAO on food security 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/018/k6367e.pdf, or the World Bank (IRBD 1992). For Amazonian 
examples, see The Nature Conservancy, 2006, or Nepstad et al., 2006.  
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government and the social movements that took power during the transition to 
democracy, with the awareness that they were largely symbolic because their 
implementation would be impossible within the existing government structure (Holston 
2008). In other words, unenforceable laws were a state strategy to simultaneously 
appease both the left and the right.  In the framework of governance, the logic that 
follows from the assertion of “good but unenforceable laws” is that there is a failure of 
the state that can only be solved through external assistance (e.g. private business and 
NGOs). In effect, the “failure of the state” becomes the primary justification for law 
enforcement through partnerships with non-governmental organizations and private 
parties.  
 This section contextualizes the emergence of Amazonian environmental 
governance with particular attention to ENGOs (also often referred to as “Big 
Conservation” (Borras and Franco 2010). I focus on how mandates to govern 
“environment and development” incorporated critiques of modernization-style 
development into governance and introduced new structures of funding that contributed 
to the hegemony of ENGOs in regional governance and the ideology of “participatory 
sustainable development” in Amazonia. Finally, I argue that the hegemonic institution of 
“sustainable development,” along with the rise of a progressive government, set the stage 
for the governance paradigm that makes neo-extractivism possible.  
From Developmentalism to Environmentalism 
By the early 1980s, high rates of deforestation associated with the military 
government’s colonization projects (explored more fully in Chapter Three) garnered 
worldwide attention. From localized resistance by indigenous and traditional people to a 
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national environmentalist movement newly concerned with forest conservation, to 
international environmentalists and multilateral agencies, new networks of global 
environmental politics emerged in response to and as a critique of the military 
government’s developmentalism (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Northern environmentalists—led by what would become the major international 
ENGOs (Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, 
and Environmental Defense Fund, among others) —had come to see “tropical 
deforestation” (a concept that did not even exist prior to the 1970s) associated with 
modernization-style development as emblematic of environmental problems caused by 
and located in the third world (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Those ENGOs were also faced 
with increasing opposition from the business community in northern countries and were 
seeking new, international markets (Corson 2010). Simultaneously, in the wake of 
decolonization, the new southern majority within the UN promoted a pro-development 
agenda for the global south. These positions came to a stand-off at the 1972 UN 
conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, where Brazil itself took a firm 
“pro-development” stance and the conference remained mired in an “environment versus 
development” debate (Carlos Walter Porto-Gonçalves 1989).  
International environmentalist networks were simultaneously deepening and 
expanding and several global institutions were formed, funded largely by private donors 
and Scandinavian governments (the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
and the United Nations Environment Program worked in conjunction with the World 
Wildlife Fund) who developed a strategy linking environment and development. These 
alliances created a new, global, institutional, conservation framework marked by a series 
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of international conferences, papers, and programs implemented by the UN also in 
conjunction with international multilateral development agencies such as the World 
Bank, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the US USAID, 
and the ENGOS.35 Additionally, during the 1980s, membership and private funding for 
the ENGOs, many based in the US, also skyrocketed, and these organizations put 
international environmental issues visibly on the agenda of international political 
concerns (Adams 2001; Corson 2010). 
The 1980s also marked the decade of democratic transition in Brazil, where social 
movements, including the environmental movement, were claiming new political space 
(Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Social movements in the 
Amazon, most famously the Rubber Tappers in Acre, were mobilizing against the 
military regime and specifically around land conflict generated by developers moving on 
to traditional and indigenous lands. To garner worldwide support for their cause, they 
recast a struggle over land conflict to one for conservation. The assassination of rubber 
tapper leader Chico Mendes in 1989 set off a chain of events that initiated new 
collaborations between the Brazilian state, national and international environmentalists, 
multilateral development institutions, foreign governments, and localized civil society 
organizations (Keck 1995; Hecht and Cockburn 2011).  
This alliance will be explored in more detail in Chapters Four and Five. For our 
purposes here, it is important to note that it had substantive effects for both Amazonian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35Researchers locate the origins of the international environmental networks in the attempt to begin 
developing international institutions through the 1968 Biosphere Conference, the UN 1972 UN conference 
on the Human Environment in Stockholm (where NGOs received significant support through the funding 
of a parallel conference to avoid alienating their governments), the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), 
the 1988 Bruntland Report (Our Common Future), the 1992 United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) conference in Rio, and the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Adams 2001). 
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politics broadly, in that it made conservation a key issue in any future considerations of 
Amazonian policy, and for conservation approaches broadly, as it was one of several key 
episodes in a global political moment in which the export of the American “fortress 
conservation” model to the developing world was undergoing severe criticism. 
International conservation activists and practitioners argued that conservation projects 
were not successful because they did not incorporate “local people.” These critiques 
resulted in a shift to a conservation approach that specifically integrated “local people” 
and their “economic development,” giving rise to the Integrated Conservation-
Development Projects (ICDPs), or Community-based Conservation, which became the 
leading conservation paradigm advocated by environmental NGOs and major donors by 
the mid 1990s (Adams 2001; Browder 2002).  
This international/localized environmentalist alliance also drew significant 
attention to the devastation wrought by some of the national development projects 
financed by multi-national organizations such as the World Bank and USAID. In 
response, these organizations radically shifted their positions and therefore the terms on 
which they lent money—mandating environmental evaluations, accountability for money 
spent, and specific goals be met as terms for lending for development projects (Becker 
1997). On a national scale, the federal government responded to harsh critiques from the 
international community and burgeoning national environmental movement by initiating 
new environmental actions, policies, and agencies, including the end of the 
PoloAmazonia development program, the creation of CONAMA (the National 
Environmental Commission), the National Program for the Environment (PNMA), and 
the Nossa Natureza Program. The government launched these initiatives with great 
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fanfare that included a comprehensive program geared toward the organization of 
environmental protection on a national level, environmental education, territorial 
ordering, and the protection of indigenous and traditional people. Article 225 of the new 
constitution (1988) was completely dedicated to the issue of “the environment;” it 
specifically designated entire parts of the country (the Pantanal, the Mata Atlantica, and 
the Amazon) as areas of National Patrimony to be protected.  
This was the context in which the concept of “sustainable development” emerged. 
Following several years after the publication of Our Common Future in 1987 and the 
establishment of the debt-for-nature swaps that first established the international ENGOs 
as key international environmental brokers, the  “Earth Summit” or UN Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 marked the 
institutionalization of the concept of “sustainable development” in the Brazilian Amazon 
through the launching of the Pilot Program for the Conservation of Brazilian Rainforests 
(1995-2009) (PPG7). The PPG7 was an international partnership between G7 countries, 
various Brazilian government environmental and social agencies, and international, 
regional, and local NGOs. Originally proposed by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the 
program provided US$250 million to meet its stated goals of reducing deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon and Atlantic Forests, conserving biodiversity, and demonstrating 
the feasibility of sustainable development and the possibility of north-south collaboration 
on environmental issues (Millikan et al. 2002).  
 Combining technical forest management with a larger project to restructure civil 
society through the creation of a professional network of environmental NGOs and 
through a territorial re-ordering based in ecological-economic zoning (see Chapter Three 
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for a more detailed discussion of this), the PPG7 effected a shift in civil society that 
Hochstetler and Keck (2005, 170) describe as moving from “adversarial (blocking)” to 
“collaborative (enabling) relations” with national and international policy makers. It 
responded to critiques of international multilateral institutions by local actors by 
requiring program participation from the sectors of society affected by the proposed 
projects. This meant that program financing targeted capacity-building in and by NGOs. 
Hundreds of new environmental or “socio-ecological” (sustainable development “from 
below”) NGOs were formed to capture some of the large sums of money flowing into the 
region for conservation projects, forming the Grupo de Trabalhosobre Amazonia (the 
Amazon Working Group), a consortium of over 600 NGOs and movement organizations. 
At the same time that financing for state initiatives and state agencies was 
shrinking under the aggressive neoliberal policies in Brazil in the 1990s, multi-lateral 
loans increasingly carried environmental stipulations. This created a market for 
environmental research and conservation projects with a large, external source of funding 
available through the PPG7, thereby shifting most conservation work to NGOs. The 
region saw the proliferation of “research NGOs” as producers of basic, scientific, 
information (IPAM, environmental research institute IMAZON, the Socio-environmental 
Institute or ISA, Friends of the Earth or Amigos da Terra, among others) who work 
alongside the region’s traditional university-affiliated research organizations (The 
National Institute for Space Research or INPE, the National Institute for Amazonian 
Research or INPA, the Emílio Goeldi Pará Museum MPEG, the Institute for Applied 
Economic Research IPEA), but are generally funded through the multilateral institutions 
and other foreign donors (Leite 2005). 
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It also meant a professionalization of movements. To access the money available 
from PPG7 and similar programs, movement actors had to become formal organizations. 
The stipulations on funding to NGOs (who prior to the 1980s largely functioned as 
political organizers rather than implementers of development projects) mandated 
technical protocols that forced organizational restructuring as government simultaneously 
began to contract out provisions of service to NGOs through partnerships (parcerias) 
(Buclet and Leroy 2002).36 They also had to implement projects with “outcomes” that 
could be measured as opposed to their more traditional practices such as political 
education, consciousness building, and organizing.  
Territorially, this meant an explosion of “sustainable development” projects 
implemented through NGOs and state and federal agrarian reform agencies (The Pará 
state land institute, ITERPA, and the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform, INCRA), working with individuals or with communities to intensify their 
economic production—often requiring communities and individuals to take out loans to 
engage in these projects. The technical assistance, community investment, and localized 
knowledge of NGOs implementing projects was (and is) highly variable. The scope of 
these projects was striking; even in the most remote villages one encounters the legacy of 
one or another abandoned project. The subjective legacy is also clear—the project 
participants (most of the rural Amazon) became adept in the language of sustainability 
that accompanied these projects, which almost always contained both a technical and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36 NGOs, as part of “civil society,” are often depicted as representatives of “the people” based in their 
emergence alongside social movements as mediators who defended and represented marginalized people.  
Many of these NGOs were associated with the Catholic Church and the liberation theology movement and 
dominated Amazonian social organizing for decades (Landim 1998). Technification and competition for 
funding, however, meant that NGO work was/is increasingly driven by market/state forces/desires. So 
while NGOs often discursively retained this position as representative organizations—e.g. stand in for 
“civil society”—they no longer necessarily enacted a practice of representative organizations (Buclet and 
Leroy 2002). 
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consciousness-building element.  
 Thus the conservation landscape in the 1990s generally favored both 
“community-based conservation projects,” which sought to make the traditional, 
indigenous, and peasant populations of the Amazon economically viable and 
conservation conscious, and the creation of protected areas (of various kinds, from 
“integral” to areas for “sustainable development,” in order to open other areas for 
development). Economic viability strategies included accessing agrarian reform benefits, 
which focused largely on people considered to be traditional or peasant (and primarily 
organized as rural workers through the rural workers’ unions), as well as land 
regularization and small loans for production projects (through the Constitutional Fund 
for the North or FNO and then the National Program for Family Agriculture or 
PRONAF) oriented largely by NGOs. The primary institutions for the implementation of 
agrarian reform were INCRA, under the Agricultural Ministry or ITERPA on state lands 
or the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the 
Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) under the environmental 
ministry. These latter institutions enacted agrarian reform largely through the creation of 
“sustainable use” protected areas, which, along with Indigenous Lands (also considered 
key conservation sites), proliferated throughout the 1990s.   
This principal strategy in the 80s and 90s of creating protected areas ultimately 
limited economic development because, whether in fortress conservation or its 
community-based successor, it ultimately meant taking land out of the market.37 As 
Brazil’s economy recovered from crisis and resources became available for internal, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37That is not to imply that Units of Conservation are not also central to the process of accumulation. See 
Brockington and Duffy for a discussion (2008). 
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extractive-based development, keeping land out of the market “made less sense,” as the 
president of Pará’s land agency put it in an interview, and a new conservation-
development strategy became necessary.  
Neo-extractivism under the Workers Party 
 During the 1990s, the agro-industrial agricultural model that had intensified 
alongside and in opposition to the smallholder struggle for land in the 1980s, 
consolidated “agri-business” into a political-economic block that included the agrarian, 
cattle-raising, industrial, mercantile, mineral, and timber sectors and their associated 
technological and ideological systems controlled by state partnerships with national and 
international financial interests (Fernandes 1999; Porto Gonçalves 2010a).38 In 2003, soy 
and sugar prices spiked and the federal government began to intensively-support rapid 
expansion of export-oriented industrial agricultural production (soy exportation alone 
grew 35% that year and agro-industrial expansion continued to grow at a rate of 22% per 
year). In a 2007 speech, Lula even went so far as to hail agribusiness leaders as Brazil’s 
“heroes” (Folha de São Paulo, March 20, 2007). 
The Lula administration largely devoted development and funding priorities to 
agribusiness, especially for soy and sugar cane production and transport, over 
smallholder agriculture. Agribusiness and smallholder agriculture are each served by a 
separate agency within the federal government (Ministerio da Agricultura, Pecuária e 
Abastecimento, MAPA for agribusiness and Ministério do DesenvolvimentoAgrário, 
MDA for smallholder agriculture). Agribusiness received 85% of the government-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38The strongest expression of which is in the Bancada Ruralista, the multi-partisan congressional group 
whose mission is to defend the interests of large rural landholders and typically controls approximately one 
quarter of congressional seats, making it the largest special interest group in Congress (INESC 2007). 
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extended rural credit despite the fact that subsistence agriculture supports over half of the 
Brazilian population, and his administration continued to support territorial policies that 
maintained the distribution of land as one of the most unequal in the world, with 
agribusiness controlling 76% of arable land ( Mançano Fernandes 2012).39 Other 
mechanisms for supporting agribusiness expansion included embracing the agribusiness 
policies of the WTO and World Bank, continuing tax-exempt status for export-oriented 
agribusinesses, legalizing transgenic soy, granting financial credits for agribusiness 
projects, creating new territorial zoning projects to facilitate development, and planning a 
series of infrastructure projects nationwide to facilitate agro-industrial exports, 
implementing “Agrarian Reform” largely in the Amazon where land “regularization” was 
prioritized over expropriation and re-distribution, and later, privatization over Agrarian 
Reform (Fearnside 2007a; Jepson, Brannstrom, and Filippi 2010; Mançano Fernandes 
2012). 
In the Amazon, the support for agribusiness expansion worked in conjunction 
with a host of other policies that supported other types of extractivism explored further in 
the following chapter. Similarly, the growth of agro-industry as a part of the national 
economy had implications for the Amazon both in terms of actual monocultural 
production moving into the biome and through the infrastructure necessary for transport 
(the extensive impacts of infrastructure construction are treated in Chapter Three), as well 
as the displacement of other production systems (such as ranching) from soy producing 
areas in the south into the Amazon. As discussed in the introduction to this section and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, one of the foremost scholars on Brazilian Agrarian Reform, defines 
“agribusinss” as bringing together industrial cattle and agricultural production, along with finance, market-
based strategies, and technological innovation within one group of corporations.  
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explained in more detail below, national and international controversy over the effects of 
soy in the Amazon generated largely through a campaign launched by Greenpeace, 
paralyzed the process of this expansion. In response, this neo-extractive project was 
forced to address and incorporate environmental concerns. In other words, it needed to be 
“greened.” In the last decade series of “partnerships” between Brazilian and multi-
national corporations, and civil society organizations, mediated by Environmental NGOs, 
and often funded either by the multinational corporations or by foundations such as Ford 
and Moore have proliferated across the Amazon Region.40 In what follows, I analyze one 
such project to “green” soy agriculture in Amazonia. Through an empirical discussion of 
this project’s effects, I demonstrate how it compromises the livelihoods of the rural poor 
and the Amazonian environment. 
SOY IN THE AMAZON: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT or GREEN 
CAPITALISM? 
 Poor transportation infrastructure in the north and center-west is one of the major 
obstacles to expansion of Brazil’s agricultural commodity production in those regions. 
Paving the Santarém–Cuiaba highway (BR-163), built but not paved by the military 
government, could solve the problem of expensive transportation for exporters Bunge and 
Cargill, which purchase millions of tons of soybeans annually from the region, by 
providing a direct route from MatoGrosso in the center-west to the Amazon River in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  There are innumerable examples of this phenomenon, including individual projects such as the TNC 
project for Green Municipalities that is funded by Vale or the “Forum for the Sustainable Amazon,” the 
most recent iteration of non-governmental sustainable development planning is funded by the Ford 
Foundation, has over two hundred member organizations, and its Executive commission is composed of 
Agropalma [an agroindustrial palm production corporation], the National Council of Rubber Tappers; 
Coiab; the Federation of indigenous organizations of the Rio Negro,  the Avina Foundation [an 
organization that connects civil society and industry]; Grupo de Trabalho Amazonico (the Amazon working 
group of over 600 NGOs that came out of the PPG7); The institution for Business ethics and social 
responsibility; the Center of Life Institute; Imazon; the International Finance Coroporation; ISA; PSA; Vale 
(one of the world’s largest mining companies); and Walmart Brazil.	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Santarém in the north, reducing transport costs by up to 40%. Cargill built its Santarém 
port in 2000, anticipating that BR-163 would be paved through one of Brazil’s recent 
public/private partnerships as part of the national development project.41 
 
 Figure	  9:	  Cargill	  Port	  in	  Santarém,	  Photo	  by	  Greenpeace 
Prior to the port construction, but in anticipation of Cargill’s arrival BR-163’s 
paving, Santarém’s then-mayor (now federal deputy), Lira Maia, commissioned the 
federal agricultural agency to test soy-growing viability in the region and to map soil 
potential for agro-industry (EMBRAPA 2008), and launched a public relations campaign 
to attract farmers to the region, touting its low transport costs and cheap land. In the late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Avança Brasil, Brazil’s US$48 billion development plan for 200-2007, as well as the Acclerated Growth 
Program (PAC, US$503 billion) and PAC II (US$872 billion), all include funding earmarked for paving the 
BR-163 (Brazil, MPOG 1999, 2010).  
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1990s, farmers began to come in waves to the new “soy frontier,” purchasing tens of 
thousands of hectares in soy-viable areas from the smallholder migrant farmers who live 
along the dirt highways in the Amazon uplands.42  
Environmentalists were concerned with the potential direct and indirect impacts 
of soy (rapid deforestation in an area with a lot of primary forest), because the 
international market price for soy was skyrocketing and land tenure is largely disputed in 
the state of Pará. The combined desire for regional agricultural development and concern 
for its environmental effects led to calls for “governance.” This governance took on two 
forms. One form, addressed in the following chapter, was through a complete territorial 
re-organization, based in Ecological Economic Zoning, implemented in order to address 
the “dragging effects” of soy development. These programs, however, do not directly 
address the issue of monoculture production in an area valued for its standing forest. This 
was a problem taken up by the NGO-corporate alliances through voluntary licensing 
programs.  
 In what follows, I explain how a network of NGOs discursively rendered 
Amazonian soy a problem that could be solved (by them) through the production of a 
different type of environmental value: soy, unable to be sold because of its environmental 
image, was rendered “green” through environmental licensing. I highlight the difference 
between program rhetoric—which argues that stopping deforestation is an apolitical, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42According to a compilation of sources including soy farmer interviews, Embrapa 2005, MPF 
denunciations (for example Santarém Federal Justice number 2003.39.02.001236-5), voided Incra land 
titles, and press releases by the Attorney of the republic (2005 and 2009) both Lira Maia and INCRA’s 
superintendent at the time also traveled to MatoGrosso to make land deals with soy farmers; eleven INCRA 
employees, an employee of the MinisterioPublico, INCRA Belém’s superintendent and later Federal 
Deputy José Roberto Oliveira Faro, along with several lawyers were implicated in the production of 
fraudulent titles for illegal sales of land from Agrarian Reform Settlements over the internet (tens of 
thousands of hectares) to soy farmers and loggers.  
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universal public good, that markets have a natural ability to provide conservation 
incentives, and that justice may be attained through existing laws—and program 
logistic—which equate private needs with the public good, which manipulate markets, 
and which re-write laws. I then examine the environmental, social, and political effects of 
these programs in the highlands near Santarém in the state of Pará. 
Voluntary licensing: Responsible Soy and the Soy Moratorium 
 Voluntary licensing is one of many types of food certification programs, which 
function as a Polanyian “double movement” against neoliberalism, modulating the effects 
of forcing “fictitious commodities” into the market by redistributing profits or re-
embedding ethics in product value so as to change the terms of exchange (Mutersbaugh 
2005). TNC with Cargill, and a group of transnational corporations with ENGOs, created 
two programs (Responsible Soy and the Soy Moratorium respectively) that address soy 
production in the Amazon. To understand how they address the problem, we must first 
understand how they define it. The problem with soy, according to Greenpeace and TNC, 
was its potential to cause deforestation of virgin forest for soy production as had 
happened in MatoGrosso (Jepson 2003; Wolford 2008). 
 Soy growers’ union leaders reported that they and Cargill partnered with TNC to 
“green” their image following Greenpeace’s 2006 public relations campaign against 
Cargill Santarém and Amazonian soy. TNC works in over 30 countries and is the US’s 
third largest nonprofit by assets and its largest environmental nonprofit by revenue. Its 
director is a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. It is repeatedly ranked as 
America’s most trusted non-profit. TNC approaches conservation according to what 
Stephens and Ottoway (Washington Post, May 4, 2003) call “compatible development”—
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combining the needs of business with the needs of environmentalism.43 Following this 
model, the world’s biggest polluters can work as partners with TNC either through their 
“corporate leadership circle” or by directly funding projects. TNC’s position is that 
corporations will either wreak havoc on the world themselves, or will find “sustainable” 
ways to expand by working with conservation organizations. In other words, “there is no 
alternative”—the Amazon needs increased production, and the Amazon needs 
conservation. The contradictory nature of expanded production and conservation are not 
the problem; the problem, for TNC and similar NGOs, is one of governance.   
 Justification for “governance” depends on the problem of Amazonian 
development being rendered a technocratic one of deforestation, rather than an ethico-
political problem of competing visions for Amazonia. In TNC’s words:  
Amidst all the arguments over the Amazon there is one point of 
consensus: deforestation should be reduced. In theory, there are two 
ways that might happen. The first, given that most deforestation in the 
Amazon is illegal, is that Brazilian authorities enforce laws against 
deforestation. But the Amazon is very large, the presence of the 
authorities is patchy and enforcement in the absence of other measures 
is unlikely ever to be a success: both sticks and carrots are necessary. 
The second way to reduce deforestation is to work directly with those 
responsible and change their behavior. For this, the people to reach 
are not the traditional partners of environmental organizations in the 
Amazon, like indigenous people, rubber-tappers or subsistence 
farmers, who clear relatively little forest. The key people to reach are 
the big deforesters: ranchers and commercial farmers. Very soon 
biofuel producers will be joining the party, as Brazil reinforces its 
position as the world’s leading producer of sugar-cane ethanol. So the 
expansion of commercial agriculture into the Amazon… is driven by 
very powerful market demands that will not disappear anytime 
soon…The Amazon cannot be insulated from the outside world. 
 
 In one paragraph, TNC has 1) rendered expansion of Amazonian soy inevitable; 
2) made all competing arguments about Amazonia superfluous, reducing them to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43Stephens and Ottoway’s (2003) Washington Post reporting revealed that TNC had stolen mineral rights 
and allowed destructive oil drilling for profit on its land. 
	   89	  
technical issue of deforestation; 3) argued that a failure of government means that the 
only effective regulation comes from the stick (forced compliance that the government 
cannot do on its own) and the carrot (market-incentives); 4) justified an alliance with big 
business; and 5) made smallholders irrelevant to the situation.   
 In enacting the Soy Moratorium, TNC and Cargill joined several other NGOs 
(WWF and IPAM), Aboive (Brazilian Association of Industrial Vegetable Oils), ANEC 
(National Association of Cereal Exporters), and the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union 
(STTR), whose presence as local people legitimized the process as “participatory.” The 
Moratorium is a voluntary agreement between buyers, growers, and “civil society” 
beginning in June 2006 then extended for three years, which put a moratorium on 
purchasing soy grown on land deforested to grow soy. Its founding document (2006) 
focuses on “governance” —creating the “soy working group” to help the government 
“implement legislation and existing laws.” Like Responsible Soy—the Cargill/TNC 
agreement for soy produced in the greater Santarém area—the moratorium is premised 
upon the idea that deforestation is the problem, and that governance is the solution.  
 
“The Carrot” in Theory 
 Licensing seeks to internalize potential externalities, thereby minimizing the 
exploitation (in this case, of the environment) that capitalist competition tends to create in 
its “race to the bottom.” This involves setting standards, in this case of production, and 
monitoring the meeting of those standards, or verification (Guthman 2007). Buyers agree 
not to purchase soy that was grown on land deforested beyond the size of the legally 
required reserve (in the Amazon this was 80% of a property and has, through negotiations 
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over Ecological Economic Zoning been reduced to 50%) in order to produce that soy. A 
third party (TNC/Soy Working Group) verifies whether or not producers have met these 
requirements, thereby authorizing the buyer to purchase the product. The agreement is 
voluntary in that it is not enforceable by law. In the case of Cargill and Santarém’s soy 
growers, the agreement could also be construed as coercive in that there is only one other 
regional buyer of soybeans, Avis Pará, who purchases approximately 10% of regionally 
produced beans. After Greenpeace’s campaign, banks stopped giving farmers loans 
without collateral. Because 67% of land in the state of Pará is not titled, most farmers 
there cannot put up their land as collateral (Oliveira 2009). Cargill, then, becomes the 
only entity capable of extending the credit that is necessary for industrial production. To 
access this credit, farmers are forced to participate in the program. In other words, the 
carrot is also the stick. 
 Voluntary agreements must be based on demonstrating the difference between 
non-licensed and licensed commodities. There is no other quality, such as taste or 
appearance, which would suggest that soy produced under the moratorium program is 
better, which would make it possible to differentiate that soy from other soy, or which 
could prove that it was produced on land not recently deforested. Verification by a trusted 
source is key to making believable claims. NGOs, then, become indispensible in the 
governing relation—they are able to transfer consumer confidence in them to the 
producer who works in partnership with them.44 Given that Amazonian produced soy has 
no exchange value on the international market (e.g. cannot be sold) without this 
certification, these programs function as the gateway to the access and distribution of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For example Grist.org, a top US environmental website, suggested, based on TNC’s advice that 
consumers only purchase soy products produced by companies participating in the Soy Moratorium (which 
includes all of the agribusiness giants). http://www.grist.org/article/2009-04-24-navigating-non-dairy/ 
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value.  
“The Carrot” in Practice 
 The Soy Moratorium’s founding document stipulates 1) that farmers must not 
deforest any new land for soy planting after 2007; 2) that farmers comply with the forest 
code; 3) that they reforest areas over the legal maximum for deforestation; 3) that farmers 
legally hold title to their land within two years of entering the program; 4) that within two 
years the soy working group develop a verification mechanism; and 5) that purchasing 
companies sign the National Pact to eradicate slavery. Farmers out of compliance with 
the above cannot sell their soy. Until 2009, no system was developed that could monitor 
deforestation of less than 100 hectares. Given that most farms in the Santarém area are 
between 200 and 1500 hectares in size, it is likely that such a large grain of analysis 
would fail to detect deforestation on soy farms. In September 2009, TNC’s Responsible 
Soy program director said they had developed a system to monitor deforestation on a 
farm-by-farm basis, but only for highlands outside of Santarém (the area in the 
Responsible Soy Program), not the entire area covered by the moratorium. He stressed in 
his interview that there was no other entity that had TNC’s technological sophistication—
no one else was monitoring any soy production at this grain of analysis, as the 
moratorium implied.  
 TNC’s terms of agreement with Cargill change yearly and the terms of the 
contract are not made public, which raises the question—what are they licensing? 
According to TNC interviews, the 2009 agreement stipulated that farmers must have 
entered into the process to get an environmental license, submitting an application to 
register for the rural registry. This requirement is met by submitting paperwork; farmers 
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do not have to receive a response from the state environmental secretary (SEMA). 
Waiting for SEMA to respond is illogical, according to TNC, because it is not TNC’s, nor 
the farmers’ fault, that SEMA does not have the capacity to respond (or the political 
will). In other words, contrary to claims elsewhere, TNC is not concerned with the 
effectiveness of governmental process, only that farmers comply with its own rules. 
Further, when TNC finds a farmer violating the forest code, they report them to Cargill, 
not to the government. So it appears that they are not actually advocating for their stated 
mission to aid enforcement of laws, but for compliance with the terms of the agreement 
with Cargill.  
 Farmers in the Responsible Soy program must have farms located in areas of 
“consolidation” or “expansion” within the ZEE (which means areas not explicitly 
designated as protected areas). This means that while farmers in the program cannot 
infiltrate indigenous or traditional territory (protected areas), there are no repercussions 
for incursions on Agrarian Reform settlements or other areas where migrant farmers 
(non- ethnically/culturally protected people yet those primarily displaced by soy) live.45 
The struggle for/over land tenure is at the heart of Amazonian land conflict. TNC’s 
research  on land tenure and soy, which they have not released publically, concluded that 
a large percentage of their farmers did not have tenure (Barreto 2009). When their 
negotiations for that tenure for soy farmers with INCRA failed, they removed the land 
tenure requirement from the program. 
 Internal government documents revealed that Cargill and TNC representatives 
met with officials from INCRA, IBAMA, and the Ministerio Publico (Cohenca, 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45There have been numerous requests for recognition of indigenous, traditional and Quilombola 
territories within areas designated for “expansion” or “consolidation” in ZEE. Taking the ZEE as 
the starting point for requirements for soy farmers effectively ignores these claims. 
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Arguing that soy would be an economic boon to the region, they asked these agencies to 
regularize the property rights of the soy farmers, reduce all of their existing fines to 10% 
of their economic value, accept data provided by TNC as “official” data (such as 
geographic data), and expedite authorizations for deforestation. They also proposed that 
the legal reserve, which at the time was 80% of a given piece of property that must be 
kept deforested, be allowed to be re-located off of the property (and inside already 
existing reserve areas)—which would theoretically allow soy farmers to be in compliance 
with the Soy Moratorium/Responsible Soy while deforesting up to 100% of their 
property. These terms raise doubts as to whether the purpose of governance is to better 
implement existing laws or to change them. 
The Effects of Soy Governance  
Environmental Effects 
 Whether the moratorium has been effective in stopping soy-related deforestation 
remains questionable. TNC and Greenpeace concede that a monitoring system capable of 
tracking deforestation on the smaller size farms more common in the Amazon has not 
existed until this past year. Further, the number of farms found deforesting in order to 
grow soy in the Amazon biome actually increased between 2006 and 2008 (Greenpeace 
2008). Researchers produce different and contradictory data on soy-related deforestation 
rates (Cohenca 2005; Coelho 2009; Weinhold, Killick, and Reis 2010). Most arguments 
for effectiveness of the moratorium rely on conclusions that are based on correlations 
rather than evidence-based causation, and NGOs’ propaganda misrepresents existing 
data. For example, Greenpeace’s website states, “thanks to the Soy Moratorium, soy is no 
longer the chief driver of Amazon deforestation.” During the primary period of soy 
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expansion into the Amazon (2001-2008), 80% of deforestation of the Amazon happened 
in Brazil and 70% of that has been cattle-related and only 10% soy-related—in other 
words, soy was never the chief driver of Amazonian deforestation. There is no data 
indicating that the Soy Moratorium has impacted soy expansion or deforestation. To the 
contrary, most evidenced-based arguments for the slowing of soy expansion point to 
falling/stagnating prices on the global market (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006; 
Malhi et al. 2008). In July of 2010, even Greenpeace, the moratorium’s biggest supporter, 
admitted that the results of the moratorium were inconclusive. The apparent the success 
of both the Soy Moratorium and the Responsible Soy program are based on rhetorical 
expertise rather than evidence-based scientific research. 
 
Figure	  10:	  Soy	  fields	  in	  Belterra,	  Pará	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Social effects 
 When Lira Maia brought MatoGrosso’s farmers maps of potential soy areas near 
Santarém, he neglected to inform them that they were not maps of an empty landscape. 
Much of the land was utilized by smallholder farmers—primarily peasant farmers who 
had migrated to the region to escape cycles of drought and extreme inequality in 
northeastern Brazil. Known as colonos, these subsistence farmers have generally settled 
in the uplands along Amazonian highways and roads. Government programs and 
propaganda regarding free land and work in extractive industries attracted hundreds of 
thousands of poor and landless workers to the Amazon beginning in the late 1960s. 
Government withdrawal from the region in the 80s left them, in their words, feeling 
“abandoned,” their communities “forgotten,” and the people “stuck.” Even now, most 
remain in small rural settlements, farming on individual plots, cynical about repeated 
government promises for roads, credit, and energy that after forty years have still not 
arrived.  
These are the communities that have been most directly impacted by the arrival of 
soy into the region. In some cases, the conflict generated with colono communities by the 
arrival of soy farmers has manifested according to what we might think of as the 
traditional forms of latifundia—peasant conflict, where soy farmers have forced people 
off of their land, burned their houses, created false titles and expropriated families living 
on land, or simply started farming on land that belonged to a given community as 
represented in the Greenpeace documentary, “Eating up the Amazon,” and reported in 
some interviews. More commonly, however, displacement and disruption of rural 
communities happens along the lines of what we might call a “rural gentrification,” 
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where what are largely medium-sized farmers (200-1000 hectares), buy land cheaply 
from poor farmers with little capital in order to establish larger soy farms. Unlike typical 
Amazonian latifundiaor ranchers, these farmers are not absentee owners. Rather, 
according to the several farmers that I interviewed as well as the head of the Sirsan, the 
agribusiness union in Santarém, they tend to be farmers who worked in middle 
management on the mega-farms of MatoGrosso, who acquired capital and moved to the 
Amazon, where farming had lower start-up costs, with dreams of establishing a 
successful farming project and a bucolic, rural life. Their success is dependent upon 
displacement of the existing communities, because the land for one soy farm usually 
comprises what had previously been the land of many families, and dependent upon 
commodification of the land, because it is needed as collateral for loans. It was also 
dependent upon their participation in TNC’s program, because without TNC’s stamp of 
approval, Cargill would not purchase their soy.  
 Since the end of the 1990s, soy farmers moving into the region have offered large 
payments for land, especially for land with documents. As some smallholders began to 
sell, incentives for others to sell increased because the social networks in which they 
lived were broken, schools were closed, and pesticide on neighboring soy fields drove 
pests into their fields. It is estimated that twenty-six communities disappeared in the 
highlands proximate to Santarém between 1998 and 2007 (Projeto Saude & Alegria 
2008).  
 The transformation of the landscape along the highways leaving Santarém from a 
landscape of family farms to one of monoculture soy was striking, and there was much 
discussion over the effect of soy on surrounding communities but little actual information 
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regarding what happened to families and communities displaced through this process of 
land sales. In order to better understand the effects of the territorialization of soy 
agriculture, I conducted meetings in three communities where we mapped out the 
families who had left, where they had gone, and if possible, what their sale prices had 
been. I also tracked down several of these families and interviewed them regarding their 
land sales and their lives after they left their communities.  
My empirical research in six of these communities demonstrated that people who 
moved out of these communities tended to move short distances (2-50 kilometers) and 
closer to urban or transportation infrastructure. Land sale prices varied widely from less 
than $100 reais (approximately US$35 at the time) per hectare to upwards of $2000 reais 
(US$850), largely depending on the time of sale (earlier sales yielded lower prices) and 
the security of property rights (titled land demands higher prices than other forms of 
possession). Families interviewed who sold land universally purchased smaller lots than 
those they had previously inhabited, and usually significantly smaller (e.g. sold 60 
hectares and purchased one hectare, or sold 40 hectares and purchased an urban or peri-
urban lot measuring 30 x 40 meters were the norm). When purchasing new land, they 
paid between five and ten times as much per hectare for land that always had less secure 
property rights. In summary, smallholders generally sold titled land or land with some 
type of legal possession and in its place purchased a much smaller and more expensive 
plot of land with no legal property rights. In all cases, the only document that people 
received for new land was a purchase receipt from the seller. People’s youngest children 
tended to move with them, while older children often went to the city (Santarém) or 
dispersed to other rural areas. Family income upon moving to urban areas always 
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included at least one form of government subsidy, usually either social security 
(aposentadoria) or the family assistance program (bolsafamilia). Those who moved to 
other rural areas continued to plant manioc (the region’s staple crop), while those who 
moved to urban/peri-urban areas no longer engaged in subsistence agriculture beyond 
small home gardens.  
 In communities where most people had left, remaining residents lamented the 
deterioration of infrastructure, the destruction of their communities, and the loss of their 
families, many of which were split up in the process of land selling. They also reported 
extreme reduction in their ability to grow, which they blamed on soy farmers’ application 
of pesticides, and said that now they were forced to purchase food that they had formerly 
grown. “Life” in the remaining community, interviewees said repeatedly, “is difficult, but 
wasn’t always this way.” Those who remained had generally never received offers to sell. 
Many development practitioners in Amazonia, including Responsible Soy’s 
program director, argue that subsistence agriculture is “unproductive,” that it threatens 
Amazonian conservation, and that it would be better replaced by the more “productive” 
(in terms of surplus) agro-industry.46 The underlying assumption is that non-agricultural 
life is more desirable, that surplus production (i.e. profit) is better and/or more secure 
than subsistence, and that urban employment even exists, which in Santarém is not the 
case. Migration for waged employment and/or for access to better land is not uncommon 
in these communities. What is uncommon is the disappearance of the communities that 
have consistently formed a rural safety net when food prices increase, or when other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46The 2008 World Bank Report, which also suggests that smallholders unable to compete in higher value 
production exit agriculture, demonstrates that this is a dominant strain in development thinking. It is also 
highly disputed. See the Journal of Peasant Studies 36(3) Forum on the Report, and specifically Li (2009) 
in that issue.  
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types of employment become scarce. Interview data revealed that relocation and return 
migration is common among these communities. If there is no place to return to, the cycle 
of rural life and its safety net is disrupted. 
 Consequently, the region’s food sovereignty is at risk as soy farms replace 
subsistence farms. Like other neo-extractivist industries, soy production is for export. 
Displaced local production must be replaced by importing food from other parts of 
Brazil. Imported goods to Santarém are expensive for the same reason that soy shipping 
is expensive—they must be shipped from afar via river or plane. Displacement also 
drives up the price for locally produced food. For example, in Santarém, in 2009, a 
combination of increased government subsidies for daily living of smallholders, low 
market prices for the labor intensive farinha (a manioc product), extreme weather 
conditions (very dry summer, very wet winter), and growing urban demand meant that 
farinha prices doubled in Santarém. Rural families who had not planted farinha in 
previous years re-planted intensively again following the rise in prices. For those who no 
longer have land, this is no longer an option. The threat to food sovereignty is especially 
severe because there is no consistent form of alternative income for displaced farmers; 
purchasing food when prices rise is challenging. 
Political effects  
The conjunctural changes of the past ten years, marked by the incursion of 
agribusiness into the region and its alliance with organizations that were previously 
viewed as sympathetic to smallholders, means that lines of antagonism are blurred. 
Rather than the historical conflict between smallholders and latifundia that often erupted 
in confrontational violence and the forced relocation of smallholders, soy farmers usually 
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purchase land from smallholders. Smallholder reception of soy farmers range from quite 
receptive (“it was by the grace of God that the soy farmers appeared and bought our 
land”) to resigned (“if I had the money to stay, I would not have sold, but I did not have 
the conditions to refuse the offer, so now we are here [in their new, smaller plot]).” And 
most soy farmers were on reasonably good terms with the people they displaced.47 When 
larger, longer-term effects of displacement became apparent, those still eligible turn to 
the rural workers’ union; the union points to “Cargill” as their adversary. A transnational 
adversary is less immediate and more difficult to effectively organize against through 
existing resistance strategies.   
 In response, union leaders built their own international alliances, stating, “How 
can we fight against Cargill? We have no resources. We do not have access to the 
national and international media. Greenpeace and The Health and Happiness Project 
(PSA, a regional NGO) are important partners because it is only with them that we have 
the resources to fight against Cargill.” The union participated in a PSA/Greenpeace 
“participatory mapping” project to record the effects of soy in Belterra. The Greenpeace 
release of this map, both in Santarem and at the World Social Forum in Belém in 2009, 
was hailed by the union, NGOs and the representatives of the indigenous, traditional, and 
quilombola communities present at these events as the key tool to battling Cargill, soy 
farmers and Agribusiness in the Amazon.  
 One and a half years later, the only official use of this map was by Cargill, who 
incorporated the map into its environmental impact assessment to demonstrate that they 
had evaluated the negative social impacts of soy, and to argue that port construction’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47One farmer, for example, built a water tower near the highway to encourage people to sell him their land 
and re-locate near the highway, which they did. He and Belterra’s mayor (who has greatly facilitated the 
expansion of soy farming) threw a party to Christen the new “community.” 
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positive impacts outweighed the negative in terms of job creation and regional economic 
growth. The map, then, was instrumental for governance in multiple ways. It functioned 
as a tool for Greenpeace to “empower” local actors, offering them resources (financial 
and technical) with which some thought would make their claims legible to government 
and media in order to rally political support against Cargill, drawing their energy away 
from other avenues of resistance. It also provided Greenpeace with the legitimacy that it 
needed to carry out its anti-soy campaign and to ultimately negotiate the Soy Moratorium 
(on their behalf), which incorporated none of the social concerns of local actors, and 
instead, as previously discussed, focused strictly on deforestation. Finally, it was a tool 
for Cargill to argue that it had considered social issues, in order to have its Environmental 
Impact Assessment, and therefore its port, approved. 
 Legitimacy of the Soy Moratorium hinged on the inclusion of “local” actors. 
Initially, the Santarem Rural Workers’ Union and the Amazon Defense Front participated 
in the negotiations; however, FDA withdrew when “they laughed at our proposal for ‘soy 
zero’” (no Amazonian soy production). Other moratorium signatories included NGOs 
that work on regional social/environmental issues but have no constituency in the 
Santarem area (ISA). The CPT, the Landless Workers’ Movement or MST, Via 
Campesina, and FASE (a national social justice NGO) all opted out of the moratorium 
stating in a letter that it would “only serve to legalize soy in the region.” The Union and 
Greenpeace argued in internal emails that although the moratorium is not ideal, 
negotiation is the only option for stopping transnational corporations from destroying the 
Amazon. As demonstrated in the introduction, more unified resistance was divided as 
some opted to “participate.” The ambiguous results of the moratorium and Responsible 
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Soy and the near disappearance of the soy controversy from the media and from everyday 
discussion in the city, indicates that governance neutralized this controversy. More 
importantly, it points to the changing terms of the territorial and environmental politics in 
Amazonia. 
CONCLUSION  
 In summary, the growing pace of neo-extractive development deemed necessary 
to sustain Brazil’s expanding economy is in part constituted by contemporary 
conservation initiatives that redeploy neo-extractive expansion as environmentally 
progressive. This “greening” of neo-extractivism itself, I have demonstrated here, turns 
on explicitly environmental and implicitly social claims. Tying neo-extractivism to issues 
of poverty and environment makes it indispensible to maintain those things, which are 
represented apolitically as the “public good.” The failure of the state is blamed for 
negative development impacts and as such, the optimal method of dealing with these 
impacts is presented as non-state, voluntary, public-private agreements. In such 
arrangements, various groups may come to the table, but only a few of them can set the 
agenda, leaving local actors with the choices to “opt in or out.” This assumes that a 
difference in form will necessarily address a difference in power relationships, an 
assumption that we will see repeated in the approach to territorial ordering that will be 
explored in the next chapter. Assuming that the needs of all parties can necessarily be 
addressed through participation neglects the reality that different actors’ needs and 
desires are based in their different material existences, and that these material existences 
are the products of the very disparate relations of force.  Thus, attending to the “public 
good” through public participation in the form of multi-stakeholder agreements and 
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participatory forums is not a simple privatization of state process; rather it is a re-working 
of public processes to make them productive for accumulation. This productivity of the 
public is one of the key strategies and effects of governance (Harney 2008).  
 The development apparatus has historically functioned as a mechanism of control, 
setting the terms of development debates (Escobar 1995); however, the mechanisms for 
doing so have substantively shifted under neoliberalism and continue today as part of the 
neo-extractive project in ways that are perhaps less apparent—focused on participation 
and empowerment of local actors—but which, I have argued here, nonetheless fail to 
substantively intervene in the given relations of force. The disruption to social relations, 
displacement of communities, and the confusion of the political lines of antagonism 
discussed above are evidence of this failure.  
 The arrival of soy into the Amazon has re-worked Amazonian territory in myriad 
ways that we have only begun to explore in this chapter. The next chapter will explore 
the more explicitly territorial partitioning of landscapes, communities, and resources 
through land use policy enacted to address the wide-ranging effects of agribusiness 
expansion. This chapter has sought to explain some of the mechanisms that in the most 
immediate sense make the geographic advance of soy, along with its proximate effects, 
possible.  This chapter also shows how these programs have co-emerged with and 
strengthen the new political networks across NGO, state, movement organizations, and 
corporations that are central to the re-working of conservation and development in 
Amazonia. 	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Chapter Three. Territories of Extractivism, Technologies of Ordering 
INTRODUCTION. AMAZONIA: THE FUTURE ARRIVES AGAIN 
 
“Brazilians feel [pride] over the opening of the nation’s new frontier, constituted by the 
gigantic work of conquering and colonizing the largest empty space on the globe.” 
Jornal do Brasil 196848 
 
“The forest is our great laboratory, the place where we must create policies and 
institutions that will have relevance in the rest of the country. Amazonia is the way 
forward (vanguarda) not backward (retaguarda)”  
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 2008 
 
Territorializing Development 1964-Present 
Military Government 
 In 1970, with the slogan “integrate to avoid losing it [to foreign governments]” 
(“integrar para não entregar) the Medici military government officially initiated its 
project to colonize the nation’s own hinterlands, the Amazon, under the Plano de 
Integração Nacional (National Integration Plan, PIN). By presidential Decree (1.106, 
July 16, 1970), PIN would address both the geopolitical concern to “occupy” the region 
and induce rapid economic growth by creating “integration corridors” to link up the 
“growth poles” established under the military government’s first development plan, 
Operação Amazônia’s (Operation Amazonia).49 That is, they planned to build 15,000 km 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Cited in Bunker (1985, 107) 
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of roads across the region, the main arteries of which would be the Transamazon (BR 
230) crossing the region east-west, and the Santarém-Cuiabá highway (BR-163), crossing 
the region north-south. Medici’s government nationalized 100 km on either side of these 
and other regional “highways,” (2.2 million square kilometers of largely unpaved roads) 
to serve as the future home sites, or so it was planned, for the half a million landless 
people from the northeast and south that they planned to resettle as “colonists.” Like the 
development plans for the Belém-Brasilia highway built seven years prior, PIN expanded 
the agricultural frontier – through agribusiness and small farming expansion – into the 
region filling the “empty space” of the northern region (Brasil 1970, 89).50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Operation Amazonia focused on providing investment incentives for agribusiness, ranching, logging, 
and mineral extraction in 15 specific areas called growth poles. 
 
50 The “empty space” crossed by the PIN roads affected 96 tribes, more than half of the tribes in the 
Amazon and further expansion under subsequent programs such as Polonoroeste and Calha Norte 
increased this number to 75%. After the Trans-Amazon was built, the Parakanã Indians lost 45% of their 
population in one year, the Yanomami by 25% and the list goes on and on.  
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Figure	  11:	  Map	  of	  PIN	  with	  BR-­‐163	  and	  Transamazon	  Highlighted.	  Source:	  INCRA	  1972 
The Poloamazonia program that followed PIN (under Ernesto Geisel, Medici’s 
successor), shifted the focus from small-scale agriculture to incentivizing investment in 
agribusiness, ranching, mineral extraction and hydro-electric dams (Fearnside 1986; 
Schmink and Wood 1992).51 The massive migration of rural poor and capitalized 
developers stimulated by PIN and the national and international multi-lateral (the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank) and private investment of 
POLOAMAZONIA and other programs effectively established a new, dominant 
territorial organization through roads and extractive exploration (Carlos Walter Porto-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Probably the best known of these projects was the Grande Carajás regional development plan in 
Northern Pará would extract largest iron ore deposits in the world and later around the bauxite and gold 
deposits also found there. 
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Gonçalves 2001).  
Avança Brasil 
Almost thirty years later in 1998, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched 
his multi-year investment plan called Avança Brasil (Forward Brazil) promising, in 
language that harkened back to the military projects of the 60s and 70s, to create a “new 
economic and social geography” for the country by investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars into a nationwide infrastructure network for the development of extractive 
resources (Cardoso 1998).52 This plan marked a significant shift in national development 
policy to re-focus on resource production and infrastructure development as a primary 
part of its economic growth strategy, a strategy that had been abandoned in Amazônia 
during the economic crisis and democratic transition of the 1980s.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration reoriented the focus and structure of national development 
projects by restructuring the country’s multi-year investment plans. Based on research conducted under the 
first plan (Brasil em Açao or Brazil on the Move 1996-99), the second plan Avança Brasil (or Forward 
Brazil) proposed a new ‘economic and social geography’ for the country, reorienting development –
planning, financing and structures of accountabilibty - around five different development axes (strikingly 
reminiscent of the military dictatorship’s ‘development corridors’) as opposed to the traditional municipal-
state-national nested structure, or around eco-regions planning that was key for conservation (Ministério do 
Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestao 1999; Fearnside 2002).  
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Figure	  12:	  Forward	  Brazil	  Plans.	  Source:	  Fearnside	  2002 
The project itself divided Brazil into “development axes” (reminiscent of PINs 
development corridors) with 338 projects planned, including the paving of 7500 km of 
highways through the Amazon that were built but never paved under the PIN project (See 
Figures 11 and 12). The proposed budget was 317 billion reais (then approximately 300 
billion USD) for investment in extractive and infrastructure development, half of which 
would come from federal government funding (primarily through the national bank, 
BNDS) and half of which (and this was the departure from the military model) would 
come through private, largely international, investment through a series of public private 
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partnerships. For the Amazon, this meant US $43 billion dollars worth of development 
investment, with US $20 billion going directly into infrastructure (road and dam) 
construction, providing paved access to and through the core region of Amazonia along 
the Madeira and Tapajós Rivers with the explicit goal of encouraging the agro-industrial 
production of soybeans, corn and other crops in several regional development centers 
(Ministério do Planejamento, Orcamento e Gestao 2010). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, outcry by the pro-environment policy block generated controversy and halted 
some of Forward Brazil’s key projects, most famously, as discussed in the previous 
chapter the paving of the BR-163.  
While the BR-163 controversy temporarily (for approximately 10 years) 
postponed plans to move forward on road paving, it did not represent an impasse of two 
fundamentally opposed positions (pro-environment and pro-development), as many argue 
(Zhouri 2010). Rather, it marked a shift in the approach to governing and developing the 
Amazon that would provide an explicit articulation of the two positions. They have 
consistently operated side-by-side but often in conflicting ways and each dominated 
policy making at different times (Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Lemos and Roberts 2008). 
This articulation was possible, I will argue in this chapter and further in Chapter four 
because they share a logic, based in political economy and oriented around the inter-
related ideas of property rights and efficient production that allows for their articulation 
within the larger state territorialization project, discussed below. 
Accelerated Growth 
The Lula and Dilma administrations’ Accelerated Growth Programs (Programa 
de Aceleraçao do Crescimento, PAC) both included many of Avança Brasil’s most 
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controversial Amazonian programs (Belo Monte Dam, BR-163 highay, Madeira River 
dams), would add others (for example, dams on the Tapajós). They would substantially 
and progressively increase the PAC budgets. Funding for PACs came from several 
different sources. They would be funded in a small part by direct federal government 
investment, and then in approximately equal amounts through investments by national 
corporations (e.g. Petrobras) and private, largely multi-national corporations. Private 
investment was/is incentivized through tax breaks and interest rate subsidies by the 
federal government for loans provided through BNDS. BNDS vastly increased its 
funding for coordination and investment in infrastructure under the PAC program in 
Lula’s second term (Oliva	  and	  Zendron	  2010:	  76). In fact, funding from the BNDS for 
these projects was so substantial – BNDS directs over 95% of its lending to Brazilian 
development projects and the bank itself lent more money than the World Bank and 
Interamerican bank combined in 2009-2010 – that a blogger at the national weekly Veja 
called “Bolsa BNDS,” a riff on “Bolsa Familia,” the federal program that gives a 
monthly stipend to low income families (Zibechi in Hardt and Reyes 2012; Hochstetler 
and Montero 2012). Linking income generated from this “new extractivism” to social 
programs would rhetorically place the mission of poverty alleviation at the center of the 
developmentalist project.53  
The previous chapter made the argument that in order for this development to be 
possible, it also had to be “greened” and explained that one of the primary methods for 
doing that is voluntary, market-based incentives. This chapter will explore the more 
expansive, region-wide, and explicitly territorial strategy to making this development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See for example, the statements of Lula’s minister quoted in the Preface or Dilma’s PAC contra miséria 
(Folha de São Paulo, January 1 2011) 
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both possible and “sustainable.” To green the PAC programs on a region-wide scale, , the 
Lula administrations introduced the Plano Amazonia Sustentável (Program for a 
Sustainable Amazon, PAS) in 2007, which proposed to integrate conservation with 
Lula’s anti-poverty mission and to develop Amazonia’s extractive resources and 
associated infrastructure (MMA 2011). This program articulates the pro-environment and 
pro-development policy positions by “solving” what both sides took as the central 
challenge to regional governance – the land tenure issue (questão fundiaria). This issue 
would be solved through the “Ordering of Territory” (Ordenação de Territorio in the 
1988 consitution, and Ordenamento Territorial in national policy) a project that marked a 
return, by the State, after over a decade, to an explicity territorial strategy for re-
establishing and “securing particular social relations and relations of production” 
(Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006). In Amazônia, one of the primary strategies for 
“securing relations” was a land-use zoning model called Ecological Economic Zoning 
and the subsequent assignment of property rights.  
 
All of the plans discussed above, from the PIN projects of the 1960s and 1970s to 
Avança Brasil in 1998, to Lula’s PAC programs and the Plano Amazonia Sustantável that 
would make them possible are premised on an evolutionary development imaginary that 
seeks to transform Amazonia from a place that is “atrasado” (backwards) and nationally 
irrelevant to one that is Brazil’s (economic) “future” by re-territorializing the region to 
facilitate natural resource exploitation. Of course, a vast political and conceptual terrain 
has been traversed since 1964 that make the strategies to reach this “future” today, under 
the neo-developmentalist state, substantively different from the military dictatorship’s 
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developmentalism.54  
The crisis of the developmentalism and of state in the 1980s was also a crisis of 
territory for the Brazilian state. In Amazonia, the organized resistance movements 
encountered in the supposed “land without men” successfully challenged the state’s (and 
capital’s) coercive function and demanded and claimed new political and territorial 
spaces.55 These struggles forced the recognition, at minimum, that Amazonia was a 
territory marked by “multiplicity” (in the words of the document) of social and spatial 
logics, a multiplicity that according to the state’s own planning documents, was based in 
and productive of “a vision of economy, society, and territory” that “fragmented” the 
state (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 35).  
Thus, unlike the dictatorships’ authoritarian programs that not only overlooked, 
but were designed to disrupt and incorporate existing forms of life in the region, today 
development planning must contend with the demands of these movements. The 
PAC/PAS, recognize and incorporate these territorialities, placing – rhetorically, if not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Developmentalism” in Brazil more generally developmentalism is generally understood be what is also 
called the ISI (import substitution) period that began prior to the military dictatorship under Getulio 
Vargus’ Estado Novo (1937-1945). This developmentalism and was defined by policy a particular set of 
policy instruments, agencies, and parastatal institutions geared toward promoting exports and attracting 
foreign direct investment. The early developmentalist state focused primarily on industrial sectors in the 
south (Sikkink 1991). With a few exceptions, it was not really until the Kubitschek administration (1956-
60) began construction of the Belém-Brasilia Highway, the 1966 creation of the Superintendency for the 
Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) was established and began funding ranches and then, most 
significantly, the military government’s National Integration Plans I and II that opened roads and promoted 
colonization that developmentalism began to take shape in Amazonia and thus developmentalism in 
Amazônia has a slightly different time scale than other parts of Brazil.  
 
55 Specifically rubber tappers, indigenous people, quilombolas, ribeirinhos, other traditional people, and 
rural workers all claimed territorial and citizenship rights.  The 1988 constitution recognized the rights to 
indigenous territory and to Quilombo lands, reaffirmed the need for the “social function of property” and 
usucapião, both of which would become key for land access for rural workers, and through the 1990s new 
forms of property rights in the form of the Agroextractive Settlement (Projeto Agroextratavista PAE) and 
the Extractive Reserve were created as a form of usufruct rights for traditional people. These forms 
proliferated throughout the Amazon. Today in the Legal Amazon there are approximately 400 demarcated 
indigenous territories and 26 Resexes.  
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practically – the needs of the poor, of social movements, and “cultural and biological 
diversity” at their center. If the shift over forty years, from colonization to governance 
meant a shift from the violent imposition of territorial order to an ordering that seeks to 
recognize, account for, and create space for variation and difference among the many 
different “Amazônias” that refused the colonization model, the continuity among these 
plans is that the central question remains one of implementing (and drawing this 
difference into) a particular kind of order, one that begins with the question of 
“legibility.”   
Legibility 
In his now classic work Seeing Like a State, James Scott (1998) establishes 
legibility as a central problem of statecraft. His argument has been taken as a point of 
departure for innumerable works that have taken up, critiqued, and revised his question of 
why state projects to impose order consistently fail. Critics argue that either Scott’s 
“state” either no longer exists (Ferguson 2005), or that it never did (Agrawal 2005; Li 
2005; Li 2007; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Corson 2011). The former position argues 
that Scott’s authoritarian, socialist, and developmentalist states are a thing of the past and 
further, that arguments about the legibility-making function cannot be easily translated to 
global capital as Scott suggests (Ferguson 2005). The latter position argues that states are 
not coherent, autonomous, bounded “up there” realms of power that expand outward and 
downward to colonize people and places outside of it. Rather, following the Foucauldian 
(2008) concept of governmentality, these authors argue that the mechanism of state 
power is no longer coercive, that state “schemes” (namely development) work on and 
through practices and desires, and that such work happens through a range of governing 
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parties, institutions, individuals, some of which are quite distant from the bureaucratic 
institutions normally associated with the state (Agrawal 2005; Li 2005; Li 2007; 
Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Corson 2011). This critical line of thinking in 
development studies takes as its starting point the premise that Scott asks the wrong 
question. The question should not be, as Tania Li (2005) puts it, “why have these 
schemes failed?” but rather “what do they do?”  
This critique has resulted in a proliferation of studies that have described the 
messy, contradictory, conjunctural effects of development schemes implemented by an 
equally messy, contradictory, conjunctural state-ngo-civil society apparatus. The basic 
argument of much of this work, broadly, is that these schemes may tend to reproduce 
relations of inequality, close off certain possibilities for action, but also that they create 
openings through which different actors may act to empower themselves and thus, every 
particular situation must be studied in its specific contextuality.  
 I would argue that this literature sheds important light on the complex, specific 
workings of power and has been foundational for nuancing and expanding notions of “the 
state.” I would also argue, however, that although much of the work in this vein of 
critical ethnography is often meant to do be a politically aimed critique, it runs the risk of 
being politically ambivalent. As Li herself tells us, this detailed description is the same 
work done by the World Bank (Li 2005). The logical conclusion of this work, which has 
effectively, and importantly demonstrated that, for example, state-civil society 
relationships are porous and complex and are not pre-determined (for an excellent 
example, see Borras 2001), should not be, that there is no particular logic to the state, that 
the complexity of relations of force is infinite, and that there are not contradictory 
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positions and goals. Rather, the logical conclusion should be that social situations exceed 
the dominant logic, containing multiple logics. The analytic question is thus not how to 
simply describe the endless complexity of positions, but how to understand (and undo) 
the dominant logic and the power relations contained therein for any given situation.  
Following from this premise, in the remainder of this chapter, I would like to 
resurrect Scott, drawing on another argument from that same book - that state projects of 
legibility are like maps, in that they implement a project of order that produces an effect. 
If, following Scott’s critics, that the state is not an “up there” a priori territorial entity that 
implements order onto docile subjects, but following Scott, that these projects of 
legibility are productive, I argue that the state (among other things) is (re)produced 
through these ordering projects, and thus these ordering projects are key sites for 
exploring the logics and functions of the contemporary Brazilian state. State 
territorialization, (and any territorialization for that matter, see Porto Gonçalves 2007 and 
Chapter Four) in other words, is productive and reproductive. It is a state and subject 
making practice (Foucault 2008; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). This chapter seeks to 
describe and theorize the state strategies articulated and produced through 
territorialization tactics.  
To do this, I examine the specific process of “state territorialization”- the series of 
programs, laws and policies broadly grouped under the term Ordenamento Territorial – 
associated with the paving of the BR-163. I argue that the contemporary complex 
landscape of laws, policies, and programs implemented by an equally complex array of 
state, non-governmental, and economic actors that governs the region embodies a 
territorial ordering strategy based on recognizing, incorporating, and disciplining social, 
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ecological, and territorial difference. This does not, I argue, change the fundamental fact 
that the re-territorialization serves as the basis for regional development functions in the 
interest of the state and market even though it very carefully incorporates certain aspects, 
strategies, practices and actors of Amazonia’s already existing socio-ecological 
territorialities into the given order-of-things. In other words, this territorialization remains 
a strategy for “above” although it is enacted, at least in part, from “below.”  
To make this argument I will first briefly review the history of the “land question” 
in Amazônia in order to develop a working definition of the concept of Ordenamento 
Territorial, which today is the central mechanism for “state territorialization” (as 
discussed in the preface) in the region. Then I will turn to the specific example of the 
series of laws, policies, and programs that comprise Ordenamento Territorial in Western 
Pará – inspired by the proposed paving of the BR-163 to explore the broad 
transformations in territorial management. I will argue that some of the most significant 
effects of this ordering for the existing regional residents are the tendency to legalize 
formerly illegal practices (grilagem, logging) and to de-link property rights from 
territorial control.  In the final section, I use the cases of Renascer and Gleba Nova 
Olinda to demonstrate how these processes of state territorialization function on a 
localized level. 
THE LAND PROBLEM, THE LAND SOLUTION 
The Land/Agrarian Issue (A Questão Fundiaria) 
Amazonian geographers (Becker 1997; Porto Gonçalves 2001; Santos 2006) have 
located the primary territorial contradiction in the Amazon between what is best 
characterized broadly, as a territoriality of “below” and “above.” The territories and 
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territorialities of “below” are defined by their pluralism. They tend to be highly 
differentiated, self-organizing, social and political groups that are oriented around what 
we (outsiders) understand as the region’s ecology, namely, its rivers and forests. Today 
we call these people indigenous, traditional, rubber-tappers, babaçu-breakers, ribeirinhos, 
quilombolos, peasants, and caboclos (although these categories are neither mutually 
exclusive, fixed, uncorrupted, nor uncontested). Amazonia, then, is a place where 
different societies co-exist, “geo-graphing” (Porto Gonçalves 2003) their own territories 
in the process of making and remaking social relationships, thereby articulating multiple 
territorial logics.  
Following these authors, and the documents of the Brazilian Ministry of National 
Integration (2006), the territory and territoriality of “above” tends to be techno-industrial, 
statist, and more recently, scientific and environmentalist, organized around axis of 
resource extraction, development, and conservation and geared toward “constructing and 
consolidating the nation-state” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 13), albeit today 
a reconstituted one. Historically, this territory has taken on multiple physical forms - 
from early networks of telegraph lines to contemporary river-road transport and 
infrastructure networks that link regional agro-industrial and extractive landscapes to 
global markets, to new forest districts and carbon sinks. The primary contradiction at the 
heart of most political struggle in the region, then, at multiple historical moments, has 
been that the territorial transformation implemented from above, either to protect natural 
resources or exploit natural capital, tends to disrupt, incorporate, and reorganize – or re-
territoralize – the terrain of self-organization.  
In academic and policy circles, this contradiction has resulted in what is called the 
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Questão Fundiaria, or the “land issue” or “the agrarian issue” – the problem of unequal 
land distribution and security of property rights –a central political question across Brazil. 
In Amazonia, “land conflict,” is commonly at the center of most social, environmental 
and political issues – from questions of migration, subsistence, conservation, 
development, government and international programs, and struggles for emancipation 
(social movements do not refer to the “questão fundiaria,” but rather, the “the struggle for 
land” (Ianni 1978; Foweraker 1981; Fernandes 1999; de Medeiros 2003; Wolford 2004; 
de Paula 2004; Wolford 2010, or more recently, "the struggle for territory," see Chapter 
Four). In state and policy discourses on the “land issue” the lack of land tenure is 
presumed to be the cause of: land conflict and violence (between 1988 and 2009 1,545 
militants in land struggles have been murdered, with half of these deaths occurring in the 
Amazon region); deforestation, especially as posse or use is demonstrated through 
landscape transformation (e.g. the labor theory of property), which in the forest, tends to 
mean deforesting; and the primary barrier to economic growth, because if land cannot be 
commodified through the creation of private property, it cannot be used as credit for 
purchasing agricultural inputs, serve as a form of accumulation through improvement and 
sale, receive rights for legal resource extraction etc.  
The roots of the contemporary iteration of the Questão Fundiaria on a national 
level are generally traced to the 1850 land law, which recognized the direito de posse 
(right of possession), or, the right to land if it was put to productive use, thereby 
consecrating in law the Lockean labor theory of property (Wolford 2007).56 Since then, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Prior to that, on April 22nd 1500, the Portuguese crown took control of what is now “Brazil.” In 1522, 
control of the crown’s lands passed to the General Governors and soon after that to the local powers. With 
the advent of the Brazilian Empire in 1822, the State began to identify, sell and legitimize (through 
“regularization,” a type of agrarian reform and to identify other publicly held lands. A resolution passed on 
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constitutional amendments, laws, and court decisions have created ambiguity regarding 
those rights, despite the fact that the 1964 land statute (no. 45004, 1964), the “usucapion” 
law (Law 6969, 1981), and the 1988 constitution re-affirmed that posse was a valid way 
to access property rights and that private holdings must fulfill a social function (Stedile 
and Fernandes 1999; Wendy Wolford 2010), a legal fact that has been basis of social 
movement demands for agrarian reform nationwide. 
In Amazonia, the contemporary “land” or “agrarian” issue is understood to have 
its roots specifically in the policies of the military dictatorship described at the beginning 
of this chapter (Loureiro and Pinto 2005; Costa 2005; Becker 2005). The dictatorship 
introduced regimes of private property and the generalized commodification of land and 
resources on a region-wide level. During that time grilagem became standard, and 
accepted practice (Loureiro 2005). To deal with the land tenure question, rather than 
expropriating and redistributing land to treat the inequality of land distribution, 
government policies have tended toward colonization and “regularization” (assigning 
rights to utilized land that lacks formal documentation), largely because much of the land 
in Amazonia is Terra Devoluta or undesignated government land, which is often 
“occupied” and used, although without formal property rights. Today 50% of the land in 
Amazonia and 67% of the land in the state of Pará is Terra Devoluta, and much of that 
land is subject to multiple, competing claims.57  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the 17th of July 1822 stimulated this occupation by easing regularization and making posse unlimited. The 
1850 Lei de Terras also sanctioned expropriation and redistribution of unproductive holdings by the state, 
although not in the interest of the landless (as has been advocated for by the MST), but in the interest of 
creating a class of landless workers to provide a workforce in the wake of slave liberation (Dean 1971; 
Holston 1991). 
 
57 These lands have their origins in the Portuguese Concessão de Sesmarais, issued by the Portuguese 
crown in 1530, which gave the crown’s land to the State on the condition such land be used productively. It 
was meant to be a juridical system that would secure colonization.  With the 1850 Lei de Terras , Terra 
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Ordenamento Territorial: Territorial Ordering as the solution 
At a municipal meeting to discuss the new Provisional Measure MP 458 (now law 
Terra Legal), called by social movements the “MP of Grilagem” (along with an earlier 
MP 422 which had a similar function), which promised to legalize 300,000 land titles for 
terra devoluta held by posseiros (like homesteaders) for land held informally in units of 
up to 1500 hectares, the then-superintendent of INCRA opened the meeting by informing 
the crowd – “[t]he state of Pará is the Amazonian state with the history of the most 
programs for Territorial ordering (ordenamento territorial) and yet it is the state with the 
least order (orden).” During and since the military government – when land 
commodification and therefore land titling became necessary and land conflict became 
extreme – a complex series of mechanisms to create order have been established, and 
have largely failed to reach their goal. This is especially true in the state of Pará, the 
Amazonian state with the most “land conflict” (See, for example, Commissão Pastoral da 
Terra 2007).  
Historically, much of the large landholding in Pará were granted as long term 
concessions (aforamentos) for harvesting wild extractive resources such as rubber. Some 
large landholders still make their claims through these usufruct grants. Smallholders, on 
the other hand, did not have legal claims on land until they began to become more 
necessary, largely during the dictatorship, with incentivized development in the region. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Devoluta was defined essentially as unused land (not serving the public use, meaning any municipal, 
provincial, or national use, not held under sesmarais, not held under posse etc., whether titled or not), which 
was therefore returned (devolved) to the State. The 1891 constitution upheld the possession of such land by 
the state. The 1934 Constitution passed this land to the states. The 1946 Constitution gave some of them 
back to the Union (those “indispensible to the defense of frontiers, military fortifications or constructions, 
and railways” (article 34, II), and a 1969 amendment included in this list the terra devoluta necessary for 
“national development” (article 4, I). Finally, the 1988 Constitution named Terra Devoluta  of the Union all 
Terra Devoluta that is “indispensible for frontier defense, military fortification and construction, federal 
communication networks, and environmental preservation, defined in law.” (article 20,II).  
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At that time, the mechanisms for legal land distribution included licitações, which were  
occasional sales of government land to large, private owners, or the sale of small plots of 
land called lotes or lots to the colonos (smallholder “colonists”) in government-sponsored 
settlement areas. During the initial colonization programs (1960s-70s) these were 100 
hectare lots and later (1980s) they were 50 hectares. In practice, the possibilities for 
accessing land through these means were nearly non-existent. The more common practice 
by both large and small landowners has been occupying land and later petitioning the 
government to “regularize” or legalize it (which also happens quite rarely).  
The vast majority of large landholdings, and therefore most land in Pará are held 
by grileiros using forged deeds (usually in combination with bribery, threats and 
violence) (Asselin 1982; Fearnside 2001a). This land could be acquired through a variety 
of mechanisms: “invading” or simply taking land, forcing others to sign over their rights 
to posse, expanding boundaries of existing claims (onto other claimed land), et cetera. 
The most common way to make a claim is to create a false title. Originally, this was 
accomplished by placing a forged title in a box with crickets (grilos) to make it look old; 
today, the more common method is called larangas, literally oranges, where people claim 
land using other peoples’ names, or false names as a proxy in order to claim land above 
the legal limit, in agrarian reform settlements, etc. As a result much of the land in Pará is 
held by “ghosts” (fantasmos), fake names that serve as a proxy for the actual landholder. 
The system for titling land through legitimate mechanisms has historically been 
exceedingly complex, involving tracing land records back historically in different 
cartorios and usually inhibited by competing land claims. 
The struggles over land and territory brought on by the incursion of development 
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into the region resulted in multiple new forms of land rights, and in Amazonia, rubber 
tappers, indigenous people, quilombolas, ribeirinhos, other traditional people, and rural 
workers all mobilized for territorial and citizenship rights through the 1980s and 1990s. 
The 1988 constitution recognized the rights to indigenous territory and to Quilombola 
lands, reaffirmed the need for the “social function of property” and usucapião – both of 
which would become key for land access for rural workers – and through the 1990s new 
forms of property rights in the form of the Agroextractive Settlement and the Extractive 
Reserve were created as a form of usufruct rights for traditional people. These forms 
proliferated throughout the Amazon. While many areas were created, many more areas 
remain contested, especially within the state of Pará 
To provide a better understanding for how rare any form of title actually is, during 
my fieldwork, I asked nearly everyone that I interviewed or had extended informal 
conversations with during my fieldwork about their legal claim to their land. Among 
those people who lived in an area with some form of collective title or usufruct rights, I 
asked about their title situation prior to the collective rights. Of the hundreds of people 
that I spoke with in three different sites across the region, the only people that I 
encountered with title were soy farmers, who largely bought any titled land they 
encountered near Santarém. Many people had certificates of posse (possession) issued by 
Incra in prior decades. Others had some sort of certification from the rural workers’ 
union, many of who have helped people to stake out the boundaries of their land in order 
to qualify them for government financing programs for micro-enterprise such as FNO or 
PRONAF. Some had papers issued from Incra recognizing them as part of a settlement 
(although they actually were not part of a settlement). And others had receipts of “compra 
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e venda,” essentially a sales receipt written by the land’s previous owner, a paper which 
is nearly meaningless unless the sale is registered in a cartório (which it almost never 
was). 
 
Figure	  13:	  Example	  of	  a	  receipt	  of	  purchase.	  The	  most	  common	  land	  document	  for	  land	  I	  encountered.	  
The complex and conflicted nature of territory and territories in Western Pará, 
marked by not only an opaque and confused constellation of land tenure, but also the 
multiple and competing designs on the region, posed significant challenges to the new 
developmentalist/extractivist program because clear land title is the basis for rights to 
extractive resources (either because it provides ownership over those resource, or the 
entry point into the legal system of accessing use rights). This precipitated a refocusing 
on state-led territorializing strategies that will be discussed below, beginning with the 
Plan for the Sustainable Amazon. The concept of Ordenamento Territorial, literally 
Territorial Ordering and more specifically  “the [territorial] organization of a group of 
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elements according to a given relation of order” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 
16), was resurrected from the 1988 constitution and turned into a national policy “the 
National Policy on Territorial Ordering ” in 2003, with implementation beginning several 
years later (around 2006). This marked a “[state] preoccupation with the re-taking of 
territory” through “a logic of ordering [that] aims to reinstate the role of the state in new 
places,” specifically in these places that express a different logic of ordering (Ministério 
da Integração Nacional 2006, 17). This re-ordering was an effort, which the National 
Policy on Territorial Ordering  policy papers indicate the state planners realized would be 
enacted not through force, or even necessarily by direct state-driven mechanisms, but 
rather through the production of “governmentality” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 
2006, 16). The DNOT policy papers begin with a summary of the concept of 
governmentality as the rationality rule within the contemporary state and then outline 
how this must be implemented through territorial planning, as “the product and producer 
of new [social] configurations” (14). 
Beyond the particular definitions laid out in the national policy documents, the 
term Ordenamento Territorial (hereafter OT) has been widely used to refer to anything 
from the generalized concept of regional planning (Santos and Becker 2006), to particular 
territorial policies such as zoning or regularization of property rights, (see for example, 
Unger 2008). I use the term more specifically to refer to what I call a technology of 
ordering generally directed toward incorporating multiple, and often contradictory, 
territorialities into a particular mode, or logic, of social/spatial organization.58 That is, OT 
is an assemblage of forces (repressive, economic, administrative), techniques (scientific, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 I explicitly use the word “generally” to leave open the possibility that such a technology can be, and is, 
engaged strategically by actors to create a different form of ordering, as will be discussed in the final 
section of this paper.  
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calculative, legal) and devices (property titles, development credits, conservation 
payments) integrated to regulate territorial relationships. OT is not simply an idealized 
concept imposed by “the state” onto space, but also a technology employed by a range of 
actors including, in Western Pará, state, federal and local government organizations, 
private actors, NGOs, and historically grassroots actors, to create a particular 
determination of space that makes certain things possible, such as the commodification of 
resources, particular understandings of citizenship, and sustainable development.59 
Practically, contemporary OT brings together old techniques of ordering, such as road 
building and property rights, with newer ones, such as GIS, ecological science, 
multicultural recognition, and participation, to address the challenges posed by multiple 
territorialities to past state territorialization projects.  
ORDENAMENTO TERRITORIAL IN CONTEMPORARY AMAZONIA 
 Despite the creation of the Sustainable Amazon Plan, which is more of a political 
statement and set of policy guidelines for a sustainable development policy in the 
Amazon than actual policy, there is no a single, coherent approach to managing 
Amazonian territorial development and land rights.  The public policy realm is 
historically contradictory, providing incentives for speculation, deforestation, and 
extractivism through road-building, incentives, tax breaks, credit subsidies, et cetera, on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Specifically, in Western Pará, government actors include the National Institute of Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(IBAMA), the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio), the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), the State Environmental 
Secretary (SEMA), the Institute for Forest Development of Pará (IDEFLOR), and the Land Institute of Pará 
(ITERPA). Examples of private actors include Vale do Rio Doce and Cargill. The primary NGOs involved 
are Conservation International (CI) The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the Worldwide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), The Institute for Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM) and the Health and Happiness 
Project (PSA). Grassroots actors include the Rural Workers’ Union (STR). 
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the one hand and on the other hand creating protected areas, inserting environmental 
protections into development mandates and more (Simmons 2002; Fearnside 2009) 60 
The details of the assemblage of laws, policies, programs, and everyday practices 
associated with territorial governance in western Pará cannot be fully explored in a single 
paper, or even a single dissertation. Given, however, that it is precisely their intersection 
that constitutes and expresses key components, practices, and logic of state 
territorialization, it would also be inadequate to try to theorize these territorial practices 
“of above” by only examining any single policy law, or case. Therefore, in this section, I 
provide an overview for how discourses and practices of state territorialization processes 
(re)produce a given order in Western Pará, by briefly reviewing the key policies and 
programs themselves – their actual content (e.g. the laws), the philosophies behind them, 
and the logistics of and struggles over their implementation.I focus my analysis on the 
emergence and function of the key policy that attempts to set the parameters for 
organizing the entire region – Ecological Economic Zoning (ZEE). I first provide an 
overview of the context in which these policies emerged. This is followed by a brief 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60 There has not been a single agency responsible for Amazonian development policy since the 
Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM), which primarily was responsible for 
developing ranching through incentives from its creation in 1966 until 1991 (when it underwent profound 
policy redirection; it was officially disbanded in 2002 because of a corruption scandal) (Bunker 1985). 
Beginning in the 1980s, multilateral development banks (World Bank and Interamerican Development 
Bank) began to play a major role in funding Amazonian development projects. The funding structure for 
current development projects has been discussed above and different projects are handled by different 
ministries (of mining, of planning, agriculture, etc.) Incra (within the Ministry of Agrarian Development, 
MDA) and in Pará, the state land agency (ITERPA) have for decades been responsible for implementing 
land tenure policies, through the regularization (either through individual title or through Agrarian Reform) 
of land claims (e.g. by posseiros or grileiros). The federal government agency IBAMA was responsible for 
most enforcement of environmental policy (and thus for land use in conservation areas) until 2007, when its 
responsibilities were shifted to primarily enforcement on federal lands. At that time, both enforcement and 
permitting for extractive industry on State held lands were devolved to the notoriously industry friendly 
state environmental secretaries (In Pará, this is SEMA, formerly SECTAM), and management of federal 
protected areas was shifted to the newly created (and largely PPG7 funded, at the time) Chico Mendes 
Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio). FUNAI, since 1967 has been responsible for 
demarcating, and protecting indigenous lands.  
 
	   127	  
summary, elaborated in Box 1, of the key policies passed in the last few years that work 
within and through the ZEE to organize the region, as well as the major critiques and 
conflicts that they generated, in order to demonstrate their contested nature. This section 
lays the basis for the final section on Traditional Territories, which provides an overview 
of the policy issues that in part constitute each of the two struggles encountered in 
Chapter One. These two sections together are meant to provide a sense for how this array 
of policies and practices intersect to territorialize the state, to familiarize the reader with 
some the details of the struggles, and elucidate how state territorialization has shifted 
under neo-extractivism.  
The Sustainable Amazon Plan 
In his first term, to the delight of the environmental community, Lula appointed 
former Rubber Tapper leader and governor of the western Amazonian state of Acre, 
Marina Silva, as his environmental minster. Her appointment, although at odds with the 
interests of some of Lula’s other cabinet positions (such as the agricultural ministry, the 
mining ministry, and other development-focused cabinets), symbolized a commitment to 
sustainability.  Marina Silva’s appointment generated significant enthusiasm among the 
mainstream environmental community and among Amazonian social movements, 
although during her time as minister, her relationship to movements would become quite 
strained. Even more mainstream organizations such as Greenpeace critiqued her for being 
too conciliatory toward development.61 Developing a sustainable development plan for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 At the National Symposium for Agrarian Geography at UFPA in Belém in November 2011, Rubber 
Tapper Leader Osmarino Amâncio called Marina Silva and the National Rubber Tappers’ Council the 
“biggest traitors” of the movement. These breaks among the left under progressive government will be 
addressed further in the next chapter.  
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the BR-163 (discussed in Box One) was the key action project to be conducted under the 
broader “Sustainable Amazon Plan” developed initially by Silva within the Ministry of 
the Environment and meant to be one of the key elements in her stated project to 
strengthen the environmental agency (PAS 2006). As Lula’s first term progressed, 
however, commodity prices rose and the developmentalist emphasis emerged, tensions 
between Silva and the administration became more severe. After a series of 
disagreements including over the BR-163 plan and culminating with the appointment of 
Mangabeira Unger to head up the Sustainable Amazon Plan instead of her, Silva resigned 
in 2008, and she would later She later became the Green Party presidential candidate. 
In 2007, when Lula began his second term, he created a new Ministry of 
“strategic affairs,” and appointed renowned, progressive Harvard Law Professor Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger as minister. Unger was a strategic choice, as he lent both progressive 
political and scientific legitimacy to the developmentalist project (de Castro 2011). 
Shortly following his appointment, the administration shifted the Sustainable Amazon 
Plan to the new ministry. Setting a new territorial agenda for the Amazon region would 
prove to be Unger’s most significant legacy. Unger's position was immediately clear. In 
an interview regarding the Sustainable Amazon Plan in Maranhão, he said, “the Amazon 
is Brazil’s future, not simply a collection of trees” (Invest NE, May 22, 2008). In another 
interview in that same month, he told the Estado de São Paulo (June 15, 2008) 
“Amazonia is our great frontier, not only geographically, but in our imaginary.” He added 
that Amazonian inhabitants “lack a project” but whose destiny is “divine, not to be 
children trapped in a green paradise” (the latter quote in de Castro 2008),62 effectively re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.socioambiental.org/nsa/direto/direto_html?codigo=2008-06-27-
103435. For all of the many years of writing against this imaginary (See, for example, Slater 2002; Stepan 
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invoking the colonial imaginary not only of Amazonia as “the future” but of Amazonian 
people as helpless, trapped, needy people, abandoned by the government and the world, 
who eek out a marginal existence – have no “projects” of their own, and are in need of 
being saved by development. This ministry, and particularly the Sustainable Amazon 
Plan is dedicated to solving these problems by articulating green governance, 
infrastructure, mineral, agro-industrial, and timber development, and the administration’s 
anti-poverty program (Ministerío de Assuntos Estratégicos 2008, see also the SAE 
website, http://www.sae.gov.br/site/?page_id=11517).  
Ecological-Economic Zoning 
In another 2008 interview, Unger explained the philosophy behind the Plan, based 
in a particular instrument of Ordenamento Territorial called Ecological Economic 
Zoning:  
 
…the point of departure for this project (the Plan for a Sustainable 
Amazon) begins with Ecological Economic Zoning of the Amazon, the 
basis for a solution to land issues, that allows for the defining of distinct 
economic strategies for different parts of the region…we need projects for 
deforested Amazonia, green Amazonia and we still have the problem of 
the complex industrial urban areas. My work is to combine all of these 
elements….it is a project of ecological economic zoning that makes 
possible the formulation of distinct economic strategies for different parts 
of Amazonia….Ecological Economic Zoning does not represent a 
cartographic exercise. It means the spatial translation of economic 
thinking.  
 
This spatial translation of economic logic in the Sustainable Amazon Plan is the 
most current iteration of “geo-coding” Amazonia (Pickles 2004), whose particular form – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2001), it remains quite pervasive. For another recent example, see the Al-Jazeera series by Gabriel 
Elizondo. 
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the Ecological-Economic Zoning originated in the 1980s. The World Bank first proposed 
Ecological Economic Zoning (Zoneamento Ecológico-Economico, ZEE) in the late 1980s 
as an instrument to “plan rational territorial occupation for “sustainable use of natural 
resources…reconciling these polarized positions [developmentalism and 
environmentalism]” (Becker and Egler 1993, 4). The ZEE contains what Henri Acelrad 
(2008) calls a “double temporality” in that it seeks to both assess the given “truth” of a 
given area (e.g. assess the given state of things), and then to prescribe its future (e.g. 
make improvements). Conceptually, zoning is based in a classical ecosystemic model that 
assumes all aspects of nature (human included) in a given area can be held in balance 
(Acselrad 2000), supposing that incorporating different processes into one, territorial 
logic can facilitate efficient, sustainable, environmentally sensitive growth. That is, 
across a given area, the needs of different interested groups are addressed by re-ordering 
the state into discreet areas to meet their various needs and demands. In this case, those 
needs and demands are framed as either conservation or development (despite the fact 
that this is a contested framing as will be discussed below), mapping particular economic 
practices (such as industrial farming, logging, slash and burn agriculture, or extractivism) 
to pre-defined groups within their newly assigned territorial polygons.  
To produce this ordered territorial whole out of fragmented, overlapping, and 
contradictory territories and territorialities (“multiplicities” in the language of the 
Planning Ministry, 2006), the ZEE renders elements in a given landscape equivalent and 
interchangeable so that their boundaries can be negotiated. Practically, that means turning 
land (namely terra devoluta) into property so that it can be exchanged in a process 
mediated by the state. It creates particular categories based in economic practices 
	   131	  
(sometimes linked to ethnic identities) by which different actors can formally enter into 
relationships with that property, rendering them “stakeholders” whose interests can be 
negotiated. 
The ZEE proposal assumes that previous failures of state planning were technical 
failures that can be resolved by refining those techniques. Methodologically, the ZEE is 
premised on incorporating all aspects of the region into a single system of (empirical 
scientific) knowledge. This is achieved by first fragmenting a given area into knowable 
parts through a combination of scientific investigation and technological innovation. 
These parts do not necessarily have any relation to the existing forms of socio-territorial 
organization, but rather, are organized according to the categories of contemporary 
science. In other words biological, social, geologic etc. processes can all be studied 
separately, and with increasing precision through methodological innovation within the 
given fields of study.  
The first ZEEs were literally created “from above” using aerial photos and newly 
available radar-based mapping capabilities along with available socio-economic and 
ecological data to zone a given region into areas for “appropriate” forms of restricted use 
(Ab’Saber 1989; Nitsch 1996).63  Problems with their implementation led to a new 
methodology based in “ground truthing” this information. This meant a whole new 
generation of trained and funded scientists (biologists, geologists, ecologists, 
agronomists, anthropologists, foresters etc. – experts created largely through PPG7 
funding to research NGOs and government positions) could extend the new research 
technologies into all facets of territory, accessing aspects of life, nature, and community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The ZEE was a national project and implemented throughout Brazil with priority given to Amazonia 
(See Brazil 1990). 
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previously outside of the domain of state knowledge. New geographic information 
systems, scholars argued, created the conditions of possibility for the integration of 
different knowledges (i.e. quantitative, qualitative, community based, etc.) (Becker and 
Egler 1993; Mello 2005) into a better prescriptive ordering model. This new technology 
allowed for the application these methodologies, and their truth regimes over large areas, 
thereby extending and solidifying authority, and incorporating nature/life/community into 
the space of sustainable development.  
The options then, for people who operate within a different system of knowledge 
(e.g. the other Amazonias or other territorialities), at best, are either to participate or not 
in the incorporation of their own beliefs, practices, etc. into the research of the ZEE and 
to cast themselves within the available categories of the state.64 To not participate is to be 
evaluated and incorporated without providing input into that process. Such participation, 
has been critiqued for leading to unjust and illegitimate excercises of power and being 
easily coupled with a top-down development model (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
“Cooptation” it is argued, manifests in these situations through a misaplication these, a 
misapplication of the processes of participation. In fact one of the major controversies 
around the creation of the ZEE for the BR 163 was the lack of even marginal attempts to 
inform, let alone include “grassroots actors” in what is meant to be a “participatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This is not only done in the ZEE, but broadly through “identity-based” land rights. For example, 
indigenous people, identified as indigenous through research by FUNAI (the Indian Agency), can have 
usufruct rights to “indigenous land” (Terra Indigena). Once the state recognizes indigenous land as 
covering a particular area, there are 90 days in which anyone else with claims to that land can contest it, 
and then the boundaries of that land are negotiated in the courts. Another category “traditional people” also 
may access land rights to a particular area through either agrarian reform (Agro-extractive settlements) or 
as a unit of conservation (Resex). These people are recognized as “traditional” by exhibiting certain 
cultural practices that are broadly linked to sustainable resource use. In other words, to access land rights, 
people must cast themselves as traditional, indigenous, etc. according to the norms laid out by the state 
rules. They must be researched by a team of experts to determine their eligibility according to these 
definitions. 
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practice.”	  	  
While individualized corrupt practices, intentional omissions, etc. within the 
process state territorialization (or any state projects for that matter) can (and should) be 
understood as intentional destruction and/or incorporation of movement demands, the 
more significant and complex phenomenon at work here is what Marcelo da Souza (de 
Souza 2006) calls “structural cooptation,” or the way that the influence that the state 
operates (in this case, the mechanisms for ordering territory), force an “adjustment” of 
the social movements dynamics and agenda to that of the state, (which the federal OT 
documents themselves essentially lay out as a governing strategy).  
For example, the state structures for land rights for indigenous or traditional 
people were created in response to demands by those movements, the rubber tappers, 
discussed in the previous chapter, being a case in point. As conceived by Chico Mendes, 
the extractive reserve both acknowledged and supported the co-existence and co-
constitution of people and nature – something not done previously in units of 
conservation – and reworked the relationship between society and the state in that the 
reserve territory remained state property, but was managed, autonomously, by the people. 
In 2001 with the creation of the National System of Units of Conservation (SNUC), 
however, the power to design reserve management plans was quickly taken out of the 
hands of the people and placed in the purview of technicians that worked at ICMBio (the 
Chico Mendes Institute, the government institution who manages conservation areas and 
whose establishment was financed by the PPG7), or outsourced to NGOs, an action that 
movement militant and intellectual Osmarino Amâncio (at Belem conference 2011) and 
geographer Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves (2009) both call “the second assassination of 
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Chico Mendes” because it corrupted the concept that he had struggled for. Thus, 
traditional movements struggle for land has since largely been framed as a struggle for 
the Extractive Reserve, the struggle for space and territory on the terms of the state. This 
corruptive effect does not obviate the possibilities for politics, as will be explored in the 
following chapters, but, I would argue, is one of the central organizing principles of 
Ordenamento Territorial. Thus the ZEE is not simply a map representing an area. As a 
prescribed future, it actively produces a particular territory and as the “spatial translation 
of an economic logic” this is the territory of neo-developmentalism. 
ZEE for Western Pará 
The Ecological Economic Zoning Plan for the BR-163, later re-named the ZEE of 
western Pará (State laws 6.745/05 and 7.243/09), elaborated in only two years (a similar 
initiative in Acre took 11), in the words of Daniel Cohenca, former director of IBAMA 
Santarém, “fell as if it were a rock on the heads of socio-environmental movements who 
were unaware this mechanism was being developed.” The ZEE divides western Pará into 
two broad areas (with many subdivisions): land for conservation (which varies from 
preservation to sustainable use) and land for development (areas of consolidation and 
expansion of extractive industry). While most environmental NGOs officially signed on 
to the measure by 2008, 65 critics took issue with three primary components of the policy: 
1) the reduction in the size of the ‘legal reserve’ (e.g. the amount of land on a given 
property in the Amazon Biome that, according to the Forest Code at the time must be 
kept as standing forest, which was 80%), 2) the designation of most areas outside of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 State Decree 1.026/2008 created the ZEE Supervisory Committee, comprised of 38 
representatives from municipal, state, and local governments, ‘social movements,’ represented by 
representatives of the rural workers’ unions, as well as environmental NGOs (CI, TNC, and 
WWF), and several research institutions, also including environmental NGOs. 
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existing reserves as spaces for the “expansion” and “consolidation” of extractive 
industries, and 3) the ambiguous, and broad, nature of the “sustainable use” zoning 
characterization. 
 
Figure	  14:	  Ecological	  Economic	  Zoning	  Plan	  for	  Western	  Pará 
The controversy over the reduction in the size of the legal reserve was particularly 
contentious given that the ZEE was created while industrial soy production was rapidly 
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expanding in the region, displacing smallholder agriculture in the highlands near 
Santarém (Fearnside 2007b; Steward 2007). Critics argued that reducing the reserve 
facilitated soy expansion, illegal logging and land theft, because it would legally open 
more land to industrial soy production, “as opposed to [protecting] the regions’ 
traditional and peasant populations with historically sustainable livelihood strategies” 
(Cohenca 2009). During the negotiations, internal government documents indicated that 
Cargill and TNC were lobbying federal agencies INCRA, IBAMA and the then State 
environmental secretariat SECTAM to reduce soy producers’ deforestation fines to 10% 
of their value and to regularize all of soy farmers’ lands and to allow them to re-locate 
their legal reserves off of their properties and inside of existing Conservation Units. Their 
petition (which was not granted by these agencies) combined with the fact that the ZEE 
coordinator at the federal agricultural agency EMBRAPA had published highly contested 
research suggesting that soy production had no impact on forest cover (Venturieri et al. 
2007),66 raised further doubts among critics about the ZEE’s capacity or intentions to 
address the needs of traditional, peasant and indigenous communities, or forests, given 
that soy expansion was happening within their territories.  
Next, the ZEE zoned almost all areas outside of already existing conservation 
units as areas for “expansion” or “consolidation” of extractive industries, reducing the 
possibilities for new territories to be recognized for indigenous or traditional people. In 
other words, areas for expansion and consolidation of development are prioritized as 
areas for establishing private property rights. Because western Pará is a relatively new 
horizon of extractive expansion, many communities only recently began pursuing such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Especially given that then - director of IBAMA, Daniel Cohenca, had published a remote 
sensing analysis (2005) of soy expansion that had also come to the opposite conclusion. 
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rights in order to protect their ways of life and their resulting territories. There are many 
potential collective land claims within these areas of expansion and consolidation whose 
territorial claims would be put at risk by the ZEE designation, because other claims on 
their territory were likely to be legalized prior to theirs (CPT 2010).  
Finally, areas designated for “sustainable use,” which as per the zoning guidelines 
meant areas where use should be geared toward activity that benefits local populations 
and should not encourage intensive resource explanation, were being opened to 
extraction, yet still considered in compliance with the ZEE. This was generally achieved 
by creating new forms, largely on state lands, of landholdings such as “state forests,” 
which would function as lands held by the state that loggers or others could apply to log 
or farm through “management plans.” Thus the “prioritized” use could easily be 
subverted.  
Territorial Programs and Policies 
The ZEE sets parameters for what types of activities are or are not permissible in 
a given area. The actual legal designation of property rights and management of 
productive activities happens through a variety of laws and policies that include older 
forms of accessing land rights – such as land sales, posseiros petitioning INCRA for 
property rights, groups of subsistence farmers petitioning Incra for an agrarian reform 
settlement (usually with help from the rural workers’ unions), ICMBio for Extractive 
Reserves, or indigenous people petitioning FUNAI for indigenous territory – along with 
newer programs to access private property rights such as Legal Land or NGO-facilitated 
programs such as some of the practices within the “Green Muncipalities” program, or 
temporary land rights for logging access. Along with land rights, there are new 
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instruments, through which either land-holders or other parties can access resources, 
including through logging “management plans,” mineral rights, payment for 
environmental services, et cetera. There are also new institutions, such as the Brazilian 
Forest Service, and institutional arrangements, such as IBAMA’s more limited focus on 
enforcement with permitting and management now in the hands of state environmental 
secretaries or IDEFLOR, and ICMBio respectively. The third key element in the 
territorial ordering of Western Pará State is the discursive or rhetorical “greening” 
function served by programs and policies such as “ecological” zoning, the “sustainable” 
BR-163, and the creation of Conservation Areas. While these programs function to dispel 
controversy, their actual implementation is much more complex and is often partial, 
contested, and the effects ambiguous, or damaging to regional inhabitants, who 
themselves tend to appear in these policy debates only to the extent that they voice 
opinions in “participatory” forums, and/or as “environmental” actors. Other authors have 
also noted this “gulf between plans and practice” (Fearnside 2009). The examples of 
Gleba Nova Olinda and Rensacer will be used below to demonstrate this complexity.  
Box One, below details the major policies, laws, and programs enacted that 
constitute territorial re-ordering (within the bounds of ecological-economic zoning) in 
Western Pará in the last several years on the state and regional level.  I will highlight a 
couple of they key policies in order to help the reader make sense of the list and to draw a 
few conclusions regarding regional trends.67 First, in 2003, in response to rising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 It is important to note that if this chapter were addressing the most significant policies on a region-wide 
basis in this, neo-extractivist moment, the most significant policies would have to include the construction 
of hydro-electricity and the new payment for environmental services programs such as PROAMBIENTE, 
Bolsa Verde, and Bolsa Floresta, which are now starting to proliferate in Western Pará as well. There is 
also legislation pending, Law project 1.610, opened by the Dilma administration, which would open 
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deforestation rates, IBAMA stopped issuing logging permits for areas without land title. 
That means that over 53% of the Amazon and 67% of the state of Pará, which is Terra 
Devoluta could not be legally logged. Given that most of the remaining land is either 
already logged or in conservation areas, this new policy essentially closed the major 
avenues to logging legally and resulted in a major push by the industry for both land 
rights and for creating mechanisms for legalizing logging. This resulted in the 2006 
Public Forest Management Law (and a parallel state law in Pará). This law opened 
federal lands to logging via bid by private companies. Territorially, this resulted in a 
territorial expansion of logging (both legally and illegally; Chapter Five will provide a 
better understanding for how this functions) as well as a series of “mosaic” proposals for 
protecting lands, where an area is created that is protected as a state or federal forest, but 
is open to extraction, as we will see in both cases described below.  
 
Next, Mangabeira Unger’s legacy to the Amazon was ultimately neither the 
Sustainable Amazon Plan itself, nor the re-invigoration of the concept of Ecological 
Economic Zoning. Rather, Unger was responsible for passing into law the program called 
“Legal Land,” which proposed to legalize 300,000 private property titles for areas up to 
1,500 hundred hectares in unassigned public land. Proponents of the law, including 
Unger, INCRA broadly and Santarém superintendent Luciano Brunet specifically, as well 
as José Benatti, president of ITERPA who also write the state version of the law, argued 
that the law was meant to protect smallholder land rights. Legal Land would legalize 
large pieces of property at fees well below market value, would forgive previous logging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
indigenous lands to mining, which would have significant effects in Pará where indigenous lands hold rich 
mineral reserves (Valor Economico, April 9, 2012). 
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on the properties, and would allow for the larger parcels to be sold within four years and 
the smaller parcels within ten. It was incredibly divisive and all major social movements, 
several prominent ecologists as well as “big conservation” mobilized against it, arguing 
that it would legalize grilagem and increase land clearing (Fearnside 2009; Oliveira 
2009). Movements also argued that it would that it would work against those seeking 
collective land rights in that private holdings would be legalized much more quickly, and 
prior to collective claims, thereby invalidating future collective claims. Within INCRA, 
50% of the staff in Amazonia were re-directed from their Agrarian Reform work to carry 
Terra Legal after the law was passed. In its first year, the law was mired in legal 
challenges, suffered a series of major technical difficulties. Brito and Barreto (2011) 
estimated that in the first year of the program, 63% of land petitions made were for 76 
hectares or less, but that these petitions comprised only 16% of the total area petitioned 
for regularization. 39% of the total area registered went to only 8% of the petitions for 
properties. The program, however, is moving forward.  
Finally, the BR-163 Sustainable Development Plan, one of Marina Silva’s key 
projects, was coordinated by prominent regional NGO IPAM (also the leader in the calls 
for “governance” in the Science debates). IPAM articulated fourteen government 
ministries and 32 NGOs to create a ‘governance’ structure –government through 
partnership with local actors - capable of supporting sustainable development and geared 
toward favoring Agroforestry over land-grabbing and soy, ranching, logging expansion to 
create a “corridor of sustainable development” around the BR-163 (Alencar et al 2005; 
IPAM 2005). A key element of the plan was to develop participation along the 
communities that would be most affected by the paving in the southern part of Pará. To 
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do this, IPAM developed the ‘Forum of BR-163 Social Movements,’ comprised of other 
NGOs (Fundaçåo Viver, Produzir e Proteger, FVPP and the Instituto Socio-ambiental, 
ISA) as well as representatives from the state federation of rural workers’ unions 
(FETAGRI), closely tied to the workers’ party government, and some residents from 
communities along the road. They held a series of meetings in cities and towns, primarily 
in the BR-163’s southern reaches, to discuss planning associated with road paving. The 
plan itself, elaborated through a series of closed meetings and discussed in public 
workshops was largely disagreed on by the people from the communities and towns 
along the road who did not share IPAM’s vision for what constituted that sustainability. 
In fact, most ‘grassroots’ actors sought road paving as quickly as possible and many were 
seeking rights to log on their lands, diverging from the NGOs’ visions of sustainability. 
The tensions among residents and between residents and the coordinating NGOs, 
expressed in interviews and visible in meetings, did not enter into the more public 
representations of the plan as a united front of pro-environment social movements. The 
NGOs involved and the government generated a lot of press around the plan and the 
planning process, which appeared as a solution to the problem of governance. The plan 
itself shelved by the federal government; the BR-163 paving moves forward with no 
particular plan for sustainability in place.  
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BOX 1: OT Policies in Western Pará, 2005-Present  
Incra Santarém.  In 2005, INCRA established a regional headquarters for Western Pará in Santarém, with 
jurisdiction over 28 municipalities and 72 million hectares. Prior to that time, INCRA headquarters (30  
nationally) had only been located in the much more developed eastern portion of the state.  
Agrarian Reform on the BR-163. In 2005-2006, the recently established Incra Santarém created 97 agrarian 
reform settlements to regularize land rights for smallholders along the BR-163, located almost exclusively in 
areas of primary forest (2.2 million hectares) and granted to 33,600 families (meeting a dual goal of achieving 
Agrarian Reform for the Lula administration and opening up land for the logging industry). It was later 
revealed that most recipients of land rights were “ghosts,” names used by the logging sector to open the land to 
timber extraction. In 2009, in one of series of scandals for INCRA Santarém (others include Faroeste, see 
Chapter Two) the Ministério Publico brought an action against INCRA. The settlements were ultimately 
voided.  
Public Forest Management Law.  This 2006 federal law (11.284) created by the Environmental Ministry 
under Marina Silva created “public forests,” a new territorial designation that could be given to any forests on 
federal land (including in reserve areas), which would open them up to logging, or “forest management,” by 
companies through bidding. These forests would be managed by the new Brazilian Forest service (Ideflor), 
also created with this law. This led to the creation of new kinds of land designations for areas that were 
formerly terra devoluta as part of an effort to control logging there, with the problem remaining that many of 
these were contested. With this restructuring in 2006. Forestry management on privately held land was 
transferred from IBAMA (the federal agency) to the state-level environmental agencies (SEMA in Pará). In 
Pará many forestry projects previously denied by IBAMA because of the lack of valid land documents were 
subsequently approved by SEMA.  
BR-163 Forest District. This district, created in February of 2006, many argue in response to outcry over the 
murder of Sister Dorothy Stang by loggers in 2005, placed 19 million hectares of land into a mosaic of 
national parks, extractive reserves, Areas of Environmental Protection, and National Forests (Servico Florestal 
Brasileiro 2010). They superimposed many areas on existing communities and contested territories, and many 
logging areas, with little possibility for enforcement, generating mobilizations against this model by actors on 
all sides of the debate. The results of the district are rather ambiguous as some argue that it inhibited 
deforestation (Banerjee et al. 2009) and others that it opened new land to logging by creating public forests. 
Terra Legal or Legal Land.  The law “Legal Land” began as MP 458, a highly controversial provisional 
measure, known as the “MP for grilagem” and passed into law 11.952 by the national congress, that would 
regularize 67 million hectares of undesignated government land (terra devoluta) as private property in plots up 
to 1500 hectares. The first areas to be regularized by Legal Land are along the southern portion of the BR-163. 
The first to be legalized by the state version of the same program are in Gleba Nova Olinda II.  
State Policy on Territorial Ordering, Pará state. In 2007, following a similar move by the federal 
government, which re-established its National Policy for Territorial Ordering in 2006, in 2007, after the new 
Workers’ Party Governor, Ana Julia Carepa appointed professor José Benatti as president of the state land 
agency ITERPA, the agency developed its own new policy for Territorial Ordering and Land Regularization 
that followed the national program in focusing on facilitating the articulation of development, anti-poverty, 
and environmental protection. Benetti also wrote a state version of Legal Land, passed in 2009, whose priority 
area for implementation was the Glebas.  
The Participatory Development Plan for the BR-163. Regional NGO IPAM coordinated a group of 14 
government ministries and several NGOs to create a regional ‘governance’ structure (Alencar et al. 2005). 
Through their ‘Forum of BR-163 Social Movements, comprising other NGOs (FVPP and ISA), union 
representatives (FETAGRI), and some area residents, they held a series of meetings along the road and 
elaborated and discussed the plan. People from the communities along the road largely disagreed on the plan 
and specifically on the notions of ‘sustainability’ in the plan (Campbell 2009).  The plan itself was ultimately 
shelved and the BR-163 paving moves forward. 
Green Municipalities. The challenges to implementation of Terra Legal have led to the expansion of the 
Green Municipalities program, which essentially devolves responsibility for land regularization to one of the 
two most powerful regional NGOs (TNC or Imazon), who have both dedicated the past several years to 
developing sophisticated databases of land tenure across the region (Imazon in eastern Pará and TNC in 
western Pará).  	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The combination of the above policies, as well as the new approaches to 
“greening” extractive industry embodied in programs like “sustainable soy” to be 
addressed in the following chapter, made it clear as the first decade of the 21st century 
progressed, that the proliferation of protected areas that had marked the Amazonian 
policy period since the early 1990s (under PPG7) had shifted.68 As the president of Pará’s 
land agency José Benatti put it in an interview (September 2009), “[c]reating protected 
areas was a strategy appropriate in the 1990s. Today there is a different logic.” This logic 
is based in techniques and programs that explicitly bring land and resources into markets, 
he explained, in order to strengthen both conservation and production.  
This shift in logic, can be delineated in the actions of regional political actors. By 
2009, the fact that the federal government had not created a Conservation Unit in over a 
year (ISA 2009), that Márcio Meira (the head of FUNAI under Lula) had gone so far as 
to say that demands for indigenous territory had become “excessive” and there needed to 
be a “limit” to their creation (Viveiros de Castro 2006, 148), that a 2006 federal law 
shifted the responsibility for granting logging management plans from the chronically 
under-resourced but (generally) trusted IBAMA to the notoriously corrupt and industry 
friendly (especially in Pará) state environmental agencies (article 83, Federal Law 
11.284, March 2, 2006), and that environmentalist politician Marina Silva had resigned 
from her position, all indicated cracks in the hegemony of the pro-environment policy 
program. This was not a simple re-centering of developmentalism - environmentalism 
debate, but rather a re-articulation of these positions into the “green development” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Lemos and Roberts (2009) call the “donor-led socio-environmental policy period,” when hundreds of 
millions of dollars in international conservation money flooded the region through the PPG-7 and re-
worked Amazonian policy and civil society relationships. 
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paradigm (what the Amazonian social movements call “green capitalism” as opposed to 
“brown capitalism), currently central to facilitating extractive development in the 
Amazon (Baletti 2012).  
This expansion of markets is not only about privatizing land, but, we see in the 
policies above, also about separating land tenure from resource rights. That is, there is an 
increasing disjuncture between land rights in property and what happens on the land itself 
that we see in many examples discussed here including the following: logging is now 
possible in “public forests” that are often technically protected areas; areas designated for 
“sustainable use,” which should protect traditional people, are open to loggers; Agrarian 
Reform clients can and are often under pressure to grant access to their land to loggers 
and miners (Jurutí Velha and ALCOA being a case in point); there is a current proposal 
in congress to open indigenous land to mining; and the ZEE’s closes off certain areas in 
order to open others to extraction. As a result, we see an expansion of areas that have 
some form of protection and a growth in extraction.  
In summary, the order that the state is seeking, through the policies of 
Ordenamanto Territorial to “create” and “expand into new spaces” is one that brings 
land and resources into markets by establishing multiple forms of land rights. The 
regional property regime mixes private property, state-held property, indigenous and 
traditional areas, and agrarian reform, but many of these forms of land rights that 
formerly took land and resources out of the market can now be opened, in part, to 
extraction. As we will see in the following examples, another significant effect of this 
planning is to limit the actual territories of traditional and indigenous people. In this way, 
their demands are technically met (e.g. they get land rights), but not on their terms. It is 
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proving an effective strategy in one sense, because over the past few years, deforestation 
rates on a region-wide scale are dropping, but the continuing conflicts over regional 
development indicates that while the implementation of "governance” may have created 
the conditions for particular kinds of conservation and development, it had done little to 
solve the problems of “the land issue” or, what will be articulated in Chapter Four as 
“territorial struggle.”  
TRADITIONAL TERRITORIES 
In this final section of this chapter, I turn briefly to one particular moment in the 
two struggles introduced in Chapter One – the assignment of land rights in order to 
demonstrate how OT impacts, and incorporates, other territorialities.  
Gleba Nova Olinda 
Gleba Nova Olinda is a 182 thousand hectare area – all of which is designated in 
the Ecological Economic Zoning plan for the consolidation of extractive industry. In 
other words, the ZEE prioritizes the area for mining, logging, and agro-industry. It is 
home to eleven traditional and three indigenous communities who had been petitioning 
for land rights since the 1980s (the history of this struggle will be recounted in more 
detail in Chapter Four). In the late 1990s/early 2000s when Cargill opened its port in 
Santarém and soy farmers began moving into the region, a consortium of 50 loggers and 
soy businesses called COOEPA entered the Gleba and began to acquire land through 
illegal and legal channels, to obtain management plans, and to log on the land that the 
people living there considered to be their own.  
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COOEPA obtained land in the Gleba through four different methods.69 For the 
first method, grilagem, they purchased fraudulent titles from a corrupt employee at 
ITERPA (the state land office) in the municipality of Jurutí. After the purchase, ITERPA 
employees made field visits to verify the land and legitimize the fraud (2500 hectares). 
They occupied land in the Gleba and cleared some area for pasture (a common practice 
for creating legitimacy for a land claim), hired gunmen to protect their claims, and posted 
signs with their protocol numbers on them.  Ibama discovered this grilagem in 2003, 
when they conducted an enforcement operation in response to a complaint by 
communities of Gleba Nova Olinda denouncing illegal logging. Ibama also found that a 
separate company, Rondon Belém Madiera, has established over 100km of illegal roads, 
logged illegally, and committed other environmental crimes. They levied a fine of 
136,000 reais and confiscated trucks, chainsaws, and other equipment. (O Liberal, 
December 15, 2003). This had no significant impact, according to residents, on logging 
practices. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 I assembled this information on COOEPA’s land rights and management plans from a number of 
different sources including the following: life history interviews in the communities of Novo Lugar and 
Cashoeira do Maró, Gleba Nova Olinda December 2009 and February 2010; various documents on the 
history of the land conflict in Gleba Nova Olinda that were held by the CPT and the legal representation for 
the movement, Terra de direitos, newspaper articles, two audiences that I attended at the Ministério 
Publico, and an examination of most of the actual management plans in Gleba Nova Olinda. I examined 
these plans on behalf of MDVCA as their selected outside observer as part of an effort to determine their 
legality or illegality, their actual geographic locations, and their relationship to land grants made by state 
agencies (the plans were provided to me by IBAMA for a limited time in December 2009) and how they 
related to the land rights being proposed to the movement by state agencies. The plans were provided to me 
by IBAMA in December of 2009. It was never entirely clear how these loggers had gotten some of these 
permits. Some management plans were issued in the permuta areas, but others were clearly illegal (in that 
they were in clear violation of existing laws), but had been approved by the former environmental secretary 
SECTAM and so, in another sense, were legal. One logger interviewed (and the only logger willing to grant 
an interview) explained that when then-candidate for governor Ana Julia Carepa (PT) was running for 
office, her staff took several regional loggers, including the interviewee, over Gleba Nova Olinda via 
helicoptor, indicating the management plans would be easily forthcoming in exchange for campaign 
support. The logger interviewed declined the offer, but suggested that those who had accepted, received 
management plan authorization. I could not verify this beyond his interview, however, Ana Julia, like all 
Pará politicians, does have strong ties to the logging industry (See, for example, 
http://www.mst.org.br/node/5082; http://veja.abril.com.br/010306/p_038.html on Ana Julia’s ties to 
logging, Accessed July 1, 2012) 
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Their second method for obtaining land in GNO was through a sort of land swap 
called a permuta. When the federal government created a Kayapó indigenous territory in 
the São Felix de Xingu in 1990, they expropriated land from several absentee landholders 
who had originally purchased the land in order to log it. (Decreto n°98.865 de 23 de 
janeiro de 1990 e da Portaria da FUNAI n°220 de 13 de março de 1990). In compensation 
for their loss, in 2006, the Pará state government assigned those landowners 25 lots in 
Gleba Nova Olinda called permutas, which were explicitly designated for logging, 
although they could not be clearcut, they had to be selectively logged.70 (Decreto 
Estadual n°2.472, September 29, 2006, published in DOEPAn°30.777, October 2, 2006). 
These permutas were located on land that Gleba Nova Olinda’s indigenous people 
consider to be their own and inside of the community of São Luiz. The permuta holders 
formed their own association within COOEPA called ASPIT (the Association of 
Proprietors of the Trairão project)  
The third strategy for accessing land in Gleba Nova Olinda (and in the 
neighboring Glebas of Gleba Nova Olinda II and III) was through a state granted form of 
temporary land rights for logging ADIPs (Authorization for the Detention of Private 
Property). ADIPs functioned as a sort of temporary land rights that were granted in areas 
with high potential for profitable logging to get around the existing Brazilian law that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Clear cutting is the type of logging associated with deforestation. Over the past two decades and 
increasingly today, as concerns for deforestation have significantly increased, logging is done through a 
process called “selective logging,” where loggers create a “sustainable management plan” and selectively 
cut and then transport to a mill for processing only the trees that they will actually sell. This is a more labor 
intensive and expensive logging because creating the plan requires a detailed forest survey submitted to the 
state that designates which trees will be logged and extraction is more complicated. It is also a much more 
difficult type of logging to track with remote sensing (or at all) because it thins forests rather than clearing 
them. By 2005 in the state of Pará, selective logging had either matched our outpaced deforestation in terms 
of the amount of trees logged and is deemed to have severe, and understudied ecological impact (Asner et 
al. 2005). As we see in these examples, its impacts on local communities are also severe as the logging 
damages local ecosystems, removes the wood that communities use, re-works their territory with 
infrastructure, circumscribes the communities, and generates conflict.  
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stipulated that logging could only happen in areas where people had private property 
rights.71  In three glebas that are adjacent to each other, there were a total of 8 ADIPs 
granted, with four of these grants within areas claimed by indigenous people in Gleba 
Nova Olinda.  
Finally, through common practices of petty bribery, loggers worked with some of 
the inhabitants of Gleba Nova Olinda – in some cases entire communities, such as Fé em 
Deus – and in other cases individuals, incentivizing (through bribery) and facilitating 
(flying them to Belém, ferrying them between Santarém and their communities via 
speedboat) their petitions for private property rights. Private property rights would serve 
the loggers in three ways. The people could sell the loggers their land, allow them to take 
out management plans on them, and it would limit the amount of land given to 
inhabitants (private lots are much smaller than collective ones), thereby opening the rest 
of the Gleba either for sale or to be a “public forest.”  
In 2007, in another enforcement operation, IBAMA found that some of these 
loggers Alfredo Sippert, Rosenil Vaz de Souza and Rondobel Industria e Comércio de 
Madeira Ltda, were in violation of several environmental laws. Upon being discovered, 
the loggers submitted to IBAMA permits for sustainable management plans in the Gleba 
that they had been granted by the State Environmental Secretary. Area residents argued 
that the loggers logged extensively outside of their allotted areas and had illegal loading 
docks and roads and, more significantly, should never have been granted the management 
plans in the first place, ethically, but also legally – within 10km of a conservation area 
(the RESEX Tapajós-Arapiuns due east) logging is illegal. Further, much of the logging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Public Forestry Law passed in 2006, a coup for the logging industry, began to allow logging on 
publically held land, but was still not applicable to terra devoluta, so was of no use in the Glebas, hence the 
ADIPs 
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was in areas claimed by indigenous people.72 Thus, while the logging itself was in 
violation of several laws, it was legal, because it was being done under a state-granted 
permit. IBAMA requested that the permits be cancelled, initiating a legal battle that 
would ensue for the next several years over the cancellation of these plans resulting in the 
standoff on the beach at São Pedro. 
 
Figure	  15:	  Sign	  encounterd	  during	  mapping	  indicating	  the	  area	  claimed	  by	  a	  logger	  with	  his	  ITERPA	  
license	  number. 
In an effort to mediate the tensions growing among Gleba Nova Olinda’s 
communities (explored more fully in Chapter Four), all of the communities of Gleba 
Nova Olinda held a series of meetings in order to negotiate a land tenure arrangement 
that would divide the Gleba into private property (for extractive development), traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Resolução CONAMA nº 013, de 06/12/1990 
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land, and indigenous land – a model very much in line with the territorial compromise 
model laid out in the ZEE. 
 
Figure	  16:	  Proposal	  for	  Gleba	  Nova	  Olinda	  land	  distribution.	  Indigenous	  land	  is	  in	  yellow,	  traditional	  
land	  in	  pink,	  private	  property	  in	  red,	  and	  conservation	  area	  in	  green.	  	  	  	  
Implementation of this agreement, however, dragged on for several years. 
FUNAI, the federal agency that governs recognizes indigenous land dragged their feet on 
the process of recognition despite numerous pleas by the indigenous residents, threats and 
fines by the Ministério Público and pressure from the National Rapporteur for Human 
Rights in Land, Territory and Food. The state forestry agency IDEFLOR, visited the 
traditional and indigenous communities to engage them in a participatory mapping 
project to develop logging management plans on their future territories (given that new 
laws opened even traditional lands to managed logging in reserve areas). In June 2009 the 
traditional territories were created in law, they were reduced to 1/5th of their agreed upon 
size. In an interview with the president of ITERPA, when asked why these lands were 
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reduced, he said “IDEFLOR mapped their use areas, those are the areas that they use. 
Saying that your grandfather once hunted somewhere is not grounds for getting land 
rights. Everyone cannot be Latifundia.” When we mapped the extents of the staked out 
logging management plans in the Gleba, our mapping demonstrated that the new, reduced 
boundaries also directly matched the boundaries of the loggers’ area. In other words, the 
boundaries of the traditional lands were reduced to leave the management plans intact.  
In summary, in Gleba Nova Olinda, we saw the legalization of not only unethical, 
but illegal activity through the creation of temporary and permanent land rights and 
management plans. We also witnessed the reduction of traditional and indigenous 
territories to meet the needs of extractive industry, and a practice, also common in the 
region, of what the ministerio publico called intentional foot dragging to allow time for 
resource extraction before creating a protected area. Whereas in previous moments, 
loggers were granted impunity, in this situation they are being granted something that is 
much more difficult to struggle against – legality. It is much easier to galvanize support 
for a movement against illegal logging, than legal (and even certified, some of these 
companies have certification agreements with Imazon) logging, despite the fact that this 
logging is being legalized on already claimed land, results in the minimization of the 
territorial extent of traditional and indigenous land, and has generated intercommunity 
conflict.  
Renascer 
The territorialization of the philosophy of governance, based in the idea that the 
territorial interests of all actors are not contradictory, but negotiable was most 
emblematically expressed by the worker’s party governor of the state of Pará, Ana Julia 
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Carepa, when she met with president Lula during a much reported plane ride from 
Brasilia to Sao Paulo in late 2008 to discuss the legalization of the Renascer extractive 
reserve. It was necessary, she argued, to find “the best design possible” to respect “the 
rights of the communities who live there and of the producers, ranchers and loggers who 
have been in that area for decades” (IDEFLOR 2008). 
What is today the Renascer (Rebirth) Extractive Reserve, located in the Prainha 
municipality, was originally slated for inclusion in the Verde Para Sempre (Forever 
Green) Extractive Reserve, located directly to the East of Renaser in the Porto de Moz 
municipality and legally created in 2003. The entire area proposed for the Renascer 
Extractive Reserve was designated for “Sustainable Use” in the ZEE for Western Pará. 
This designation is reserved for areas that would explicitly “prioritize” the needs and 
livelihood practices of traditional people. Renascer was recognized in multiple studies as 
a key area for biodiversity and cultural conservation.73 It is also rich in hardwoords and 
located in a prime area for logging (an industry that arrived only 10 years prior and 
whose arrival was the impetus for regional people’s struggle for territorial rights), 
ranching, and it would later be revealed, is rich in yet-undeveloped bauxite deposits 
under initial exploration by interested mining corporations.  
The Prainha and Porto de Moz mayors (both PSDB along with then-governor 
Jatene), were both the municipalities’ largest landholders, and loggers and ranchers 
themselves), a common situation in Pará, and had, working jointly with the logging 
industry, successfully lobbied against the inclusion of Renascer in the Verde Para Sempre 
Reserve to the east. Immediately following Verde Para Sempre’s creation, then Pará state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 It is a key site, for example, for Brazil nut trees, angelim-vermelho, muiracatiara, maçaranduba, mogno, 
cedro, maparajuba, acai, and buriti. Fishes include pirarucu, tambaqui, and surubim. There are 43 species of 
mammels.  
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Governor Simão Jatene (PSDB) opened the 400,000 hectare area of the future Renascer 
to loggers by declaring the entire area a “state forest” (FLOTA) through a gubernatorial 
decree. Loggers immediately began to obtain environmental licenses for management and 
logging authorizations AUTEF (Authorization for Timber Exploitation). In other words, 
the area was named a protected area (in accordance with the ZEE) so that it could be 
open to exploitation.  
Logging in the Renascer area was not necessarily contingent upon having a legal 
claim and permit. Much of the logging was flagrantly illegal. In the introduction, recall 
that Manoel do Pão, logger and advisor to the mayor, indicated that he – whom many 
considered to be on the side of justice – logged illegally in the Renascer area. He did this 
through another common practice, which was to purchase land with title (although 
usually without trees), and obtain a permit for a sustainable management plan on that 
land. Loggers then remove timber from forested areas, in this case the Renascer area, 
using that permit. When the wood illegally removed from an area arrived at customs, it 
would be carrying a legal permit, thus “laundering” illegally extracted timber. The third 
mechanism through which loggers wood illegally was through document falsification. In 
July 2012, when the logging that we had detected in our mapping – the largest 
apprehension of illegal logging in Brazilian history ($16 million reais worth of wood) – 
was finally formally prosecuted, the head of the Jauru logging corporation, Adriano 
Dandolini, was accused of forging 1,189 documents.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See the Ministério Publico’s denouncement at: 
http://www.gvces.com.br/index.php?r=noticias/view&id=242583 Accessed July 1, 2012. Perhaps not as 
relevant to this chapter per se, but rather to the overall argument regarding the links between progressive 
government, anti-poverty, extractions and political strategy, the Ministério Público Federal also entered 
into a judicial action in 2010 to stop ICMBio from contributing the $16 million reais to the Ministry of 
Social Development and anti-hunger (MDS) in an elections year (implying that it was an attempt to buy 
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The communities in conflict with loggers were advised by the IBAMA and the 
Rural Workers’ Union that their only option to protect their territories against loggers 
who were now, in part, operating legally was to struggle for another extractive reserve. 
Several communities re-organized themselves into the movement for Renascer (this 
struggle was contested within the reserve itself; all communities/people in the 
communities were not in agreement). The struggle for Renascer, continued for several 
years and was extremely contested, as will be detailed in Chapter Five. It generated bitter, 
at times violent, conflict in the region between people “for” and “against” the reserve, 
which broke down largely along the lines of those aligned with the logging and cattle 
industry and those engaged more exclusively in traditional living practices, and even 
generated a split in the movement itself between the Rural Workers’ Union and the 
reserve movement, which will also be discussed in the next Chapter.  
Following closed door negotiations between the rural workers’ union, the WWF, 
and federal and state government officials, on “World Environment Day” the fifth of June 
2009, Renascer Extractive Reserve was created by presidential decree with an area of 
211, 634 hectares, approximately one half of the size (414.274) petitioned for by the 
communities involved, recommended by the research report by IBAMA 75 and discussed 
in the Public Audience in the Reserve in December 2007. An area owned by local 
ranchers, the floodplain, almost all of the primary forest, the sources for the reserve’s 
three rivers, and most decisively, a later interview with ICMBio coordinator Fabiano 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
votes) and moved for the money to be returned to the communities of Renascer. At the time of this writing, 
the communities are still in conflict with ICMBio over this. 
75 IBAMA. 2006. Estudo Socioeconomico da area proposta para criação da Reserva Extratavista 
Renascer, Prainha/PA. A study conducted by a UFPA professor “Raimundinha” the wife of Airton Faleiro, 
state deputy (PT), former president of FETAGRI, and coordinater of the movement for the survival of the 
Transamazon and the Xingu region. 
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Costa (interview September 2009) would indicate, the Bauxite deposits, would be 
excluded from the reserve in “the best design possible.” The area excluded from the 
reserve is again slated to become a “state forest,” which would be open to mining and 
timber extraction.  
 
Figure	  17:	  Map	  of	  RESEX	  Renascer.	  The	  Resex	  Verde	  Para	  Sempre	  is	  to	  the	  east	  marked	  with	  hatching.	  
Renascer	  is	  in	  green	  and	  the	  yellow	  outline	  indicated	  the	  proposed	  reserve	  area	  that	  was	  eliminated	  in	  
the	  final	  creation	  of	  Renascer. 
The process of creating protected areas has another significant impact for 
communities – the intensification of extraction. It is quite common that, because it takes 
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time for government agencies to set up mechanisms for enforcement, resource 
exploitation spikes when conservation areas are created in law, so that industry can 
extract as much as possible prior to being removed from the area. In the case of Renascer, 
because their area was cut so significantly, this meant that loggers infiltrated community 
common lands. 
The reduction in the size of the reserve came to reserve residents as a shock. 
Those people who had been unwilling to negotiate on the size of the reserve – which, 
they argued compromised their very identity as “traditional” people, were not invited to 
participate in the negotiations. In other words, stakeholders were only those who would 
negotiate on the state’s terms. Thus, at the end of over a decade of struggle, the people of 
Renascer found that their broader community was deeply divided. They had achieved 
territorial recognition, but found that it was insufficient to their own reproduction with 
much of their land nearly all of the primary forest placed outside of the reserve. There 
was also concern that the Resex would create restrictions on their livelihood practices 
that would likely be incongruent with their actual means of subsistence (because their 
management plan would be drafted by ICMBio and there were already disagreements 
with ICMBio regarding what was permitted and not permitted within the reserve 
boundaries). 
CONCLUSION 
The overall argument of this chapter was that an examination of the evolution of state-led 
or state inspired development projects indicates that state approaches to governing and 
development have shifted from maintaining/producing order through force to doing so 
through the fragmentation and incorporation of existing other 
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logics/subjects/territorialities. This demonstrates that while the mechanisms have 
certainly changed, the ordering function (producing/reproducing relations of force) has 
not. State territorialization is the process of producing that order. Specifically in this 
situation, the way to do that is to turn nature into resources, land into property, and 
resistant subjects into stakeholders all integrated into a single, holistic model of territory 
that assigns each of these elements their proper place, which people are increasingly 
dissatisfied with.  
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Part Two. Territories of Resistance 
The first half of this dissertation recounted the historical, social processes that 
precipitated and made visible a sort of territorial crisis – a moment when the tenuous 
nature of the link between territory and state became apparent in the wake of the 
dictatorship and developmentalist period and the emergence of new territorial actors in 
Amazonia in the 1980s. It unpacked the contemporary hegemonic processes re-
territorializing the region, based largely in what we might call a geopolitics of sustainable 
development and resource control, which set the conditions for the intensification of 
extractive industry in the region ongoing today.  
In this final section of the dissertation, I return to the two struggles introduced in 
Chapter One to examine the “new territorialities” geared toward emancipation emerging 
and/or present in the face of this re-territorialization (Porto Gonçalves 2006). In Chapter 
Four, through a detailed examination of the genealogy of the Movement in Defense of 
Life and Culture and the Arapiuns River, I examine the emergence of territorial subject(s) 
and within that, the concept of territory itself. As part of the larger argument of this 
dissertation to re-think “territory” as separate from the nation-state, this section is based 
in the premise that innovation in strategies of struggle has meant the re-invention or 
creation of new concepts. The de-linking by social movements of the concept of territory 
from the nation-state serves two functions. It reveals the instability/destabilizes the 
naturalized link between state and territory, and it offers up the concepts that make these 
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practices of struggle intelligible, articulating an approach to politics that is historically 
and epistemologically adequate to the current moment. 
This exploration of innovation in strategies of struggle is not meant to over-
emphasize their “success.” One of the arguments of this dissertation is that Brazil’s 
economic growth, the corresponding anti-poverty payments to low or no-income people 
(including, significantly, the payments for environmental services that are not explored in 
this dissertation but have begun to be dispersed in these areas studies over the past 
several months), and the presence of many social movement actors into institutional 
politics, presents a significant challenge to previous social movement strategies. Rather, 
my intention is precisely to map out the shifting terrain of politics, and to try to better 
understand what movements are articulating as political strategy adequate to the current 
moment.  
In this vein, Chapter Five examines more closely the processes that come after the 
moment of attaining land rights in the case of Renascer, where the Resex inhabitants 
achieved a degree of territorial control, but not what they had been struggling for. It 
explores how, when a minimum amount of stability is achieved, new political 
possibilities for self-determination become actualized. This happens, however, alongside 
and within political practices aimed at re-establishing the given order. While this chapter 
does not examine the concept of territory as explicitly as Chapter Four, its premise is that 
the possibilities for the self-determination at stake in the project to establish Resex 
governance rest in a material and territorial capacity to reproduce and protect their ways 
of life. 
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 Through both of these chapters we will see the development of a conception of 
territory that, as I will elaborate further in Chapter Four, is based simultaneously (and 
inextricably) in the spatialized social practices that constitute a particular, collective way 
of life and the struggle for the defense of that way of life. Given that the questions 
engaged here are explicitly political, and in response to – and building on – a substantial, 
recent literature that focuses on the cultural and environmental practices of traditional 
people rather than on political subject formation (see for example the recent edited 
volumes by Nugent and Harris 2004; Adams et al. 2009), my analysis focuses less on an 
ethnographic description of daily practices and more explicitly on developing a practical 
comprehension of struggle. 
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Chapter 4. From Land to Territory: the Movement for the Defense of 
Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost immediately following the taking of the timber barges on the Arapiuns 
River, described in the introduction, officials from several state agencies rushed upriver 
to where the barges were being held to try to mitigate the situation. The state 
environmental agency representative offered to take the wood elsewhere to determine its 
legality. The wood, however, was the movement’s bargaining chip; they did not even 
consider that proposal. The state forestry agency offered to pass demands regarding 
indigenous territory on to the federal government. Indigenous issues, the agency 
explained, were outside of their jurisdiction. The aldeia (indigenous community) leaders 
could not count the number of times they had heard that before; the federal government 
was well aware of their demands. They declined the offer. The Civil Police threatened to 
arrest the demonstrators, although they had no arrest warrant. The protesters sent the 
police back to Santarém empty-handed. 
Realizing that they were settling in for the long haul, the protesters assembled on 
the beach to discuss organization and strategy. First they dealt with logistics, setting up 
commissions for cooking, cleaning, camp infrastructure, resource assessment and 
procurement, and entertainment/consciousness-building – establishing the material means 
for the encampment’s existence. Then, they moved on to questions of leadership, 
establishing a twelve-person commission, with rotating membership, to represent the 
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movement. This group, it was decided, would always consist of both men and women 
and of both indigenous people and “extractivists.”76 Next, they articulated their 
objectives/demands, and outlined a strategy for moving forward. As discussed in the 
introduction, the movement’s early demands were quite specific – determination of the 
detained wood’s legality, expansion of the Agro-extractive Agrarian Reform settlements’ 
(PAEx’s) boundaries (which, as discussed in Chapter Three, had been reduced to one-
fifth of their agreed upon size), and demarcation of the Borarí indigenous land in Gleba 
Nova Olinda.77 Finally, they selected a name for themselves. The Movement in Defense 
of Gleba Nova Olinda was the obvious choice, but it was not the name they chose.78 It 
was true that the demands themselves aimed at “defending” rights to land and resources 
in Gleba Nova Olinda. However, the desires and goals of the movement, it was argued, 
exceeded the immediate implications of these demands. In fact, the majority of the people 
protesting on the beach did not even live in Gleba Nova Olinda. They lived in the 
RESEX Tapajós-Arapins and the PAEex Lago Grande. Why then, were so many 
communities from across these different areas, who already had collective property 
rights, who had basically “succeeded” in their “struggle for land” gathered on the beach, 
in a standoff with both loggers and the state, to make demands about land rights in a 
place that they did not even live?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 This was the designation that they began using for non-indigenous people from the extractive reserve 
(extractive reserves are dedicated to subsistence extractivism, as opposed to industrial extractivism). They 
ultimately deemed the word unsatisfactory because, as one indigenous leader pointed out, “We are all 
extractivists.” 
 
77 Gleba is the word used to describe a large area of government-held, undesignated land (e.g. no property 
rights or use rights are assigned in this area). 
 
78 Naming movements the “movement in defense of [name issue here]” is common in Amazonia, perhaps a 
legacy of the environmental movement and the fact that the wave of region-wide movements in the 70s and 
80s were largely defensive (defending land and resources from exploitation by developers). 
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 For years, and intensely in the previous several months, the people and 
communities of the Arapiuns, Aruã, and Maró Rivers witnessed logging barges headed 
downriver to Santarém from Gleba Nova Olinda daily. To them, the extraction of 
millions of dollars worth of timber represented the first step in their ultimate 
dispossession and displacement. The effects of activities in Gleba Nova Olinda could not 
be restricted to that area. As one interviewee explained, the only thing that differentiated 
the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda from the rest of the people of the Arapiuns were 
the “boundaries created by the state.” These boundaries, she explained, did not represent 
difference among them as people. They all “plant farinha, hunt, and fish” and had family 
networks that extended across the entire region. Many of them, she explained, were “one 
movement, we have struggled together, against the loggers, for the Resex…for our 
rights...Without Gleba Nova Olinda, there is no Arapiuns. These rivers, this territory they 
are our life, our culture, all of ours.” These were the initial moments of the formation of 
the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River, a movement not for 
land, but, in their words, for territory.  
In this chapter I demonstrate and theorize this shift, by movements in the Lower 
Amazon (Baixo Amazonas) over the course of two decades from a “Struggle for Land” to 
one for territory. I argue that this move from the pursuit of land and property to a struggle 
for life, culture and territory is not a simple “re-framing” (Benford and Snow 2000) of 
ongoing struggle. Rather this substantive and strategic shift expresses deeper political 
changes in the capacity of these movements to confront, and intervene in the given order 
of domination. Embedded in this shift is a move away from the political supremacy of the 
concepts of “peasant” and “rural worker” introduced by political parties and the syndical 
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movement in rural Amazonia (and Brazil) (Castro 2006; Almeida 2011), and toward new 
subject categories that split these previous categories and re-organized them according to 
self-determined collective, ethnic, and ecological (e.g. relations to nature/natural 
resources) elements. 
 
 
At the foundation of this shift, I will argue, is a move away from economically 
based claims about production. The framing of the struggle for land within the labor 
theory of property (land to the tiller) ultimately trapped the claims that Amazonian 
movements were making within an economic argument that was inadequate to their 
actual struggle, and could even be used against it. The claim for territory, in response, is 
less a claim of economic productivity – although economic production may be one 
component of it – and more a claim about the production of a collective subject and a 
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particular way of life.79 This claim expresses a conception of territory that understands 
particular territories and subjects as a co-produced and thus inextricable and that 
understands territorialization as a practice of resistance forged through a combination of 
everyday practices and struggle through which these subjects are formed (Porto 
Gonçalves 2001; Porto Gonçalves 2009; Fernandes 2005; de Almeida 2006; Reyes and 
Kaufman 2011; Zibechi 2008).80 I will more explicitly theorize this conception of 
territory by charting the emergence of new collective political subjects (e.g. movements) 
and their corresponding, specific processes of territorialization and territories - what 
geographer Bernardo Mançano Fernandes (2005) calls socio-territorial movements – in 
multiple iterations, in the Araipiuns region. 
To make this argument, I begin with an overview of what we might call the 
sociological characteristics of life in the lower Amazon, which lays the foundation for the 
analysis that follows of how a rather objective category (agricultura familiar) was 
invested with meaning and linked to particular notions of both struggle (for land) and 
political change. In other words, I explore theoretically and historically how practices-in-
common were used to generate a broad political category (peasant, and then rural 
worker). I address the limitations of these broad categories of analysis through a closer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 It is important to note here that I am not suggesting that the struggle for land is not a struggle for a 
particular way of life, or, for that matter, for territory, as I would argue that it most certainly is (and in fact, 
this analysis draws heavily on other analyses of the Landless Workers’ Movement as a movement for much 
more than simply “land” (Wolford 2004b; Wolford 2004a; Wolford 2005; Wolford 2004c), and that argue 
that the MST is a socio-territorial movement (Fernandes 2005). Rather, many of these broad categories 
were externally introduced to Amazonian people and although they are meant to be categories of resistance, 
they have some of the same destructive effects of erasing difference as other colonizing practices. The 
strategic innovation in explicitly territorial claims that express diverse forms of collective life are a re-
claiming of this difference.  
 
80 This is a conception explained quite clearly in the above quote from a protester, whose self description 
of the movement was people who “hunt fish and plant farinha” and who have “struggled together.” 
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examination of territorial struggles in Gleba Nova Olinda, demonstrating that common 
livelihood practices do not map on to political categories. Rather, following EP 
Thompson (1978) and others, these are forged through struggle. I examine the co-
constitution of political subjects and land claims in Gleba Nova Olinda through the 
struggle for the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, the “Resurgent” Indigenous 
movement, and finally the movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns 
River (MDVCA). I pay special attention to the way that the concept of territory as 
articulated by the indigenous movement informs MDVCA’s formation, especially in its 
capacity to join different forms of collective subjects into a common struggle. 
TRADITIONAL POPULATIONS 
Across Amazonia (and Brazil, but here we are particularly concerned with 
Amazonia), innumerable variants of collective groups of people who subsist largely 
through agriculture and/or a combination of agriculture and subsistence extractivism are 
agglomerated in the literature under the terms “smallholder” agriculture in English and 
agricultura familiar (family agriculture) in Portuguese. A more specific description of the 
actual production processes in different places and communities can vary substantially, as 
people adapt to the complex, delicate and infinitely variable regional micro-ecosystems 
that form the basic unit of cultural and economic life.81 Such differences mean that there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The complexity and variation among these different types of practices should not be underemphasized, 
from the western Amazon where rubber tappers base their subsistence in rubber, to Gleba Nova Olinda 
which is a combination of hunting and fishing to the varzea communities closer to Santarem who fish, to 
the crab collectors on the coast, to the babaçu-breakers of Maranhão, these differences are increasingly 
claimed and celebrated. This variation can also be found within the lifetime of a single person. Many 
interviewees worked as wage laborers in mining or ranching, in aviamento situations tapping rubber or 
harvesting malva, lived in different places, even within a single year of their life. See Porto Gonçalves 
(2001) on the variety of “traditional” people that inhabit Amazonia (whose names include but are not 
limited to ribeirinho (river-dweller), caboclo (can mean anything from person to mestizo, to hillbilly), 
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is a vast heterogeneity of daily practices, forms of organization, and spatial practices 
(WinklerPrins 2001; Raffles 2002; Nugent, Harris, et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2009). What 
these “peasants,” “people of the forest,” or “traditional populations” 82 hold in common, 
generally speaking, are practices and systems that are small-scale and geared toward 
subsistence and thus oriented around a logic of self-reproduction rather than that of 
accumulation. In this section, I briefly provide an overview of these collective livelihood 
practices in Gleba Nova Olinda, in order to familiarize the reader with an understanding 
of what are considered to be some of the key elements of collective livelihood practices 
there. Then I explore the way that this rather objective understanding of these practices 
has been used to construct the political categories of peasant and rural worker and some 
of the tensions that emerge in that process. This will lay the basis for a broader argument 
that both daily collective practices and the processes of struggle constitute the territories 
at stake here. I place this argument in contrast to a literature, a conservation and 
development practice, and former projects of movement building that define these subject 
categories largely through the former (e.g. practices of everyday life). Because scholars 
have documented these practices, this chapter pays less detailed attention to an 
ethnographic representation of daily life and focuses more on describing and analyzing 
struggle as a constituent practice of territory.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
quilombo (remnant afro-Brazlian escaped slave communities), indigena, seringueiro (rubber tapper), 
extrativista (extractivist), pescadores (fishermen), or the more generic traditional.  
 
82 All of these terms are used to reference these groups and will be addressed in more detail below, but 
briefly, the designation “people of the forest” was proposed by the many different social movements 
(indigenous, rubber tappers, ribeirinhos etc.) as a project of building a common struggle for identity-based 
rights in the 1980s. “Traditional” is a legal designation.  
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Traditional populations of the Arapiuns 
While the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda have different particular histories, 
most of the current communities were established between fifteen and fifty years ago. 
They trace their ancestry to communities that have lived in the broader region for 
generations,83 in small hamlets or communities that were loosely organized around 
dispersed extended family units, a dispersal that was largely the effect of the post-
Cabanagem (uprising of 1835-40 discussed in the introduction) regional repression and 
the subsequent re-structuring of relations of domination through the aviamento system.84 
These processes nearly completely destroyed familial and affinitive relations and 
consequently the ethnic and social fabric that had so deeply challenged the structures of 
domination. People and families re-located in small groups from the river margins to the 
more remote terra firme (uplands).85 Beginning with the rubber industry in the late 1800s 
and continuing during the mid-late 20th century with the production of juta and malva, 
people began moving back to the rivers, or more commonly, maintaining an area within 
the forest centers and along the rivers edge. Communities remained small and relatively 
mobile, moving when resources became scarce or to escape conflict.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Or always, the collective memory encountered in interviews goes back at least to Cabanagem, the 
uprising of 1835-40 discussed in introduction. For a more detailed analysis of the specific regional history 
of the lower Arapiuns see (Bolaños 2008; Vaz 1996; Vaz 2004; Vaz 2008). 
 
84 Aviamento is a mercantile system based on personal debt relations established region-wide during the 
rubber boom that significantly re-worked labor and social relations across the region entrenching clientalist 
relationships that persist today. For discussions of aviamento see Weinstein 1983; Da Cunha and de 
Camargo Monfrê 1967; Wagley 1988; Hecht and Cockburn 2011).  
 
85 In an 1850 visit to the region, British naturalist Henry Bates noted that the Borarí people, then living in 
Alter do Chão (an entirely different location closer to Santarém than their Borarí descendents of Gleba 
Nova Olinda) that almost no one escaped the massacre and there were almost no middle aged males left 
among the Borarí. (Bates 1876 quoted in Ioris 2011, 226). 
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Today, the people and families living in Gleba Nova Olinda’s three indigenous 
and eleven traditional communities variously engage some combination of productive 
practices generally understood to comprise traditional production systems, including 
subsistence agriculture (slash and burn/shifting cultivation) and extractive activities such 
as fishing, hunting, collecting, and non-timber forest product extraction.86 Agricultural 
labor is oriented around the production of manioc as a staple crop. Manioc is inedible in 
its raw form, but used to produce – through an extremely labor intensive process – a 
course flour called farinha, or a derivative called tapioca, eaten with every meal and 
supplemented by some combination household level animal husbandry (cattle, pig, or 
chicken and duck production), fishing and hunting.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
86 The indigenous communities, Novo Lugar, Cachoeira do Maró and São José III, are located proximate to 
one another on the Maró River. The traditional communities are Prainha, Fé em Deus, Repartimiento, Viste 
Alegre and Mariazinha on the Maró and São Francisco do Aruã, São Luis do Aruã, Novo Paraíso, São 
Parentes, São Raimundo, and Sempre Serve on the Aruã. The Gleba is estimated to contain a total of 309 
families and 1,304 people (Iterpa 2007). The size of communities varies between approximately 10 and 
approximately 50 families. The difference between indigenous and traditional communities is complex and 
as I will argue below it is a political question, rather than a sociological one. While the specific livilhood 
practices may vary by community and even by family, they are do not specifically vary by these identity 
categories (indigenous/traditional) and this section is broadly describing life across the Gleba).  
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Figure	  18:	  Back	  from	  hunting 
Figure	  19:	  Home	  life 
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Figure	  20:	  Making	  an	  oar 
	  
	  
Figure	  21:	  Slaughtering	  a	  cow	  for	  upcoming	  assembly	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Figure	  22:	  Making	  farinha 
 
Subsistence practices vary seasonally because life is oriented around the rivers, 
whose levels vary drastically from the rainy season (inverno) to the dry season (verão), 
affecting the availability of fish, fruits, and crops. Planting of manioc and other staple 
crops in the small fields called roças is generally done close to the villages and up to a 
few hours walk into the forest. Living areas are determined and organized according to 
communal forms (either family or community level) of territorial appropriation and each 
family’s roça, as well as the location of their house is designated through decisions made 
in community meetings called assemblies. This is the case whether one’s house is in the 
village or in the forest (“the centro” or center); some families do not live within the 
village sites although they are considered part of the community. People also collect 
“wild” food from the forest, including, but not limited to, myriad fruits, castanha-do-
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Pará (the Brazil nut), and palm fruits such as açaí and bacaba, they build their homes 
and boats with wood taken from the forest, and they make their roofs from palm 
(palha).87  
Labor (planting, home-building, community projects) is generally done by family 
members, through reciprocity, communal practices (especially to meet the reproductive 
needs of the communities, such as maintenance of community structures, event planning, 
etc.), and in some cases, people are paid for day labor (in 2010 the paid labor rate was at 
a rate of 15 reais per day, approximately $7 USD at the time). 88 Basic commodities 
(rice, sugar, coffee, cooking oil, and cachaça, the regional alcoholic drink of choice) are 
increasingly purchased, either on monthly trips to the city or from local mercadinhos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This is a housing construction model, which is one of the first things to change once people receive land 
rights and become eligible for government housing credits. That is, they receive funding, sometimes as 
grants but primarily loans for up to $18,000 reais, to build a home, which is built by a company contracted 
by INCRA and in a style designed by INCRA. During my time in the field, the former superintendent of 
Incra Santarém was also the head of the house construction corporation.  
 88 Based on a household level survey of four houses in two communities (Novo Lugar and Prainha), I 
drafted a list of plants cultivated and collected. In a community meeting in Novo Lugar with several 
households, we reviewed the lists and added items they believed were missing. We found that in their roças 
and home gardens, all families plant manioca and some combination of macaxeira, milho, arroz, batata, 
cana-de-açucar, cará, feijão, and the fruits abacaxi and melancia. Fruit trees in home gardens or exploited 
in the forest usually include some combination of cajú, mamao, cupuçu, laranja, banana, muruci, goiaba, 
taperibá, manga, abacate, acerola, manga, jambo, graviola, cajá, limao, maracujá, ata, and pupunha. 
Other commonly extracted forest foods include bacaba and açai, castanha do Pará, uxi, tucumã, miriti, 
buruti, and inga. People also commonly extract wood for houses or canoe construction, primarily itaúba or 
guaruba or oiti. Other forest products commonly extracted include cipós and barks along with oils such as 
andiroba and copaiba, and other medicinal herbs, and fibers such as curua (for making string) and palha 
(for house roofs), as well as latex. Commonly hunted animals are small veado, cutia, tatú, paca, and 
occasionally macaco and jabuti, along with a variety of wild birds, such as jaca-açu and galega. People 
also raise galinha and pato along with the occasional boi. There are seemingly innumerable types of fish 
and fishing methods vary from underwater diving with handmade spears, to net fishing. Some examples of 
fish in include traíra, jatuarana, and apurá. These lists are compiled from interviews with families, home 
garden and roça visits, group discussions and questions asked while walking in the forest. They are not 
necessarily exhaustive, but meant to give a general idea of the diversity of cultivated and extracted 
products. While people sometimes sell surpluses (especially of castanha do Pará and some of the barks and 
cipós) to middle men or at the mercadão 2000 (the largest outdoor market at the port) in Santarém, sale, 
trade, or sharing of food and medicinal products is common within communities. People tend to purchase 
coffee, pasta, rice, sugar, crackers, and bread on trips to Santarém. Sale of fish or hunted meat outside of 
the community is extremely rare. The staple food is manioca, which is processed through a labor-intensive 
process into a flour called farinha and into a tapioca flour used for cakes and beiju.  
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usually consisting of a stack of items for sale in someone’s living room. Alcohol is sold 
only in the towns that have a logging presence and its sale (although not its consumption) 
is explicitly banned in the indigenous communities. 
Beyond agriculture and extractivism, livelihood strategies take on myriad forms, 
and inhabitance in one’s community, especially among younger people, can be dynamic. 
Many of the youngest generation of adults migrate to Santarém, or often to Manaus, for 
several years or permanently. Manaus is located three days upriver by boat from 
Santarém and is a free trade zone that offers the possibility of economic success. Aside 
from the proposal by outsiders to begin soy plantations there, Gleba Nova Olinda has no 
major cash crop, although historically the people there, like most people across the 
region, worked in rubber production, and at different times collected other non-timber 
forest products (drogas de sertão) for sale to local middle men or in Santarém through 
the aviamento system. Today people may sell surpluses, artisanal goods, or local 
commodities (boats, oars etc.) in the villages or occasionally in Santarém. They may 
operate small stores out of their homes, or move to the city for periods of time for 
employment. At times they may work on boats, or work for loggers or other extractive 
industries . Some families receive government subsidies in the form of bolsa familia (the 
family grant program) or aposentadoria (similar to social security). Many extended 
families have houses or family in Santarém and it is common for children to spend 
several years studying in the city because there are no schools in the communities past 
the elementary level.  
Nearly five hundred years of evangelism by the Catholic Church means that most 
families are Catholic. Yet because visits by priests are only occasional, masses are 
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organized and conducted by catechist teams within the communities. In recent years 
evangelical churches such as the Seventhth-Day Adventists and the Assembly of God, 
have made inroads into some of the communities. The evangelical churches prohibit 
dancing, soccer playing, and saint-day festivals, some of the most important regional 
communal practices, giving rise to inter-community conflict. Evangelicalism has not been 
permitted in the indigenous communities. 
What is more difficult to communicate through this rather objective description is 
that beyond simply a strategy of subsistence, the roça and its product farinha, embody a 
consistency of practice across the various Amazônias that do not mark simply a method 
of cultivation or simply a strategy of subsistence. Rather they define a collective way of 
living (Almeida 2006; Almeida 2011). The roça signals, in the mundane sense, the choice 
of agricultural land and areas of extractivism. More importantly, the roça marks a 
particular relations between time and space, a process of territorialization that articulates 
and organizes the social practices and institutions – the agricultural calendar, religious 
festivals, soccer tournaments – standing as a central reference that sediments inter and 
intra-familial and community relations of reciprocity that are ultimately both productive 
of and necessary for the demand for and defense of territory, as we shall see below.  
The Traditional Peasant/Caboclo as an object of study 
As discussed above, scholars designate the many different Amazonian peoples 
and communities who engage in these combined practices of agricultura familiar and 
extractivism by multiple names that fall under the broad category of the “traditional 
peasantry” (camponês) (a word seldom utilized among the Arapiuns people themselves), 
which has an ethnic correlate of caboclo. That is, they are understood to be mixed-race, 
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non-Indian peasants, who, in the popular imagination, are descended from of northeastern 
migrants to the region and detribalized indigenous people (Galvão 1955; Wagley 1988; 
Ross 1978; E. F. Moran 1981; S. G Bunker 1985; Furtado 1988; Browder and Godfrey 
1997; Nugent 1993; C. Adams et al. 2009; D. M. Lima 2009).89 The word caboclo itself 
carries myriad racialized stigma. At best, the term caboclo is a gross oversimplification 
of a complex regional, racial, and ethnic history, as is the term “peasant,” which itself 
does a lot of the work of erasing these complex ethnic identities.90 In this section, I 
examine the emergence of the Amazonian traditional peasantry as an academic and 
political object of study, its continued importance to contemporary analyses of struggle. It 
is these limitations – namely its tendency toward economism –that, I will later argue, 
territorial struggle works toward overcoming. 
Initial theorizations of the Amazonian peasant emerged at a historical moment 
where on the one hand, the worldwide rural uprisings associated with decolonization 
were generating a re-invigoration of political and academic fascination with rural people 
as political actors. On the other hand, and in response, this moment was marked by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The “traditional” peasantry is differentiated from the “neocampones” who are the more recent migrants 
from the south and northeast (discussed in Chapter 2), landless peasants themselves. See Nugent (1996) on 
the variety of both names and practices of the “neo-componeses,” e.g. people who have migrated to the 
region in the past four decades often refered to as colonos (colonists), nordestinos (people from the 
northeast), sulistas (people from the south), squatters (posseiros), along with the other group of more 
capitalized migrants, which include garimpeiros (gold miners), fazendeiros (ranchers), sojeiros (soy 
farmers), grileiros (land speculators), gauchos (generally wealthier and white people from the south), and 
of course, pistoleiros (hired gunmen). 
 
90 Racist stereotypes range from caboclos as lazy, as a category of non-being –they are not Indians, nor 
white, nor Afro-descendents – to romanticization as the simple, uneducated, forest-dwellers, a stereotype 
that continues to this day. For example, sse recent Al Jazeera news report on Amazonian life for a perfect 
example of this http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/06/201262310194990483.html [accessed 
July 1, 2012]. Although the actual racial history of the Amazon is infinitely more complex and  at a 
minimum the “caboclo” is a descendent of indigenous populations, escaped slave populations, Portuguese 
colonizers, later migrants etc. For a more substantive discussion of race, ethniticy, and “caboclo” see 
Nugent (1997) and Harris (1998). 
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development of an international regime of counter-insurgency, largely enacted through 
both repression (in Latin America by the military dictatorships) and new development 
strategies (such as Basic Needs development), all oriented toward addressing the new 
figure of the “peasant.”91 Academic and political analyses tended to naturalize the 
“peasant,” as the rural political, economic, and social subject – a category that stood in 
for and masked other forms difference (ethnic and racial) (Harris 1998; Viveiros de 
Castro 2006).  
Amazonian political economy re-focused on the Agrarian Question and broadly 
proposed two different analyses of the Amazonian peasantry. “Classical frontier 
theorists” (Cleary 1993) such as Otávio Velho (1976, 1981) and Joe Foweraker (1981), 
writing at a time when industrial capitalist transformation of the region appeared 
inevitable, theorized the “peasant” as the key actor in the transition to capitalism. In other 
words, the peasant was the subject who evolved from subsistence farmer to petty 
commodity producer to waged laborer.  
Other scholars, broadly inspired by peasant uprisings in the northeast (Ianni 1978; 
Martins 1981; Leroy 1991), cast Amazonians as peasants in an explicit effort to 
foreground their potential as revolutionary political subjects. This argument relied on a 
certain “peasant essentialism” (Bernstein and Byres 2001) that links particular livelihood-
based and cultural practices (subsistence farming, egalitarianism) to a definition of 
peasants as unique political subjects that constitute a class (that is, different from either 
the proletariat or the latifundia). This amounted to the reading of a political category onto 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Not to mention the fact that Mao and events in China forced a re-thinking of the peasantry as 
protagonists of revolutionary political change. That is, it forced a rethinking of peasants beyond the 
classical political economic analyses that sought to understand their place in transitions to capitalism, 
socialism, or liberal democracy (Marx 1976; Lenin and Fineberg 1943; Kautsky 1988; Luxemburg 1951). 
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what is essentially a sociological one, and consequently in a rather instrumentalist 
analysis (albeit one that we may have sympathies with) of peasant as political actor, (not 
to mention an ultimately politically ambivalent one as it is this same essential peasant 
who can be the agent of capitalist transformation, as in the above scenario).  
This argument regarding the peasant is based on an analogy of the laboring 
subjects’ (peasants) relation to their instruments of production (land). José da Souza 
Martins (1991), solidified this conception of peasant as laborer in his seminal work on the 
distinction between “terra de trabalho,” that is, land as an instrument of labor meant to 
provide familial subsistence, and “terra de negócio” or land of business, privately held 
land meant to provide profit, usually through speculation, rent, and the generation of 
surplus value. These categories of land use were then introduced to identify the primary 
contradiction (between use-value and exchange-value) within agriculture as a system. In 
other words, they were understood to set the conditions of possibility for class struggle in 
the countryside.  
This conception of rural contradictions would become key to the construction of 
the “struggle for land” in second half of the 20th century in Brazil, which broadly counter-
poses subsistence and industrial agriculture as the material expression of this 
contradiction and Agrarian Reform (through expropriation and redistribution) as its 
potential resolution. While this analysis is useful for helping us to understand that one of 
the - if not the - primary contradictions in the contemporary Amazon is between the 
organizing logics of surplus-oriented and social reproduction-oriented relationships to 
land, the empirical categories (peasant and latifundia) and demands (land reform based in 
the labor theory of value) that were developed politically from this analysis ultimately, 
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did not/do not map on to the material reality of Amazonia, and are thus inadequate to 
represent the extent of the contradictions present there. This limitation, I will argue, is 
linked to the fact that these categories work within the logic of political economy (e.g. the 
logic of the dominant order), a logic that I argue contemporary struggles for territory 
attempt to disrupt. 
Subsequent treatments of Amazonian peasants within academic and policy 
analyses would broadly continue to engage with one of these two frames - peasants as 
either agents or inhibitors to the capitalist transition of the amazon. By the 1990s and 
2000s social and natural science research, conducted in the wake of the clear 
environmental destruction wrought by modernization programs, was almost universally 
informed by a strong ecological discourse and a preoccupation with the “environment.”92 
Questions of capitalist transition versus liberation were recast as questions of 
environmental destruction versus conservation. In consequence, the question became 
whether Amazonian “peasantries” were the potential destroyers or saviors of the “lungs 
of the earth.” That is not to say that there was not more nuanced research, such as that 
done in Political Ecology, which more critically explored the political possibilities of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  The exception to this would be the more recent anthropological literature (and especially work within 
and inspired by a conversation between Mark Harris and Steven Nugent. See for example, Harris 1998; 
Harris 2000; Nugent 1997; Nugent, Harris, et al 2004), which has attempted to respond to what they argue 
is a certain economic reductionism in Amazonian peasant studies by rescuing the “Amazonian peasantries” 
and the caboclo (with an emphasis on their plurality) as a cultural category. The anthropological response 
to the multiple “peasant essentialisms” and to political economic analyses of the peasantry more broadly, 
was to argue, not incorrectly, that is both modernization itself, and theories of frontier change, and 
environmental stewardship had erred in their failure to recognize (and thus to overcome and understand, 
respectively) the nuances of what was not a “peasantry,” but rather highly differentiated “peasantries,” 
(Cleary 1999). For Amazonian Peasant Studies, then, the mandate was/is to describe, analyze and create 
concepts, and add ethnographic nuance, that capture the diversity of livelihood practices. Thus, recent 
anthropological approaches have focused on providing the historical and ethnographic detail that can help 
to understand the emergence of the traditional peasantries. This work has made significant contributions to 
historicizing and nuancing the category of peasant/caboclo, but ultimately and perhaps paradoxically also 
theorizes Amazonian peasantries as simply outcomes of an economic process (e.g. merchant capitalism in 
the form of the rubber industry).  
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peasants-as-agents (Schmink and Wood 1992; Hecht and Cockburn 2011 are some 
excellent examples of such work), and cultural ecology, which explored how they could 
be environmental stewards, largely through consciousness and institution building with 
expert help ((Furtado 1988; Moran 1993; Brondizio et al. 1994; McGrath et al. 1999; 
Lima et al. 2000). Much of this research also has an economist bent, seeking to measure 
and increase the economic viability of traditional production systems, marked by the 
proliferation throughout the 1990s and 2000s of participatory development projects 
across traditional, rural Amazonia. This research was in a large part inspired by 
environmentalists’ interest in incorporating local populations into conservation 
frameworks, which contributed to valorizing the productive and biological diversity of 
“traditional peasantries” and served as a key strategic argument and an important factor 
in some of they key victories in the Amazonian struggle for land.  
This mobilization, from below, by people that identified themselves not as 
peasants per se, but as, ribeirinhos, quilombolas, babaçu breakers, indigenous people, 
extractivists, and people of the forest, to name a few, established subject categories that 
rejected analyses of them as naturalized biological actors and assumed positions as 
collective, political subjects constituted through processes of territorialization. In the next 
section, I turn to the history of the struggle for Gleba Nova Olinda to argue that the move 
away from the concepts of “peasant” and “land” help us to understand how particular 
constructions of struggle could be and have been interpolated into the reproduction of the 
status quo, and what sorts of strategic and conceptual shifts move toward breaking with 
it. 
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GLEBA NOVA OLINDA: A GENEOLOGY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND93  
 Territorial struggle in Gleba Nova Olinda, and the Tapajós region more broadly is 
marked by what I argue are four distinct moments – the expansion of the logging frontier 
and the establishment of the Rural Workers’ Union; the struggle for the Resex and 
“traditional” identity; the resurgent indigenous movement and the Movement in Defense 
of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River.94 In this section, I recount this history, 
focusing on the co-constituent processes of subjects and territory through an analysis of 
the way that conceptions of and arguments for and about territory emerge with traditional 
land claims and how through the indigenous movement and MDVCA they shift, 
responding to the given situation.  
The Expansion of the Logging Frontier 
The arrival, in the 1960s and 70s, of tens of thousands of landless peasants into 
the Amazon, new government incentives for developers, nationalization of land along 
transportation corridors and elsewhere (70% of all land in Pará), and the establishment of 
federal (INCRA) and state (ITERPA) land agencies, were all instrumental in the push for 
land regularization in the Tapajós-Arapiuns region beginning in the 1980s. The most 
immediate reason that “smallholders” began to demarcate the boundaries of their land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The history recounted in this section draws primarily on interviews, and countless informal 
conversations and observed meetings, as well as participation in and witnessing of most of the events 
associated with the formation of MDVCA, all implemented between January 2009 and October 2010. 
Historical facts were also cross-checked where possible with a few key sources – there is limited written 
documentation on this region - including Leroy 1991, an unpublished report by Raphael Frederico Acioli 
Moreira da Silva (2010) the anthropologist for the Federal Ministério Publico in Gleba Nova Olinda, and 
Vaz (2004). These are cited in the text where they provided information not provided in primary data.  
 
94 To clarify something that might be a point of confusion for the reader, the “resurgent” indigenous 
movement that will be discussed below is a movement of several thousand people in this region who, at the 
end of the 1990s and early 2000s began to reclaim their indigenous identity. They share a history and 
livelihood practice with other communities across the region and so prior to that time, self-identified as 
rural workers, traditional people, and other forms of self-identification that will be discussed here.  
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and to pursue property rights, however, was as a strategy of defense against the incursion 
of the logging industry.  
In 1974, Poloamazonia’s Amazon Development Plan II (Plano de 
Desenvolvimento da Amazonia II, PDAMII) specifically designated the Tapajós River 
basin as a “growth pole” for the timber industry, and in the 1980s the federal government 
began to subsidize extraction of “madeira pesada” (hard wood, also “madeira de lei”) 
more commonly located inland in the terra firme, to meet growing demand in 
international markets (Browder 1987).95 Taking advantage of the subsidies, and of 
Incra’s willingness to assign them land rights for legal logging, timber companies 
Amazonex Exportadora Ltda. and Santa Isabel Agroflorestal Ltda began logging in the 
terra firme of what is today the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex.  
Because this land was already inhabited by thousands of people in nearly 100 
communities, the companies engaged in forms of negotiation and manipulation, still 
common today within the logging industry, in order to access land (Leroy 1991). That is, 
alongside spreading misinformation, surreptitious land occupation, and small bribes, they 
entered into a series of agreements with several communities, granting the companies 
access to land in the terra firme (remaining 13.4 km from river margins, Ioris 2011) in 
exchange for land rights for the existing communities along the rivers, for work in 
logging companies, for small cash payments and other amenities.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The area had been first opened to logging by an FAO program in the 1950s. Earlier timber exploration 
for the less valuable “madeira leves” (light wood) occurred primarily along the river banks. 
 
96 This meant assigning land rights to small famers so that loggers could attain rights to the remaining land. 
INCRA and the logging companies worked together to demarcate small farmers land in an extremely 
circumscribed way. While communities lived along the river for access to water and fish, most of their 
most important living spaces are deep in the forest, what they usually call the centro (center), areas that 
were not titled to them, but to the logger. 
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 “Community” both in name, and in organizational structure, was heavily 
influenced by the work of the Catholic Church’s radical liberation theologists, who were, 
regionally and nationally, key organizers in the anti-authoritarian struggle against the 
military dictatorship, specifically in the struggle to stop expulsion of rural people from 
their lands and to demand land reform. Beginning in the late 1960s, the progressive 
Church sectors (and importantly the Pastoral Land Commission or CPT, still a key 
mediator organization for these movements today) began organizing rural people across 
the country into Ecclesiastical Base Communities (CEBs) (Azevedo 2004; Houtzager 
2001). In the Tapajós-Arapiuns-Maró this community organization coincided with the 
geographical re-location/establishment of many regional community bases from the terra 
firme to the river margins. The word “community” itself became a very particular referent 
to a common identity with embedded notions of common rights to land and resources 
(Lima 1999).97  
By the early 1990s the logging companies were disregarding their agreements not 
to log on community-held land. The communities living along the Tapájos and Arapiuns 
Rivers found their territories increasingly circumscribed to “their house, their yard, and 
one or two hectares of useless land” (Leroy, 116). Articulated through the newly 
established Rural Workers’ Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais, STR), they 
began to mobilize against loggers and INCRA engaging tactics that would become 
common practices – making demands through demonstrations at government agencies 
and demarcating their territorial boundaries with picos or lines cut through the forest. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
97 Other words used to reference communities but that are more descriptive and less political include 
povoado (town), localidade (locality). 
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Seu Raimundo of Gleba Nova Olinda explained: 
 
…. In that time was when the union first said that we should begin to demarcate our 
communities, and they asked us where our community [Novo Lugar] ended and 
Cachoeira [neighboring community] began, but we did not have a boundary like that and 
so we met – the two communities met – and decided that it should be at the Arraia 
[igarapé] that went to Cachimbo they made a division [a pico] at and they said that they 
were going to demarcate all of this and that it would be our land, on this side of the pico 
would be ours and that they would help us to negotiate with INCRA to get title, collective 
title… 
 
The simple act of cutting picos to defend land against appropriation also marked a 
conceptual shift from conceiving their territory as consisting of abundant land, as an area 
without fixed borders or frontiers, as containing multiple, potentially overlapping 
collective areas, and as something that could shift from one place to another, to defining 
it as a fixed, exclusive area. This counter-strategy of land demarcation did not, however, 
indicate a mere acceptance of the loggers’ terms or territorial framework. Rather, it 
explicitly sought to avoid commodification of land and to maintain many of their existing 
territorial practices (e.g. collective use areas, shifting cultivation and home sites, etc.) 
within a more fixed, defined area through collective titling. 
The Rural Workers’ Union 
Through this struggle, the Rural Workers Unions became a key mediator for the 
rural regional communities and the communities became a key site for the unions. 
Originally, Rural Workers’ Unions were founded as para-statal institutions, part of the 
corporatist, officially sanctioned labor bureaucracy under the military dictatorship. The 
STR Santarém, in particular, was originally formed in 1972 by local oligarchs linked to 
CONTAG (the national agricultural worker federation and later the central organization 
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in the syndical movement), who used clientalistic social welfare program as incentive to 
attract all local “rural workers” – be they, in the Amazon the traditional or neo-campones 
- to join (the union today continues to be the purveyor of social benefits including 
retirement etc.).  
The progressive elements of the Catholic Church, community, and those involved 
in the early formation of the Workers’ Party, however, recognized the unions as viable 
institutional bases from which to organize with rural people. As a result, early struggles 
within the rural union apparatuses aimed to transform the unions into representative, 
worker-controlled (rather than state or elite-controlled) organizations. The dramatic and 
historic struggle liberate the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union from clientalist control was 
largely considered one of the most successful of these struggles for the (then) “new 
unionism” in the countryside (Leroy 1991 provides an excellent and detailed account of 
these events. (Houtzager 2001; See also Schwartzman et al. 2010).  
In the interest of building a movement adequate to face the existing threat of the 
expansion of extractive industries and the corresponding land takeovers by southern 
developers, ranchers, and national and international corporations, practices-in-common 
(agricultura familiar) became an intentional, strategic, objective category around which 
to construct a political category, the “rural workers,” as a class (at times synonymous 
with, at times replacing “campones”). Nationwide, “rural worker” became a political 
category that broadly included all rural poor (and thus, by this logic, oppressed) people 
and placed them in contradistinction to the wealthy landowners (latifundio), commercial 
investors, and the military government (Leroy 1991; Petit 1996; Houtzager 2001).98 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98 In Amazonia, the Rural Workers’ Unions were deeply involved in party and electoral politics and key to 
establishing the Workers Party (PT) in the region (Petit 1996). 
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CEBs became key sites, throughout the democratic transition and afterward, where the 
church, working largely through the CPT, and the progressive factions of the Rural 
Workers’ Unions focused their efforts to unite the peasant populations under the banner 
of “rural worker” in a “struggle for land” (and thus for the building of the Workers’ Party 
[Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT] in the north). As one former union and party 
organizer put it rural communities were key sites for organizing, “because our work was 
based in the philosophy that to organize the people we had to be inside him, live with 
him, feel what he feels…we would defend the idea that no one teaches nobody else 
(ninguém conscientiza ninguém), people build their own consciousness participating in 
the process of building a new society.”   
Because much of the land tenure conflict in Amazônia was different than the large 
landholder/landless peasant conflict so common in Brazil, the Rural Workers’ Unions in 
the North (the “north” of Brazil is the Amazon) had to develop different demands and 
strategies. Rather than seeking an Agrarian Reform based in the expropriation and 
redistribution of large landholdings, the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union, and the rural 
workers unions in Amazonia more generally, focused on organizing against displacement 
and for secure access to land (e.g. a struggle for land regularization) through the 
establishment of property rights – either individual or collective for people that already 
held land in order to avoid or stop expropriation. Through its work accompanying and 
facilitating regional peoples’ struggles for land, the union was thus established as a key 
ally, key strategy, and in fact a key identity – sindicalista. As one interviewee who had 
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fought for land rights in what is now the Tapajós-Arapiuns through the union during the 
tumultuous 1980s and 1990s explained, “from that time on, we were all sindicalistas.” 99 
Across the Amazon, the Rural Workers’ Union was quickly standardized as a 
form of rural political organization (even Chico Mendes was a union leader). The 
struggle for land regularization popularized by the unions in the 1970s, 80s and into the 
1990s adapted the broader struggle for land to a particularly Amazonian context and in 
many cases was very successful at attaining land rights, as well as instrumental in 
mediating government services, and the extension of credit to rural workers (FNO and 
later PRONAF). Their legal argument for land regularization remained based in the Land 
Statute of 1964, itself, based in the labor theory of value/property, or “land to the tiller.” 
This organizing enacted a sort of homogenization of different existing forms of 
organization across very different types of rural peoples (Leroy 1991; de Paula and da 
Silva 2008). This homogenization would give rise to new tensions.   
Becoming Environmental Subjects 
“There is no Defense of the Forest without the People of the Forest” –Chico Mendes  
We were surprised at this time with the arrival of new people there [in their villages]. 
Anthropologist, biologists, geologists, any kind of “ologist” you can think of started 
arriving calling us “ecologists” and “environmentalists.” They came and said, “Here are 
the greatest ecologists in the world” and I asked Chico, what is this thing, ecology? And 
so we asked them to explain. They explained that there is a polar ice cap, I don’t know 
where, and it was dissolving and the ocean was going to rise 8-9 meters. And we said, but 
we live far from the ocean, so what does that matter to us? And they said that there is a 
layer around the earth called the ozone layer. It is like a curtain, like what we use to keep 
out mosquitos when we sleep in our hammocks, and this curtain of ozone was breaking 
and if the rays of the sun hit people’s skin, mostly white people, it would cause cancer. 
And we said, but we aren’t white and we don’t work in the sun. And so they gave us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The definitive book on the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union, Uma Chama na Amazonia by Pierre Leroy 
has a chapter title that is a very similar quote “o sinidcato é nós,” or “the union is us,” meant to capture the 
argument and sentiment of the time that the union quite literally embodied the people.  
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another explanation. They said that the forest was important and that they did not want to 
take our land (colocações) – that is, they didn’t want to at that time – and they wanted to 
keep the forest standing, and they wanted to assist us with education and health, and so 
we said, ok, that’s good, let’s have a partnership and so we made one, a partnership of a 
struggle that was very historic.  
--Osmarino Amâncio 
 
In the late 1980s taking advantage of attention from international 
environmentalists the rubber tappers in the western Amazonian state of Acre, famously 
recast a struggle for land organized as part of the rural labor movement, into one for 
conservation (which, they argued, would be achieved by granting territorial rights to 
forest peoples). On a national and international level, they forged an uneasy but strategic 
alliance with the international environmental community, who could bring international 
pressure to bear on the Brazilian government in favor of their struggle (Allegretti 1990; 
Almeida 2002). Externally, they were celebrated as “environmentalists,” internally they 
developed what they called an “ecosocialism,” that is, “joining the struggle against 
devastation [of the forest] with a struggle against exploitation and capitalism” (Porto 
Gonçalves 2010; Amâncio, 2011 ).  
The rubber tappers formed their own representative organization (the National 
Rubber Tappers’ Council, CNS) and proposed a new form of conservation unit, the 
Extractive Reserve. As conceived by the rubber tappers, this conservation unit challenged 
assumptions regarding the separation between people and nature, by arguing (and 
demonstrating) that nature would only be “conserved” by protecting the existing practices 
of people whose lives were deeply intertwined with and, in fact, inextricable from it. 
Logistically, the reserve model would create usufruct rights to families’ houses and 
collection areas and hold the larger forest area in common. It also innovated the 
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relationship between society and the state in that formal property ownership would stay 
with the federal government, but autonomous governance of their territory would stay 
with the people. In practice, the PAEex (Agro-extractive settlement project, which were 
established first) and ultimately (and shortly after Chico Mendes’ death) the Extractive 
reserve (Reserva Extractivista, RESEX) was established a legal category through 
dialogue between social science researchers, social mediator organizations (union, CPT), 
and social movement leaders, many of whom were part of the leadership of political 
parties of the left, namely the workers’ party (Hecht and Cockburn 2011; Porto 
Gonçalves 2001; Esterci 2002; Hochstetler and Keck 2007).  
At this time “traditional populations” (populações tradiciones) became an object 
of policy as a result of the various struggles of the “people of the forest” across Amazonia 
and nationally, especially the indigenous and quilombola struggles for full recognition.100 
Legal recognition of these different peoples carried with it different, specific forms of 
land rights that were based in their different modalities of holding land and using 
resources. In 1992, the federal government created an agency specifically to deal with 
traditional people’s issues, the National Center for the Sustainable Development of 
Traditional People (Centro Nacional de Desenvolviemnto Susentado das Populações 
Tradicionais, CNPT) (Portaria 22 de 10 Feb 1992), launched as a centerpiece of the Rio 
Earth Summit, institutionalizing the link between environmentalists and local people.101 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Struggles by indigenous people, quilombolas, rubber tappers, babaçu breakers and a long list of others 
resulted in recognition for many of these different groups in the Constitution of 1988. For a much more 
substantive review of this political and legal history and its contemporary implications see, for example, 
Almeida 2006; French 2003; French 2009; Almeida 2011, among others.) 
 
101 CNPT was a predecessor of the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation, which today 
governs traditional territory and was created and initially funded under PPG7. 
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The subsequent proliferation of what Chico Mendes called “agrarian reform for rubber 
tappers” and what other authors have called the “other agrarian reform” (Little 2002), or 
“Amazonian Agrarian Reform” (Esterci and Schweickardt 2010), meant that the granting 
of collective land rights to “traditional” people who would protect the environment would 
become a key part of the dominant ordering logic of the region. Throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s, over 40 federal extractive reserves encompassing millions of hectares of 
land were established in the Legal Amazon.102 
The people of the Arapiuns region also engaged in traditional livelihood strategies 
and, in 1996, the Rural Workers’ Union, Grupo em Defesa da Amazona,103 the National 
Rubber Tappers’ Council and others supported the people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns region 
in re-articulating their struggle for land rights as “traditional populations” and petitioning 
the government for an extractive reserve. Just over one year later (an extremely short 
turn-around time) the federal government signed the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex into law 
with an area of over 647 thousand hectares, home to over 20,000 people in 67 
communities. The reserve area explicitly excluded the Pará State-held area west of the 
Maró River, Gleba Nova Olinda and its 14 communities, who had formed part of the 
struggle since its initiation, who were linked, via community (e.g. several communities 
were literally cut down the middle by the reserve boundary), affinity, and kinship to the 
people of the area that was now the Resex and thus subject to different protections, rights, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 For a list of extractive reserves, their sizes and dates of creation, see http://uc.socioambiental.org/uso-
sustentável/reserva-extrativista. The rate of Extractive Reserves created has slowed since approximately 
2006. 
 
103 GDA (Group in Defense of the Amazon) is a Santarém NGO founded in the late 1970s by several 
Franciscan Friars, along with some regional inhabitants some of whom would become key in the 
Indigenous movement. 
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and rules of governance. With the creation of the RESEX, the logging companies 
operating in the area almost immediately found their “sustainable management plans” 
cancelled and their activities monitored. To get around this problem, they simply crossed 
the Maró River into Gleba Nova Olinda.  
Traditional Territories 
With the emergence of mobilizations for “traditionally occupied land” (terras 
tradicionalmente ocupadas), we began to see – in movements’ discourse, scholarly 
analyses, and in the actual content of the claims made - new elements, such as ethnicity, 
ecology, and collective practices, as opposed to strictly productive claims, as the basis for 
what are explicitly territorial claims (made by explicitly territorial subjects). Specifically, 
on the Arapiuns, the initial mobilization through the union and in defense of community 
lands had strengthened organization within and across communities, resulted in an 
articulation of community territories and tactics for their defense, and forged political 
subjects strongly associated with the unions.104 The re-articulation of the movement in 
the mobilization for the Resex as one of traditional people both reimagined and specified 
territorial rights in a way that more explicitly mapped onto their own particular ways of 
inhabiting and producing territory. That is, rather than mobilizing together against 
loggers and for their own individual land rights based in claims to areas that they use (e.g. 
home sites and roças), they created a form of collective rights, governed by an assembly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For example, Teresinha from the community of São Pedro explained, “We were here, struggling against 
the loggers, who were taking our land, and the struggle was very difficult (pesado) and we though that it 
was only us…and then we went to the union and we met people from the Tapajós and they were struggling 
with the same loggers, the same people, Amazonex, and we were not alone, no, we were stronger together.” 
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of its residents, and organized generally according to their relationships with one another 
and with nature.  
Becoming traditional (to appropriate a trope from Jan French’s 2009 book on 
identity and land claims in the Brazilian northeast), meant rejecting the racist, prevailing 
narrative of regional people that cast them as atomized, invisible, disappearing 
“caboclos,” a subject category that, again following French (2009), carries no legal rights 
of any kind and, for that matter, no territorial imaginary. It meant affirming and 
valorizing existing collective practices –community and intercommunity organization, 
livelihood practices, etc. – especially those relating to the use of natural resources, and re-
classifying them as environmental. Further, in the process of the struggle for that 
territory, (e.g.territorialization) the collective, territorial subject itself –its spaces, its 
networks- is strengthened and transformed. Claiming the Resex meant establishing new 
collective practices by organizing first into a movement for the Resex (a process itself 
fraught with conflict and negotiation) and then into Resex-wide assembly to govern the 
area, specifying and formalizing territorial organization (family areas, community 
common lands, Resex common lands, reserve areas). Through this process of mobilizing 
to make this claim, the traditional people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns (or at least those of 
them who lived within the boundaries of the reserve) articulated themselves as collective 
and territorial subjects, strongly associated with the Resex territory and with a broader 
movement of traditional, extractivist people.  
These territorializing processes simultaneously posit a different conception of 
territory (from that of the state). Territories produced through these struggles, are not 
simply something determined and assigned arbitrarily from above (e.g. a subdivision of 
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state territory) – or at least, they are not that way as proposed by the movements. This is 
explicitly different from an agrarian reform that would have selected, subdivided, and 
delegated particular areas for them. 105 Their existing forms of territorial organization 
were incompatible with such a model. The claim to the Resex – an expansive area that is 
much greater than simply home sites, farming areas, and community areas – and the 
claim to traditional territories more generally, posits territory as an expression of a 
specific, collective life (e.g. it is not the area necessary to produce farina, but to re-
produce the society) and a claim made to protect this collective life in the face of conflict 
with loggers. Expressed in the demand for the Resex is the argument that overlapping 
territories (of loggers and traditional people) were destroying the traditional communities 
and thus what is at stake in this struggle for territory is not only a piece of land, but the 
very existence of a collective subject. Within the project to, we might say, deterritorialize 
the state-sanctioned territories of, in this case, logging, lies the potential for territorial 
struggle to disrupt, challenge, and intervene in the territoriality of the given order, the 
territoriality of “above.”  
Such potential, especially as brought into a legal framework, is not without risks 
and drawbacks. Casting themselves as environmental subjects, gave traditional people a 
greater claim to legal and popular legitimacy, but also limited their abilities to determine 
the content of their territories. The process of linking collective claims to some 
relationship to conservation or sustainability also has, to a greater or lesser effect 
depending on the situation, the effect of ensnaring these people within the limitations of 
these the subject categories. For legal recognition to be implemented, subject categories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 This is not to say that Agrarian Reform through re-distribution is not potentially territorial. The MST 
and the work of Bernardo Mançano Fernandes have demonstrated that it most certainly can be. Rather, I 
would say that it is strategically, rather than inherently territorial.  
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are defined and given parameters, the locations and forms of territories specified, and 
their “management” institutionalized. As juridical mechanisms for this have been 
developed over the past two decades, in addition to legally linking a definition of certain 
types of traditional people to sustainability, these mechanisms have put the ultimate 
responsibility for recognizing traditional, and even self-determined indigenous people 
into the hands of government-employed social scientists. The National System of Units 
of Conservation SNUC established in 2001 transformed governance of extractive 
reserves into a technocratic exercise, moving it from the Resex associations comprised of 
inhabitants, into the hands of government technocrats who make and implement Resex 
rules with the “participation” of the people.106 Barretto (2004) and Ioris (2011), argue 
that this post-SNUC RESEX form is not a right to territory at all, rather it “allows” 
people to stay on their lands – a privilege reviewed an renewed every 20 years – that is 
contingent on people’s ability to be seen as “authentic” and “sustainable.” Subject to 
external evaluations to determine their suitability to such categories, the traditional 
people of the RESEXs are left in a relation of dependence and unequal power that 
neutralizes any of their territorial demands and subjects them to the rules (established 
with minimal “participation” in the management plan). Finally, and perhaps most 
important for the case of Gleba Nova Olinda, is that those “left out” of the Resex are 
excluded from rights, from land security, and ultimately, from being part of the territorial 
collective subject that was constituted during their struggle as an effect of reserve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Porto Gonçalves describes the National System of Units of Conservation, the law that accomplished the 
forms and institutionalization of such management, as the “second assassination of Chico Mendes” because 
it gave government technocrats and NGOs management control of the Resexs. Under SNUC, the reserves 
are governed by a council that composed of the reserve association (e.g. the people of the reserve), NGOs, 
and ICMBio, with a federal manager ultimately having the final say over reserve decisions. Further, the 
management plan, essentially the reserves master plan is a technical document, based in scientific research 
and a perception of sustainability that comes from the state and from ecological science. Reserve residents 
participate in making a “utilization plan,” one component of the management plan.  
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construction, which only recognizes those who live within a certain boundary as 
legitimate traditional people. Seu Genio explained, “When we found out that we had been 
left out [of the Resex] we couldn’t believe it, we thought, after all that, Damn! and now 
what? We are forgotten, ignored, we struggled together, and now here we are, on the 
outside, not only of the Resex, of the movement. ” 
The Struggle for Gleba Nova Olinda 
 In 1998, at the same time that the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex was being created, the 
new national development plan “Forward Brazil” was re-igniting dreams of 
modernization and wealth through extractive resource development across the country. 
New developers, with capital for investment in soy agriculture and timber extraction 
(which, like ranching and logging, often work in tandem), traveled the BR-163 to 
Santarém and began to establish themselves through the region taking, buying, and 
claiming land.  
This time, when the timber companies moved into Gleba Nova Olinda, they did 
not first negotiate with regional inhabitants. Signs and wooden stakes with painted tops 
laid out in lines through the forest started appearing, marking out their claims. The signs 
had names and permit numbers on them. They were posted along newly cut roads. 
Although the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda had not staked out all of their own 
forest claims with picos, this was not unclaimed land. Much the forest was crossed by a 
series of unmarked collective territories. Possession of familial plots both within and 
outside of the community boundaries (the centros) were, marked, if at all, by the end of a 
row of crops or the overgrowth of a field used previously and then left fallow. More 
distant forests used by multiple communities contained overlapping claims. This overlap 
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was not always without conflict, but there was a structure for their mediation in 
community assemblies. These conflicts never neared the degree of intensity that would be 
generated by the arrival of extractive industry. 
By now familiar with the process of making claims on the state, Gleba Nova 
Olinda’s residents filed a denunciation with the Ministério Publico and IBAMA. In 2003 
Ibama conducted an enforcement operation, where they encountered COOEPA, the 
consortium of 50 logging and soy businesses from the southern states of Paraná, Rio 
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Mato Grosso called COOEPA had established itself in 
Gleba Nova Olinda and that was discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. As discussed, 
COOEPA, along with several other logging companies had taken over significant 
portions of land in the Gleba through both legal and illegal methods, had staked out 
management plans,107 and were logging, primarily selective logging, across indigenous 
and traditional territories  
Exclusion from the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex had dealt a significant blow to the 
movement for collective rights in Gleba Nova Olinda. The practices-in-common around 
which the syndicalistas constructed the notion of a shared identity were proving 
insufficient to hold together a political struggle, and previous strategies were doing little 
to build a movement or to intervene in exploitation. At a loss for what to do, and with 
increasing pressure from loggers, relations between and within communities began to 
fracture. “After we were left out of the Resex the union came and helped us demarcate 
our communities again, to cut picos around the communities. The first time, we went 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 SEMA, notorious for its loyalties to the logging industry as well as for its corruption, began handing out 
management plans to those who paid the standard bribe. As one logger interviewed put it “you don’t get a 
permit for less than $10 reais per hectare. It is simple you don’t pay, you don’t work” (management plans 
in GNO tend to be tens or hundreds of thousands of hectares). 
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with everyone but Fe em Deus (one community), but already on the second trip, Aruã 
didn’t come, so we lost already them [to the loggers].” 
COOEPA and the other logging operations had made the usual promises - 
occasional work, gas-powered motors for energy, and financial support for future 
development projects (such as dams to generate energy, etc.). In exchange, they wanted 
forest access, road construction permission and space inside of communities to build 
loading docks to transfer timber from trucks to barges. They also proposed that the 
communities divide their land into individual lots, get property rights to them and sell 
them to the cooperative. Attaining private property rights to individual lots would also 
“liberate” the Gleba’s remaining land (e.g. the common lands) for purchase by the 
Cooperative from the state. Some families and some entire communities (Fé em Deus, 
Aruã, some people from Vista Alegre, some in Prainha, for example) accepted the 
payments, and began to pursue private property rights, even flying to Belém (paid for by 
the logging companies) to make the case for private property to ITERPA.108 Tensions ran 
high and at times became violent between communities and even between families (pro 
and anti-logging). Anti-logging community leaders have been kidnapped and beaten, 
homes set on fire with families sleeping inside, and tense armed standoffs between 
loggers and communities demarcating their lands deep in the forest.  
“You start offering money and people lose their heads,” Seu Francisco, and older 
resident and former president of Novo Lugar in Gleba Nova Olinda. They forget their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
108 This strategy was quite effective. When I interviewed Jose Benatti, then president of ITERPA, he 
referred to this meeting several times in order to argue that many communities of Gleba Nova Olinda 
wanted property rights.  
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friends, their own mother for an electric motor. They think, if Prainha has an electric 
motor, why shouldn’t we, it is only fair. They think that is justice. Imagine that.” 
“Eu sou indígena. Nos somos indígenas.” (I am indigenous. We are indigenous) 
As the Resex was established, people immediately began to reckon with the fact 
that its territory was not the same as theirs, or in other words, did not map on to their own 
territoriality, (not the least of which was because it excluded those living in Gleba Nova 
Olinda). Simultaneously, there was increased tension and conflict with loggers, the 
arrival of soy interests, and the breakdown of inter-group alliances that accompanies 
attacks on their social structure through industry bribes, separation of the movement by 
partial recognition (e.g. demobilization through the establishment of the Resex).  In this 
context, several hundred communities and several thousand people across the region 
began a movement to affirm their indigenous heritage and cultivate their indigenous 
identities, eviscerated during a long and violent history of colonization and development 
in the region. Territorialization is a key constituent process (Oliveira et al. 1998; Oliveira 
1998), and as a result, we see some shifts in the conceptualization of territory.  
The 2nd cacique (like “chief”) of the Novo Lugar aldeia in Gleba Nova Olinda 
and part of the Borarí ethnic group tells the story birth of the movement, a story that I 
heard repeated in several interviews: 
Pajé (medicine man) Laurelino, he always said, “I am indigenous and I am 
not ashamed of this.” He identified himself [as indigenous] “I am 
indigenous, here my people are indigenous. We are Mundurucu.”109 And 
that was the time, that Pajé Laurenino, he died, you know, he died to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109 Other ethnic groups that would form part of the indigenous movement are Arapium, Tapajó, Jaraki, 
Munduruku, Arara-Vermelha, Apiaka, Tapuia, Tupinambá, Borari, Maitapú, Cara Preta, and Camaruara 
(See Bolano 2011). The approximate number of indigenous people in the region is estimated at 
approximately 5000 people. 
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resurrect [ressurgir] many people, with his death. What it means for us is 
that he isn’t dead because it was only with coming together at his death 
that many people started to identify themselves as indigenous. And at that 
time Florencio110 was already saying “in the Constitution there are rights 
for indigenous people” and so, we decided to study. We began to have 
encounters (encontros), seminars, and we organized a group, the 
Indigenous Consciousness Group (CGI), and we worked with the 
consciousness of the people, and would go to communities and ask people 
if they were indigenous…Some people said, ‘I am not, but my 
grandmother says that she is an Indian’, or other times, ‘I am an Indian, 
but I don’t identify as one because I am discriminated against, very 
discriminated against.’ And there were also some people that said no, I am 
not indigenous… And then more and more people said, said “yes, I am 
indigenous. We are indigenous, and we are not ashamed of this” At and 
so, shoot, that was how the movement began, and we founded CITA (the 
indigenous council of the Tapajós-Arapiuns), and today there it is, we 
have 10 years of this struggle, and [more] really because before CITA, 
there was CGI...  
 
Here we see the articulation of indigeneity as an intentional, collective project to 
(re)produce new subjects capable of struggling. It is an affirmative project that rejects 
former structures that inhibited its potential (“I am discriminated against” to “we are not 
ashamed of this”) and creates new organizational forms to work throughout the 
movement creating consistency. 
Most interviewees trace the precise moment of the birth of the movement to a 
meeting, in 1998 (shortly after the Resex was created), in the aldeia of Taquara, on the 
right margin of the Tapajós River where multiple aldeias composed a letter for FUNAI 
asserting their indigenous identity.111 That meeting, was followed by a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
110 Florencio Vaz is a Franscisan priest from one of the indigenous communities on the Tapajós who was 
instrumental in movement formation, a founder of CGI and would go on to write a doctoral dissertation on 
the indigenous people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns. 
 
111 Aldeia is the Portuguese word used to identify and indigenous settlement and is the name that the 
people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns region use to designated indigenous villages as one of they key ways that 
they mark their difference from non-indigenous communities. In 2001 and 2003 (the team dispatched to 
Gleba Nova Olinda was in 2003), FUNAI sent research teams to initiate the identification procedures to 
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meetings, workshops, conversations and assemblies across the region, with encontros 
happening every two years. The regional indigenous movement grew quickly and gained 
political force. They created their own representative organization called the Indigenous 
Council for the Tapajós-Arapiuns (Conselho Indigena do Tapajós-Arapiuns) (which, 
according to interviews was the start of now on-going tensions with the Rural Workers’ 
Union), that represents 38 communities across the region, and whose designated 
leadership (a council of 6 people whose coordinator position rotate between aldeias from 
the Tapajós and Arapiuns/Maró and now includes new communities from the Terra 
Firme near Santarém), is accountable to a generally assembly, held yearly.  Through 
CITA, the various indigenous groups organized their campaigns for recognition and for 
demarcation of their indigenous territories. 
 
This particular form of indigenous mobilization – the revitalization of indigenous 
identity among people and in places where it has been obliterated – is variously referred 
to in the anthropological literature as ethnogênesis (Hill 1996; Oliveira 1998; Bartolomé 
2006), ethnic revival, ethnic resurgence (Ramos 2003), or ethnic emergence (Viveiros de 
Castro 2006) and among the indigenous people themselves as “resistance ethnicity” or 
“resistant Indians” (the re-claiming of the word “indio” as a source of pride as opposed to 
a racist term figures centrally within indigenous discourse). In the lower Amazon region, 
the Cabanagem uprising in 1835-1840 that was ultimately crushed by the national army 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
determine their territories and in 2004 they announced that the lands would be included for demarcation in 
a project for indigenous land demarcation in the Amazon called the Projecto de Proteção ás Populações e 
Terras Indigenous na Amazonia Legal. In 2006, CITA was informed that demarcation of the regional 
indigenous territories had been cancelled (they alleged that there were inconsistencies in CITA’s listing of 
regional indigenous groups and further field investigation would be needed. 11 years later, only one of the 
indigenous territories have been demarcated (Bragança). 
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was followed by an even more destructive period if indigenous dispersal – indigenous 
people were chased from their lands, forced into work camps, “assimilated” and 
eventually subject to a new system of domination in the aviamento labor system, leaving 
“a trail of mutilated identities across the Amazon” (Ramos 2003, 416), especially in Pará, 
where most of the fighting, and the autonomous government, had occurred. Given that 
the Cabanagem was the biggest, bloodiest, and most successful rebellion in Brazilian 
history, its near-complete absence from the national historical narrative is evidence of the 
complete annihilation of its protagonists.112 The indigenous movement of the Tapajós-
Arapiuns explicitly links itself to Cabanagem, not necessarily through bloodlines, but as 
inheritors of that spirit of resistance. On the beach at São Pedro, people were constantly 
informing visitors and new arrivals that the rebellion was the “largest [in the region] since 
Cabanagem.” 
While the wide range of debates surrounding indigenous and ethnic recognition in 
Brazil are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I’d like to draw attention to what I think 
are the key elements of the Borarí’s claims for thinking about effective strategies of 
resistance today and to what lays the groundwork for the emergence of the Movement in 
Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River. First, while claims of indigeneity 
may always have some link to a pre-colombian past (Viveiros de Castro 2006), the claims 
of the resurgent indigenous movements, and the Tapajós-Arapiuns movement in 
particular, is not exactly autochtonous. Rather, these claims are actually based on the 
notion of a break with the past – violent repression caused the cultural suppression and 
territorial dispersion of indigenous communities. Thus, unlike many other indigenous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 If it were popularly recognized as a historical moment, there would be a question of righting historical 
wrongs on the table – its invisibility makes the issue of these people also invisible. 
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people, they cannot base their claims on a linear relationship to a past tradition – they do 
not “still” speak a language or “still” practice shamanistic rituals – or continuous 
occupation of a particular space – they do not “still” inhabit their historical territory, or 
even the same particular land as they did, in this case, 60 years ago. Rather, they are 
constantly and consciously redefining the definition and understanding of an “authentic” 
indigenous identity as one that is actively forged in the present, or more profoundly, 
challenging the very notion of authenticity.113  
While claims to land may be the “literal landmark” (Ramos 2003) of indigenous 
identity and an assumed correlate, it is not simply a desire for land rights that forms the 
basis for indigenous claims. In fact, in the Tapajós – Arapiuns region, the vast majority of 
these indigenous communities already had land rights in the form of the RESEX, or, on 
the left margin of the Tapajós, in the FLONA, but primary demand of the movement was 
for territory. Territory, for the indigenous resistance movement, then, is not simply land 
(See also French 2009); it is the material expression of the social relations forged in the 
process of the struggle for self-determination. Especially because there is not some pre-
given cultural referent for resurgent indigenous claims, territorialization, or the process of 
taking hold of that territory is the primary constituent process of subject formation. This 
process of territorialization, has two components. On the one hand, collective memory, 
spaces of resistance, and socio-cultural practices – from learning indigenous language, 
arts, and ritual, to the community practices of assembly, religious festivals, and soccer, to 
subsistence farming, hunting and fishing, and medicinal practices – are spatial practices 
(Lefebvre 1991), cultivated in common. And on the other hand, it is through the struggle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Even the Maró’s indigenous people mark a difference between themselves and some of the “indios 
puros” (pure Indians) who live upstream. They would never, however, consider themselves to be less 
indigenous than the “indios puros;” their indigenous identity simply has a different genealogy. 
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for territory – that is where there is a shared point of antagonism and a process of struggle 
around it - that relationships within and across communities (e.g. the collective) are built 
and strengthened, that the collective, territorial subject emerges. In Gleba Nova Olinda, 
the decisions to make this claim were not uncontroversial within the indigenous 
communities (because of normative racialized pre-conceptions about what it means to be 
indigenous, fears of having to “return” to some form of idealized past way of living, 
because some communities and families were working with loggers etc.). Through long 
conversations and debates as well as through the processes of (re)constructing their 
indigenous practices together on their lands, and also in opposition to the process of 
territorial takeover by developers, that the Borarí communities constituted themselves as 
a collective subject of resistance.114  
 
In other words, a territory, following Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, is both a 
“convention” and a “confrontation.” It is a convention in that it is space created through 
the everyday practices of collective subjects who, producing and inscribing it with their 
particular social relations, themselves produced in that process of “geographing”.115 It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 A key factor, for example was in the literal demarcation of their territory. As a counter-offensive 
against the increasing claims to land by COOEPA and their supporters in other communities within Gleba 
Nova Olinda, the three indigenous communities there mobilized a large group of people to do an auto-
demarcation of their lands. This process involved discussions amongst the communities regarding the space 
that they needed for their own reproduction (including future reproduction and the mobile livelihood 
strategies that they engage in), and, it is important to note, that this was not meant as a definitive boundary, 
but an assessment of the extent of their territory at that moment, subject, according to interviewees, to 
continual negotiation and reflection amongst the communities. During this demarcation, they encountered a 
pico that had been opened by COOEPA, as part of a management plan that was approved by SECTAM in 
2007 that passed through the center of their communities. This demarcation also initiated a conflict with the 
community of Fé em Deus, affiliated with the loggers, who was also laying claim to an area called Beiju-
Açu, the former site of the community now known as Novo Lugar. 
 
115 Vivieros de Castro (2006) argues that indigenous territoriality is necessarily collective. “There is not an 
indigenous community because there is a collective of indigenous individuals, there are indigenous 
individuals because there is an indigenous community.” 
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a “confrontation” in the sense that in inscribing space with the order of these particular, 
collective social relations, it threatens other (dominant) order that is, in this case, 
dependent on limiting the spatial extent of their claims, and commodifying their 
resources (be it for conservation or development).  
That is not to say that multiple territorialities (or, following Haesbaert 2004 multi-
territoriality) cannot and do not exist within the same space, or even, following Reyes and 
Kaufman (2011), within the same subject. In fact, it is precisely the existence of such 
multi-territoriality that makes the resurgent indigenous movement so important for 
understanding what type of resistance strategies are adequate to the given moment where 
there are no pure spaces external to relations of capital and state. That is, resurgent 
indigenism does the work of (re)creating political subjects, from people whose histories 
are infinitely complex, who have deployed multiple identities, shifting political and 
economic allegiances and engage in an immense variety of livelihood practices (not only 
their “traditional” practices, but also negotiating with loggers, waged labor, strategically 
commodifying their own externally valorized cultural processes). That is, they are not 
remnants of pre-capitalism, not necessarily ideal environmental subjects, nor mere 
victims of repression and development (although their existing practices may contain 
elements of some of these, and a geographical and social condition of marginality may 
have been key to their ongoing cultivation). To be, or rather, to become (de Castro) 
indigenous is not a question of re-locating a pre-existing subjective category of 
difference, rather it is a dynamic process of differentiation. As such, indigeneity in this 
case is not a simple question of culture, it is a question of politics – of differentiating the 
collective from a given identity in order to create the conditions for self-determination. 
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This is an approach to subject-making, is central to MDVCA’s strategy to challenge the 
given order-of-things.  
The Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River (Movimento em 
Defesa da Vida e Cultura do Rio Arapiuns MDVCA) 
 The power of the territorial identity categories and ordering of the state is 
expressed in myriad ways, not the least of which is in academic representations. In the 
few published papers on the movements for regional land rights and the indigenous 
movement in the Tapajós-Arapiuns (Bolaño 2011 and Ionis 2005, 2008) Gleba Nova 
Olinda barely makes an appearance. In fact, it does not even appear on their maps of 
indigenous communities in the region. It is remarkable, then, or perhaps logical, that the 
struggle for the Gleba would be the struggle that would galvanize the entire region. 
 In the decade of indigenous struggle, the state created an agrarian reform 
settlement for traditional people (Paex Lago Grande, created in 2005), continguous to 
Gleba Nova Olinda but again excluding it. Logging rates rose despite IBAMA’s 2003 
enforcement operation. Gleba Nova Olinda’s the three contiguous aldeais, Novo Lugar, 
Cachoiera do Maró, and São José III, decided that rather than wait for FUNAI’s 
recognition, they would demarcate their own territory and began a process of auto-
demarcation that led to a stand-off in the forest with loggers and subsequently intensified 
threats of violence. Ultimately, several of the indigenous leaders were put into the federal 
government’s protection program and were guarded by police agents whenever they 
traveled to Santarém.  
 The indigenous movement generated tensions between indigenous and non-
indigenous people. These tensions have a basis in the history of racism against 
indigenous people, deeply internalized even among regional peoples, and exacerbated by 
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a concerted media campaign against the “false Indians.” This campaign, propogated for 
years within local and state media outlsets, went national during the MDVCA 
encampment, with articles challenging the Borarí indigeneity appearing in local and state-
level media outlets, and even in the national weekly magazine Veja (January 5, 2010).116 
A secondary, but key point of conflict was that both indigenous and traditional people 
feared that the others’ territorial claims would threaten their own because they inhabited a 
shared territory. Although they negotiated this conflict through a series of meetings in the 
Resex Tapajós-Arapiuns in the early 2000s, tensions and concerns remained (as indicated 
by a number of interviews). The re-subjectification that came with making particular land 
claims in terms legible to the state had ultimately generated conflict that weakened a 
movement that had previously acted together.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  The “authenticity” of clearly autochthonous indigenous groups like the Yanomami or the Kayapó might 
be clear to a larger public, but all sorts of accusations of “non-indian-ness” are hurled at the indigenous 
groups that do not hold the stereotypical markers of indigeneity – language, dress (or as the press likes to 
claim, no dress. Pure Indians have been portrayed in Sanatarém’s media as those who like to run naked 
through the forest). People associated with the loggers and soy farmers in Gleba Nova Olinda have sought 
to discredit the claims of the Borarí people, kidnapped and beaten their spokespeople, homes set on fire 
with families sleeping inside, generally terrorized their communities and there have been tense armed 
standoffs between loggers and a group of Borarí demarcating their territory. Other challenges to their 
identity have come from a  ‘researcher’ (with no degree or research employment) named Inácio Régis who 
works for right wing federal deputy Joaquim Lira Maia (DEM) and wrote a piece challenging the ‘DNA’ of 
Dadá, the second cacique of one of the Gleba Olinda Communities. Not only is his story completely 
fabricated, based on all of the interviews that I and other anthropologists have done, but ‘DNA’ is not a 
legal basis for determining ethnic identity. As part of an effort to discredit the MDVCA, the national 
weekly magazine Veja also challenged the ‘indigenousness’ of the Borarí people in an article (Coutinho 
2009) alleging anthropologists were facilitating the takeover of Brazilian territory by Quilombola and 
indigenous people. Other challenges in local media have been based on Régis’ claim or have come from the 
Rondonbel loggers.116 
Such allegations, and tradition of anti-indigenous racism that they draw on and cultivate are not 
without effects for the movement. As a consequence of that article, one Borarí leader named in the Veja 
article was assaulted and badly beaten in Santarém. This media also exacerbates existing tensions among 
indigenous and traditional Arapiuns residents that I witnesses and discussed with people in interviews. 
Currents of anti-indigenous sentiment is related in part to the earlier destruction of indigenous culture, 
exacerbated by unequal distribution of government resources among these communities (indigenous people 
receive more government benefits). The tension is also a function of the regional struggle for land rights 
within the categories given by the state, as some twenty indigenous communities seeking demarcation as 
indigenous are located within the Tapajós-Arapiuns and approximately eight such then in the PAEX Lago 
Grande, and many people are concerned that recognition of indigenous territory threatens the future 
security of their own land claims. 	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Gleba Nova Olinda is on state, not federal, land (although indigenous 
demarcation remains under the purview of the federal government) and the election in 
2006 of a Workers’ Party governor, along with the appointment of José Benatt, a law 
professor and IPAM (regional NGO) researcher who has written extensively on the 
traditional peoples’ territorial rights, to be president of the state land agency Iterpa, and a 
shift in the FUNAI leadership in 2007,117 re-invigorated hope for negotiations in the 
Gleba on the part of movements. Conflict attracts NGO attention as well and a 
participatory mapping project initiated through a partnership between the STTR and a 
Santarém based NGO called the Health and Happiness Project (Projeto Saude & Alegria) 
created maps utilized as part of a series of negotiations among all of the regional 
communities and aldeias, including those in conflict, facilitated by the Rural Workers’ 
Union and the CPT, with all of the relevant government agencies participating (The 
Ministerio Publico, ITERPA, INCRA, IBAMA and SECTAM) for the “ordenamento” of 
Gleba Nova Olinda. They reached an agreement (discussed in Chapter Three) that 
divided the Gleba into traditional lands (PAExs) private property, Indigenous Territory, 
and an unspecified conservation area.  
Despite this agreement, and despite a second research trip by FUNAI to begin the 
demarcation process of the Borarí terriotory in 2006, by 2009, none of the areas had been 
created legally. Even an aggressive campaign by the Santarém Ministerio Publico to 
force FUNAI move on the promised demarcation, including the publication of a letter 
accusing FUNAI of intentional foot-dragging, the demarcation was not published. During 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Márcio Mera replaced Mércio Gomes. In publication in the Estadão in January of 2006, Gomes had 
suggested that the Federal Supreme Tribunal needed to define a “limit” for the increasingly “excessive” 
demands for more indigenous territories (Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 2006). This generated outrage among 
indigenous movements, but was also very much in line with the turn taken toward limiting and 
incorporating the territorial claims of social movements discussed in the previous chapter.  
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this same time, recall from Chapter Three, Gleba Nova Olinda was designated in the state 
Ecological Economic Zoning plan as an area for the expansion of extractive industry. In 
what appeared to be part of an effort to realize this, in 2009, Pará state passed its own 
state version of the Legal Land law and slated Gleba Nova Olinda and its contiguous 
Glebas (names here and perhaps map) to be the first areas regularized. Also in 2009, the 
traditional lands were finally legalized at 1/5 of the agreed upon size and the rate of 
timber leaving the Gleba, by all reports, escalated rather than diminished. 
A second participatory mapping project 2008, again implemented through a 
partnership between PSA and the STTR and IDEFLOR with SEMA and ITERPA and 
funded (180,000 reais approximately $90k) by the Ford Foundation was meant to help 
communities develop management plans for harvesting timber and other “artisanal”, 
productive, sustainable projects under the new public forest concession law (the law that, 
among other things, opens protected areas to logging). Other than a report that mapped 
and inventoried the productive activities of the Gleba’s inhabitants, there was no outcome 
to this project. When I interviewed Benatti, the head of Pará’s land agency regarding the 
severe reduction in size to the traditional settlements, he used the maps created by 
IDEFLOR in this project to argue that the communities only “used” the land on the river 
margins, and thus any type of larger claim was simply their desire to be “latifundio.” 118 
Thus, an indefinite postponement of indigenous recognition, tensions among 
indigenous and traditional people, violent threats and attacks on indigenous leaders, the 
continued exclusion of Gleba Nova Olinda from collective rights, the Gleba’s legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In the latter part of the 2000s, the STTR began to get significant funding from international NGOs and 
funders including Greenpeace and Ford and facilitate “development” projects. PSA has slowly and steadily 
been making inroads into the Arapiuns and the Gleba Nova Olinda by bringing funding for small projects, 
including participatory mapping, video project, internet projects, all which become property of PSA.  
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designation as an area of expansion for extractive industry, and the reduction of 
traditional land rights there as part of a move to make this possible, was the context in 
which communities of the entire region – not only from Gleba Olinda and not only 
Indigenous or traditional – mobilized to block the river and seize the barges of timber, 
and demand control over Gleba Nova Olinda in October of 2009. I have already 
summarized their MDVCA’s demands (regarding territorial control – land rights, ending 
extractivism, etc.), organization (both the pre-existing organization necessary and the 
new intensity of organization within the encampment itself), and tactics (demonstration, 
consciousness building, sequestering and burning wood, creating their own data and 
narrative through mapping, filing complaints through the ministerio public, and 
negotiating with government agencies, seeking support from communities and NGOs) 
and so I will not recount them again here. Rather, in this final section, I outline how 
MDVCA draws on key elements from prior struggles to innovate their strategies of 
resistance. 
FROM LAND TO TERRITORY 
The history of regional struggle has made MDVCA aware of the limitations of 
any form of government-granted land rights, including indigenous lands (terra indigena). 
Although indigenous lands carry more autonomy than an extractive reserve, in Brazil, 
indigenous land rights mean possession and usufruct rights to federal land, rather than 
full territorial control. On the one hand, MDVCA demands land rights – demarcation of 
specific indigenous and traditional land. On the other hand, they challenge state 
definitions of those territories in two substantive ways. First, they reject the category of 
“use” as a legitimate way to demarcate their land. MDVCA considers its territory to be 
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all of that land, not only where they farm, but that has symbolic relevance to them, that 
they may need in the future as they grow and move their communities (thus maintaining 
and re-invigorating a notion of territory that is not fixed), and that must be protected in 
order for them to continue to thrive – what we might call in scientific terms, an 
ecosystem. As such, and following from this, Gleba Nova Olinda is the territory that 
supports the life and culture of people whose day-to-day existence happens quite far from 
that geographical location and thus MDVCA is a movement comprised of people from 
across the Arapiuns. So it is not only that the Borarí claim a larger space than a peasant 
who is claiming land for production might claim (although it is also that), but that 
MDVCA as constituted by people from the entire Arapiuns region, claims all of Gleba 
Nova Olinda as its territory.  
This claim to territory stands in contrast to from decades of previous struggles 
that were framed as a struggle for land and the pursuit of property (even collective 
property). The idea of the right to land for those who work it, which has been so central 
to the struggle for land in much of Brazil (Wolford 2004c; Mançano Fernandes 2005), in 
the Amazon, where livelihood strategies are often only partially agricultural, this idea of 
land to the tiller has been used against movements to limit their land claims (e.g. 
recognizing only their fields as part of their settlement), as we saw in the arguments made 
by Benatti, head of Iterpa. In response, the demand for territory is a demand for control 
over an expanse of land that extends well beyond any particular area that is being used 
for economic reproduction (farming, hunting etc). It can thus be read as an argument 
against the idea of economic production as the defining factor in the struggle for 
ecological and social justice. Instead MDVCA is explicitly making a demand for the 
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reproduction of a way of life. That is, to the preservation of social and natural 
relationships that are inscribed in space. By proposing an alternative framework that 
values territory beyond its productive capacity, these movements reject these categories 
of political economy.  
It would be incorrect to say the desire or demand for a particular way of life is not 
present in the struggle for land, because the rich history of this struggle is also certainly 
about the struggle for a particular way of life. Rather, I would argue that the demand for 
particular ways of life is not as clearly enunciated in the broadly constructed struggle for 
land (for those who work it) as it is in the multitude of different specific types of 
territorial claims that have emerged in Amazonia (qulombolas, babcu breakers, rubber 
tappers etc.).  
When I say that MDVCA rejects the categories of political economy, or their 
place in the given order, it is not to say that they remain external, or unrelated to these 
categories (e.g. is simply non-state). In bringing together indigenous and traditional 
people to make a claim to an entire territory – that of the Arapiuns River Basin –on the 
one hand, they refuse the categories of state recognition (indigenous, traditional etc., and 
people being identified with the particular conservation area or agrarian reform 
settlement in which they live) that we see implemented through state ordering and that, as 
discussed above, had re-subjectifying effects that were at times divisive. At the same time 
that they unite indigenous and non-indigenous people into a movement to defend and 
celebrate life. However, they also simultaneously deploy these same categories in order 
to gain certain minimum control over a given area or moment (e.g. they are still trying to 
achieve traditional collective land rights, indigenous territory).  
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Not only do they use the categories of the state in order to re-position their own 
practices of territorialization, but they also utilize the more traditional forms of ritualized 
protest in order to enact new forms of protest. For example, in turning the union’s 
symbolic action into an act of concrete oppositionality, MDVCA used resources from 
Rural Workers’ Union and NGOs to initiate mobilizations that were only ever allowed to 
happen because they were pre-coded as symbolic, as not truly adversarial, and as existing 
within the field of State Politics to make demands that did not fit within the given order-
of-things. Thus, they work against the state logic without regarding it as wholly exterior 
to the domain of their politics. According to MDVCA spokespeople, working through 
state, the market, and the ambiguous world of NGOs - which one participant explained to 
me are ‘tools’ that the movement utilizes, even while recognizing that they may have 
contradictory goals - can be a necessary maneuver in an overall struggle that exceeds 
them. 
The new lines of antagonism became visible quite quickly. Within a few days of 
the barge capture, the Rural Workers’ Union officially withdrew its support from the 
mobilization. Although some individuals within the union continued to visit the 
encampment, the sindicato, in a letter, indicated that it had too much to lose (financially – 
their building, funding from government agencies, etc.) by supporting any sort of illegal 
action. After the burning of the barges Greenpeace publically condemned the movement 
(link to greenpeace article here). This mode of direct protest, perceived as illegal and 
violent, was thus rejected by the groups who today stand-in in the region for “resistance” 
as being too openly oppositional.  
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CONCLUSION 
Thus the political subjects, “born in fire” with the MDVCA were not (only) 
resistant, but embodies a propositional concept of territory that is collective and that 
transcends a particular, productive relationship to land and a resistant strategy that 
engages and exceeds contemporary forms and relations of politics. These claims are for 
self-determined control over territory and resources strikes at the heart of the 
contemporary neo-extractive project. The conditions of possibility for the growth and 
stabilization of Brazil’s economy has been the re-centering of extractive development. In 
the struggle for control over these resources, then, the contemporary form the state is 
precisely what is at stake, which is why this, and other similar struggles across Latin 
America are precisely at the heart of the question of politics today.   	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Chapter Five: Toward the Worker State? or Working for the State? 
Reflections on the Rural Workers’ Union and the National Rubber 
Tappers’ Council in the Renascer Extractive Reserve 
INTRODUCTION. LOCATING THE TENSIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY 
STATE  
 Under the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) government, social 
movement/leftist party leaders have entered the state in astounding numbers (an 
estimated 21,000 cargos de confiança or appointed positions under the Lula 
administration, multiple governorships, and countless mayors, city council people, state 
representatives etc.) and scholars and activists have debated whether this amounts to the 
inhabitation of the state by the party, or vice versa (see for example, Guimarães 2004; 
Singer 2005; Singer 2010a; Betto 2006; Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; De Oliveira 
2007; Ricci 2010a; French and Fortes 2012). Explicit resistance to particular state 
projects in the lower Amazon have created new tensions in relationships among affected 
communities, social mediator groups historically aligned with social movements and with 
the workers’ party, and the state. These tensions are further exacerbated by the fact that 
individual people find themselves simultaneously inhabiting several of these positions. 
The argument of this chapter is that a closer examination of these relationships can help 
us not simply to determine whether movements have been co-opted by the state or vice 
versa, but to delineate the relations, and breaks, among movement, civil society, and 
state, at a moment when these very categories themselves have become uncertain.  
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In what follows here, I first situate the struggle over the creation of Renascer 
within the national and regional development context. The second half of the chapter is a 
detailed analysis of the evolving differences, which saw their most dramatic expression in 
a dispute over the meaning and form of democratic governance for Resex Renascer, 
between the Prainha Rural Workers’ Union (STR), the National Rubber Tappers’ 
Council (CNS) and the Movement in Defense of Renascer (MDR). I delineate how the 
STR and CNS tend to perform the work of the state, (albeit a re-constituted one). That is, 
they function as the state both institutionally, in that members of STR leadership 
simultaneously hold municipal and state offices, and effectively, in that they are deeply 
invested in maintaining the given order, namely hierarchical relations of control. I 
highlight, in contrast, the nascent impulses of MDR to break with institutional politics-as-
usual and how those impulses are acted on by these organizations to fold them back into 
the dominant political logic. 
THE CASE OF RENASCER 
 The Renascer Extractive Reserve is located in the eastern part of Western Pará in 
the center of an area that spans hundreds of miles between the Xingu River and the BR-
163, contains some of Pará’s last large stocks of commercially high-value timber and 
which, in the 1990s, was relatively untouched by industrial extractive industry. The large 
supply of high value timber in this area, along with the rapid growth of both the ranching 
and soy sectors nationally and specifically in the BR-163 region near the end of the 1990s 
and in the 2000s increased pressure on this area by logging, which generally moves ahead 
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of these industries (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006).119 As a result of this this 
development expansion, Greenpeace (2003) estimated that by 1999 approximately 90 
logging companies (funneling their timber into four larger companies Curuatinga, 
Rancho da Cabocla, Madesa, Eidai and DLH Nordisk) operated in the territory claimed 
by hundreds of traditional communities on the border of the municipalities of Porto de 
Moz and Prainha (the eastern portion of Western Para). As in Gleba Nova Olinda, 
individual loggers and logging corporations accessed land and forests primarily through 
land theft (grilagem), through the state land agency (ITERPA) who granted either 
permanent or temporary land rights (ADIPs) and the state environmental agency 
(SECTAM later SEMA) who granted temporary logging rights (AUTEFs), and operated 
with the near complete lack of monitoring on the federal level, other than on the 
occasional case-by-case basis.120  
Gerson Campos and Gandor Hage (both PSDB, the Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party, a center-right party that has been the primary opposition to the PT) the then-
mayors of the two municipalities, both the largest or near-largest landowners in their 
respective municipalities and firmly ensconced themselves in the business of logging, 
ranching, and the grilagem, fiercely defended the industry and sanctioned the ongoing 
violence against those who opposed it, setting the conditions for its continued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 As land must be cleared for cattle or soy farming, they cycle of deforestation usually works with 
loggers clearing an area and then these other industries expanding into it. Selective logging, discussed in 
Chapter Four is also increasingly common in this region.  
120 These were the same mechanisms described in Chapter Three. The ADIP was the Authorization for the 
Detantion of Public Property and the AUTEF was the Authorization for Forest exploitation. In this area a 
substantial number of requests for logging concessions had been denied by IBAMA because their 
documents were questionable. After the Public Forests Concession Law was passed in 2006, SECTAM 
authorized most of these previously denied petitions, which, as described in Chapter Three, also opens the 
area to logging well beyond the management plans themselves.  
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expansion.121 The Mayor of Porto de Moz himself was not only one of the municipalities 
largest landowners, but he also controlled one of the major logging companies in the area, 
was part owner of the sawmill Exportadora Cariny, his brothers owned one of the three 
largest logging companies (Indústria Madeireira mature Ltda (Maturu), were also the 
municipalities largest cattle ranchers, and had been accused in the Brazilian National 
Report to the UN high Commissioner on Human Rights of multiple counts of land 
invasion and violence (for a more detailed account of the near countless crimes of Grupo 
Campos, see Greenpeace’s 2003 report “State of Conflict). The Hage family operated a 
political machine that had controlled the government of the municipality of Prainha for 
over forty years and although they lost the mayoral seat in 2008, hold strong clientalist 
networks throughout the municipality through their control of the timber and ranching 
sectors. Greenpeace (2003) also reported that the then-president of the Pará land agency 
ITERPA, Ronaldo Brata, also aggressively supported the logging industry, warning the 
governor in a letter against creating a protected area in the region as it would “be a 
serious impediment to the economic development of the region” (Greenpeace 2003, 32).   
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121 The Mayor of Porto de Moz himself was not only one of the municipalities largest landowners, but he 
also controlled one of the major logging companies in the area, was part owner of the sawmill Exportadora 
Cariny, his brothers owned one of the three largest logging companies (Indústria Madeireira mature Ltda 
(Maturu), were also the municipalities largest cattle ranchers, and had been accused in the Brazilian 
National Report to the UN high Commissioner on Human Rights of multiple counts of land invasion and 
violence (for a more detailed account of the near countless crimes of Grupo Campos, see Greenpeace’s 
2003 report “State of Conflict). 
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Box	  1:	  Historical	  Occupation	  and	  Livelihood	  Practices	  in	  Renascer	  	  	   Life	  in	  Renascer	  is	  oriented	  around	  its	  three	  rivers	  –	  the	  Uruará,	  the	  Tamuataí,	  and	  the	  Guajará	  –	  all	  Amazon	  tributaries.	  Its	  14	  communities	  contain	  anywhere	  from	  approximately	  25	  –	  150	  households	  each.	  The	  numbers	  are	  a	  bit	  elusive	  because	  many	  people	  of	  the	  reserve	  move	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  varzea	  or	  floodplain	  (outside	  of	  the	  reserve)	  and	  the	  terra	  firme	  or	  uplands	  (inside	  of	  the	  reserve)	  with	  the	  seasonal	  flooding.	  Cattle	  is	  moved	  to	  the	  varzea	  when	  the	  water	  is	  low	  for	  feeding,	  and	  then	  back	  to	  higher	  ground	  during	  the	  rainy	  season.	  Residents	  also	  practice	  shifting	  cultivation	  and	  rely	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  fishing,	  working	  in	  their	  roças,	  forest	  extraction,	  and	  increasingly	  on	  cattle	  and	  buffalo	  production	  along	  with	  some	  commercial	  crop	  production	  (primarily	  watermelons).	  	  Roças	  are	  also	  located	  both	  close	  to	  the	  villages	  and	  further	  away.	  As	  in	  Gleba	  Nova	  Olinda	  the	  clearing	  of	  new	  land	  by	  any	  family	  or	  individual	  must	  be	  approved	  in	  community	  assemblies.	  The	  list	  of	  fruits	  and	  vegetables	  cultivated	  and	  animals	  hunted	  overlaps	  significantly	  with	  that	  of	  Gleba	  Nova	  Olinda	  but	  also	  varies,	  especially	  because	  these	  communities	  are	  situated	  closer	  to	  the	  Amazon	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  oriented	  more	  around	  consumption	  of	  river	  animals	  (such	  as	  turtles,	  alligators,	  and	  capivara)	  and	  fishing,	  including	  some	  small-­‐scale	  commercial	  fishing,	  and	  the	  consumptive	  and	  commercial	  production	  of	  piracuí	  (a	  farinha	  made	  from	  manioc	  and	  dried	  fish).	  	  There	  is	  no	  road	  to	  Renascer;	  it	  must	  be	  accessed	  by	  boat	  –	  an	  easy	  task	  in	  the	  rainy	  season,	  but	  in	  the	  dry	  season	  most	  of	  the	  reserve	  is	  only	  accessible	  via	  canoe	  or	  rabeta	  (canoe	  with	  outboard	  motor).	  There	  are	  two	  families	  on	  the	  Tamuataí	  that	  run	  a	  passenger	  boat,	  each	  of	  which	  go	  to	  and	  from	  Prainha	  once	  a	  week	  for	  10	  reais	  (approximately	  5USD	  one-­‐way).	  In	  the	  summer	  (dry	  season),	  people	  wishing	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  city	  must	  travel	  several	  hours	  by	  rabeta	  to	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  Tamuataí	  at	  the	  Uruará	  River,	  where	  commercial	  boats	  that	  go	  from	  Prainha	  to	  Santa	  Maria	  pass	  multiple	  times	  per	  week.	  Some	  of	  the	  villages	  have	  a	  small	  dried	  goods	  store,	  but	  outside	  products	  are	  generally	  purchased	  in	  the	  nearby	  city	  of	  Parinha	  and	  brought	  back	  via	  boat.	  Most	  families	  send	  their	  children	  to	  the	  city	  for	  secondary	  education,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  communities.	  Although	  there	  are	  evangelical	  churches	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Prainha	  and	  nearby	  Santa	  Maria,	  all	  of	  the	  communities	  of	  Renascer	  remain	  Catholic.	  	  While	  most	  regional	  colonial	  histories	  reference	  settlements	  along	  the	  Tapajós	  River	  to	  the	  west	  and	  the	  Xingu	  River	  to	  the	  east,	  the	  historical	  occupation	  of	  the	  three	  rivers	  of	  Renascer	  is	  not	  well	  documented.	  Among	  interviewees	  I	  did	  not	  encounter	  a	  historical	  memory	  that	  went	  back	  more	  than	  two	  generations	  –	  a	  truncated	  historical	  memory	  that	  may	  be	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  repression	  that	  followed	  the	  Cabanagem	  and	  in	  part	  to	  the	  fluidity	  of	  regional	  territorial	  occupation	  until	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Although	  many	  interviewees	  reported	  that	  their	  families	  have	  lived	  on	  these	  rivers	  for	  as	  long	  as	  they	  have	  known,	  they	  explicitly	  do	  not	  identify	  as	  indigenous,	  and	  they	  differentiate	  themselves	  from	  indigenous	  people	  through	  stories	  of	  conflicts	  that	  happened	  with	  “indios”	  over	  territory	  on	  the	  Tamuataí	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s.	  	  Those	  people	  (the	  majority)	  whose	  families	  had	  migrated	  into	  the	  region	  largely	  came	  during	  one	  of	  two	  migration	  waves.	  The	  first	  migrants	  came	  from	  the	  nearby	  Xingú	  region	  and	  the	  neighboring	  municipality	  of	  Almerím	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  and	  the	  second	  wave	  came	  from	  further	  away,	  from	  Breves	  (Ilha	  do	  Marajó)	  near	  Belém	  in	  the	  1950s.	  People	  came	  looking	  for	  land,	  for	  drogas	  de	  sertão	  and	  many	  came	  in	  response	  to	  solicitations	  for	  work	  on	  the	  plantation	  farms	  being	  established	  in	  the	  region	  at	  that	  time	  for	  the	  production	  of	  jute	  and	  malva.	  Seu	  José	  explains	  the	  story	  of	  his	  family’s	  migration:	  	  	  My	  father	  was	  from	  Breves	  and	  my	  mom	  she	  was	  from	  another	  village	  (povoado)	  called	  Afuá,	  and	  me,	  well	  I	  came	  from	  Breves	  too,	  but	  I	  was	  very	  young	  because	  life	  there,	  life	  there	  was	  only	  suffering,	  and	  so	  we	  moved	  every	  few	  years….We	  left	  there	  because	  Tavico	  Miranda	  came	  to	  find	  many	  people	  to	  come	  and	  live	  here	  to	  work	  in	  Jute	  with	  him.	  We	  came	  here	  in	  ’53	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to	  the	  Amazonas….we	  stayed	  in	  Vira	  Sebo	  [a	  community	  outside	  of	  the	  Resex	  in	  the	  varzea]	  and	  we	  worked	  there	  in	  jute,	  for	  two	  years…and	  we	  worked	  for	  the	  Alvarengas,	  we	  went	  to	  work	  with	  him	  and	  I	  passed	  my	  youth	  there,	  working	  with	  him,	  and	  he	  treated	  me	  well,	  and	  I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Or,	  as	  another	  resident,	  Edinildo	  put	  it,	  “everyone	  worked	  in	  jute	  production	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  was	  like	  the	  garimpo”	  (referencing	  the	  gold-­‐mining	  that	  brought	  thousands	  to	  Pará	  in	  the	  1980s).	  As	  Pedro	  explains	  above,	  many	  families	  came	  to	  work	  in	  relations	  of	  clientalism	  with	  the	  Alvarenga	  family.	  Although	  Jute	  production	  dissipated	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  Alvarenga	  family,	  along	  with	  the	  Hage	  family,	  continue	  to	  hold	  most	  economic	  and	  political	  power	  in	  the	  municipality	  and	  remain	  in	  clientalist	  relationships	  with	  regional	  residents.	  	  	  These	  migrants	  also	  brought	  with	  them	  some	  subsistence	  or	  small-­‐scale	  artisanal	  commercial	  practices,	  namely	  timber	  extraction	  for	  boat	  production	  or	  for	  local	  commerce	  (timber	  extraction	  was	  a	  major	  industry	  in	  Breves	  since	  the	  17th	  century,	  Torres	  2007).	  	  Until	  the	  1950s,	  most	  communities	  or	  settlements	  (sort	  of	  a	  pre-­‐cursor	  to	  communities	  –	  a	  group	  of	  people	  living	  together)	  remained	  fisherpeople	  in	  the	  varzea.	  Many	  people	  moved	  to	  the	  uplands	  of	  what	  is	  today	  Resex	  Renascer	  and	  established	  the	  present	  community	  sites	  after	  a	  significant	  flood	  in1952	  destroyed	  homes	  and	  crops	  and	  impelled	  many	  families	  to	  relocate	  to	  higher	  ground	  (IBAMA	  2006).	  According	  to	  interviews,	  people	  lived	  largely	  in	  dispersed	  settlements	  until	  approximately	  the	  early	  1970s	  when	  they	  began	  to	  form	  “communities.”	  That	  is,	  they	  established	  collective	  village	  sites,	  began	  to	  build	  houses	  near	  each	  other,	  establish	  schools,	  churches,	  common	  land	  management	  systems,	  and	  develop	  the	  community	  as	  a	  political	  and	  social	  entity.	  	  This	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  regional	  transformations	  happening	  within	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  the	  Amazon.	  Marked	  by	  two	  regional	  bishops	  meetings	  in	  1972	  and	  1974,	  in	  Santarém	  and	  Manaus	  respectively,	  the	  formation	  of	  pastoral	  agents	  and	  ecclesiastical	  base	  communities	  was	  prioritized	  as	  part	  of	  the	  church’s	  re-­‐organization	  and	  politicization	  (Arenz	  2001,	  quoted	  in	  Fannelli	  2008).	  This	  was	  also	  the	  time	  when	  the	  Rural	  Workers’	  Union	  was	  in	  formation	  and	  both	  of	  these	  organizations	  established	  strong	  bases	  in	  these	  communities,	  an	  influence	  that	  continues	  to	  this	  day,	  as	  will	  become	  apparent	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  struggle	  over	  Renascer,	  discussed	  below.	  	  The	  Rural	  Workers’	  Union	  worked	  alongside	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  a	  project	  of	  political	  consciousness	  building.	  As	  part	  of	  its	  regional	  project	  to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  the	  peasant,	  the	  Union	  introduced	  both	  the	  project	  of	  acquiring	  land	  rights	  and	  of	  accessing	  rural	  credit	  into	  these	  communities.	  Many	  regional	  inhabitants	  reported	  that	  the	  state	  land	  agency	  ITERPA	  had	  visited	  the	  area	  sometime	  in	  the	  1970s,	  although	  I	  did	  not	  encounter	  anyone	  who	  had	  a	  document	  for	  their	  land.	  Most	  people	  did	  seem	  to	  know	  the	  exact	  size	  of	  their	  individual	  plots	  of	  land,	  which	  surprised	  me,	  because	  it	  is	  usually	  a	  type	  of	  knowledge	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  land	  claim.	  The	  Union	  president	  informed	  me	  that	  the	  union	  and	  the	  state	  worked	  together	  to	  help	  the	  communities	  stake	  out	  their	  land	  claims	  and	  to	  take	  out	  loans	  through	  the	  federal	  agricultural	  development	  loan	  fund	  (FNO	  program)	  in	  order	  to	  purchase	  cattle.	  In	  other	  words,	  cattle	  were	  introduced	  to	  the	  communities	  through	  state-­‐led	  programs	  for	  rural	  development.	  Today,	  ironically,	  their	  cattle	  ownership	  is	  the	  primary	  point	  of	  conflict	  with	  the	  government,	  as	  ICMBio	  asserts	  that	  it	  is	  the	  livelihood	  practice	  that	  threatens	  their	  status	  as	  “traditional	  and	  conservationists.”	  	  Since	  then,	  and	  primarily	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  many	  people	  have	  also	  taken	  out	  other	  loans	  under	  the	  family	  agricultural	  development	  fund	  (PRONAF)	  program,	  primarily	  to	  start	  sustainable	  production	  “projects.”	  The	  most	  common	  projects	  were	  for	  
acai	  and	  lime	  production.	  I	  did	  not	  meet	  a	  single	  family	  who	  had	  invested	  in	  a	  successful	  project	  that	  was	  not	  for	  cattle.	  The	  acai	  did	  not	  grow,	  and	  the	  limes	  grew	  abundantly,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  market	  for	  them.	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  families,	  who	  have	  no	  income,	  currently	  carry	  a	  debt	  between	  a	  few	  hundred	  and	  eight	  thousand	  reais.	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Despite the strong coalition of people in power supporting logging expansion, 
there was also significant regional opposition. More than two decades of organizing for 
land rights by local rural workers’ unions (STRs) in the lower Amazon, along with the 
region-wide struggles of traditional people such as the Rubber Tappers, and the 
institutionalization of new forms of conservation areas (SNUC 2000), had formalized 
organizational and legislative networks for traditional, indigenous and peasant peoples to 
protect their lands (if not the political will, see below). Communities and militants 
embroiled in conflict with loggers accessed these networks, seeking land rights as a way 
to stop logger incursions onto their territory. The Rural Workers Unions of Porto de Moz 
and Prainha, along with support from the National Rubber Tappers’ Council and 
international environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and WWF successfully petitioned 
INCRA, IBAMA and SECTAM to create the Verde Para Sempre Extractive Reserve in 
2004, Brazil’s largest Conservation Unit. 
 Verde Para Sempre’s boundaries were cut along the boundary between federal 
and state lands, which were also municipal lines, effectively excluding the state-held land 
in Prainha from the reserve. Governor Simão Jatene (PSDB) opened the excluded 
400,000 hectares to loggers by naming the entire area a “state forest” (FLOTA), as 
discussed in Chapter Three. Several communities working with STR Prainha petitioned 
for a second reserve, Renascer, and in their words, their struggle was “reborn.” The 
loggers excluded from Verde Para Sempre, however, had moved west to the Uruará 
River and set up shop in the town of Santa Maria (which grew rapidly with the 
establishment of saw mills) and within the proposed reserve area. As is common practice 
for loggers to access land held by marginalized rural communities, loggers provide jobs, 
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and they provide local communities with amenities that the municipalities cannot, such as 
direct payment for land access, building schools, health clinics, and energy, often through 
deals negotiated by local politicians, generating loyalty for their (both loggers and 
politicians) position.  
The links between loggers and politicians is not limited to the political right or the 
old clientalist networks. An advisor to the social movement sympathetic mayor informed 
the encampment at Renascer that the mayor accepted 200,000 reais from loggers for his 
campaign. When the movement confronted the mayor about this bribe when he visited 
the encampment, he responded that “Now is not the time to discuss this.” He also later 
negotiated with loggers to allow them to stay in the Reserve for three months and finish 
their work in exchange for a health clinic and a school (authorization that he did not have 
the authority to give on federal land). At the state level, the exchange of management 
plans for campaign financing in Pará is notorious, and the PT’s Ana Julia Carepa’s 
gubernatorial campaign was implicated in a scandal called “Safra Legal” where PT 
officials were found to be facilitating management plans in exchange for campaign 
funding. Ana Jula’s ex-husband, Marcílio Monteiro, was appointed by her to be head of 
IBAMA while this was ongoing.122 
The conflict over Resex Renascer’s creation was not simply a struggle between 
traditional people and loggers/ranchers. Nearly all families living within the proposed 
reserve area meet the legal definition of “traditional” people (MMA 2006), however, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The story of Safra Legal is to complex to do justice to here. For more on this scandal, see a series of 
articles at http://candidoneto.blogspot.com/2009/02/e-saga-continua.html. See also the series of stories in 
the national weekly magazine Veja, March 1, 2006 and June 3, 2005, the Folha de São Paulo February 26, 
2006 and, most importantly, the full report from CPI, Inquiry by the parliamentary Commission on 
Biopiracy.  
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did not all want a Resex. The Resex movement polarized existing tensions within and 
beyond the proposed reserve area between, on the one hand, families and communities 
“in favor” who believed that the Resex model could serve as a tool to stabilize their 
territorial control in the face of the incursion of loggers and ranchers onto their lands, and 
those “against” who viewed the reserve as an instrument that would destroy their 
livelihood practices, either because those practices were logging, ranching, or payment 
from loggers, or because they believed the reserve would limit their ability to hunt, fish, 
raise cattle etc. and subject them to the rule of government environmentalists (a fear 
cultivated by the Hage family political machine through the spreading of gossip and also 
through Junior Hage’s weekly radio show, Junior Hage on the move [Junior Hage em 
Ação). This latter concern was not unjustified, as the reserve would limit the amount of 
cattle permitted in the area, which would (and will) have serious repercussions for many 
people in the reserve (on both sides “contra” and “a favor”). This led to bitter conflicts 
between and within communities between those who began to call themselves 
“extractivists” and those who called themselves “not extractivists” invoking external 
categories from a broader debate that framed regional conflict as one between 
“environment” and “development.”123  
Even those “in favor” of the reserve became progressively convinced that neither 
the state, nor the union who “increasingly [kept] both feet in the judiciary and policy 
realm” (Interview RS March 2009) would intervene quickly enough to protect their 
resources. From 2004 to 2007 communities organized a series of defense actions that 
were intense and at times violent (forced logger eviction, river and road blockages, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 This claim to be “extractivist” was itself extremely complicated because it created some confusion in 
the actual goals.  
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barges of wood set aflame), organizing themselves into the Conselho Popular da Região 
do Guarape (without the participation of the STR). These tactics bore fruit. In 2006’s 
Operation Renascer, Ibama expelled all loggers from the area and a federal judge issued 
an injunction against the existence of a “state forest.” Within one year, the logging 
companies had changed names and returned. 
In addition to the new movement leadership in the conselho popular, the 
mobilization for Resex Renascer differed from that of Verde Para Sempre in that it 
occurred within a new political context. Between 2002 and 2008, the Workers’ Party 
gained control of the presidency (Lula), the governorship (Ana Jula Carepa), and the 
municipality (mayor Sergio Pingarilho PMDB and vice-mayor Adamor Malcher PT won 
on a compromise ticket), and three different leaders from the Prainha STR/PT served 
multiple times as city council people. Also, Greenpeace’s high profile “State of Conflict” 
report (2003) as well as a series of letters to the federal government signed by several 
prominent international environmental NGOs meant that national and international eyes 
were on the future of Renascer. This attention was due less to the plight of local people 
(although that plight did figure largely in that discourse) and more to issues of the 
shifting politics of conservation. It was increasingly clear that the proliferation of 
protected areas that had marked the Amazonian policy period since the late 1990s had 
shifted.124 That the federal government had not created a Conservation Unit in over a 
year (ISA 2009), that Márcio Meira (the head of FUNAI under Lula) had gone so far as 
to say that demands for indigenous territory had become “excessive” and there needed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Lemos and Roberts (2009) call this the “donor-led socio-environmental policy period,” when hundreds 
of millions of dollars in international conservation money flooded the region through the PPG-7 and re-
worked Amazonian policy and civil society relationships. 
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be a “limit” to their creation (Viveiros de Castro 2009, 148), that a 2006 federal law 
shifted the responsibility for granting logging management plans from the chronically 
under-resourced but (generally) trusted IBAMA to the notoriously corrupt and industry 
friendly (especially in Pará) state environmental agencies,125 and that environmentalist 
politician Marina Silva had resigned from her position, all indicated cracks in the 
hegemony of the pro-environment policy program. This was not a simple re-centering of 
the developmentalism - environmentalism debate, but rather a re-articulation of these 
positions into the “green development” paradigm (what the Amazonian social movements 
call “green capitalism” as opposed to “brown capitalism), currently central to facilitating 
extractive development in the Amazon (Baletti 2012). 
This articulation was territorialized in the state’s approach to the region’s 
“questão fundiaria” whose premise is (contrary to the arguments made by the 
movements) that the territorial interests of all actors are not contradictory, but negotiable. 
Ana Julia Carepa, the PT governor known for her links to loggers126, met with president 
Lula during a much reported plane ride from Brasilia to Sao Paulo in late 2008 to discuss 
the situation in Renascer. It was necessary, she argued, to find “the best design possible” 
to respect “the rights of the communities who live there and of the producers, ranchers 
and loggers who have been in that area for decades.” 127  
 On June 5 2009, the Resex Renascer was created with an area of 211, 634 
hectares, approximately one half of the size (414.274) petitioned for by the communities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Such management plans immediately proliferated. 
 
126 See http://www.mst.org.br/node/5082; http://veja.abril.com.br/010306/p_038.html 
 
127 See http://www.ideflor.pa.gov.br/?q=node/140 
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involved, recommended by the research report by IBAMA128 and discussed in the Public 
Audience December 2007. The floodplain, almost all of the primary forest, the sources 
for the reserve’s three rivers, and most decisively, a later interview with ICMBio 
coordinator Fabiano Costa (interview September 2009) would indicate, the Bauxite 
deposits, would be excluded in “the best design possible.” People interviewed living 
within Renascer were at a loss. Speculation and rumor quickly spread, some of which 
placed the blame on Ana Julia, because “Lula would not have done this if he had known.” 
Others within the union blamed Professor Raimundinha’s (the principal investigator on 
the federal study for the reserve), links to the state (she is married to state deputy Airton 
Faleiro, PT). Many also suspected that the union had negotiated away half of the reserve 
in order to claim the creation of the reserve as a political victory.  
Tension among movement leadership and union had been evolving for several 
years and the union and the conselho popular increasingly operated in separate realms in 
their reserve advocacy. The latter and their allies increasingly acted on their own behalf, 
mobilizing within the reserve, meeting with government officials in Santarém, and 
consulting with the Pastoral Land Commission. The first meeting that I attended in 2009 
with both groups present erupted in a conflict over the over the fact that Delfem, 
secretary of the STR, refused to step down from his position despite the fact that he had 
been elected to city council. The conflict expressed a larger tension over the fact that 
Badé’s Ferreira’s family (Delfem’s father, several times president and ex-city council 
member) controlled rural political representation. His daughter-in-law (Delfem’s wife) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 IBAMA. 2006. Estudo Socioeconomico da area proposta para criação da Reserva Extratavista 
Renascer, Prainha/PA. A study conducted by a UFPA professor “Raimundinha” the wife of Airton Faleiro, 
state deputy (PT), former president of FETAGRI, and coordinator of the movement for the survival of the 
Transamazon and the Xingu region.  
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was union secretary, his son Valdilene was treasurer, and his other son Vadison Ferreira 
was president of the Colonia de Pescadores.129 One month prior to the establishment of 
the reserve, Delfem, Bade, Cley (the other PT city council person) and Vadison had 
flown to Brasilia and Belém for closed-door meetings with representatives from WWF, 
the Ministry of the Environment, the Casa Civil and others, raising suspicions regarding 
their role in the negotiations.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the rural workers unions began as a para-
statal institution, part of the corporatist, official sanctioned labor bureaucracy under the 
military dictatorship. Church, community, and party leaders, however, recognized them 
as viable institutional bases from which to organize, and developed a political program 
based around economic grievances particular to “rural workers” as a class and opposition 
to the military dictatorship (Houtzager 2001). Efforts to democratize the institutions and 
break them of their elite ties and clientalist structures focused on removing leadership 
engaged in those practices, (and were largely successful, most famously in the case of 
Santarém. See Leroy 1991), but largely embraced the union structure. This process 
culminated with rural unions in Pará allying nationally with CUT (Unified Workers’ 
Central, the national trade union movement), and later with FETAGRI (the state level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 This conflict was an expression of ongoing tensions regarding union practices more broadly that would 
become more apparent in future month. Practices that included the holding of exclusive meetings – the 
sindicato would frequently call those that they considered to be leaders to meet privately in Prainha, rather 
than holding open meetings in the communities, the lack of transparency in use of and access to funding 
(using motorboats to travel around whereas everyone else used regular and very slow boats, frequent trips 
for “leaders” e.g. Badé’s family to Brasilia and Belém – decisions made at the level of the union leadership 
and not among reserve members) among other things. Immediately following the creation of the reserve, 
Badé, who held no official position in the union or the municipality, solicited 10,000 reais from the city in 
order to visit all of the communities of the Resex. This was understood by the participants in the conselho 
popular to be his campaign to be president of the Resex. They were outraged and began a campaign to say 
that the president of the Resex must be from the Resex. 
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association of unions), and became a key site for the cultivation of the Workers’ Party in 
the rural north (Leroy 1991; Petit 1996).  
Any discontinuity between the union and community practices seems to have 
been largely obscured under the military dictatorship and during the democratic 
transition/neoliberal period when the primary regional antagonism remained between the 
world views and practices of rural people and developers in the dominant sector (largely 
associated with right wing politics.) The union became the location for economic support 
for rural people, facilitating access to land rights/agrarian reform, FNOs, Pronafes and 
other benefits. Not only in Prainha, but across the state, STR leaders from the rural 
workers union would go on to win mayoral, federal congressional elections, seats in state 
legislatures and city councils as well as a host of appointments to state and federal 
government positions. These achievements created ongoing tensions about whose 
interests these leaders were protecting (Schwartzman et al. 2010). The contradiction that 
the union holds is that it simultaneously represents the grievances of a rural population 
dominated by authoritarian and later development interests, and is an expression of a 
particular conception of power, leadership and political relationships “of favors” that 
have produced the given order of domination.  
 
Following the legalization of Resex Renascer, the rate of timber being felled and 
leaving the reserve skyrocketed.130 Petitions for enforcement fell on deaf ears, the mayor 
and city council encouraged (and negotiated) compromise with the loggers, and ICMBio 
claimed a lack of resources to enforce. Residents of Santa Maria and the reserve set up an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 There is always a lag-time between the creation of a Conservation Unit and ICMBio’s capacity to 
demarcate and monitor the area. Thus loggers increase their activities in an attempt to extract the maximum 
possible profits before the area becomes inaccessible. 
	   228	  
encampment at the entrance to the reserve blocking the river to logging traffic for 45 days 
(again, without the sindicato). On January 14th, six barges left the sawmill inside of the 
reserve headed for the Amazon. When the barges approached the encampment they 
opened fire. Two people were shot and the rest escaped into the forest. With promises 
from the government to act on the situation, the assembly decided to disband the 
encampment but created a committee of 13 people from their group, charged with 
organizing workshops and meetings on the reserve’s three rivers of the reserve to 
organize the Reserve-wide “mother association” as a system of “self-determined, 
democratic governance” They were called the Movement in Defense of Renascer (MDR).  
 
 “THE GREATEST LAW IS AN ORGANIZED COMMUNITY”: MAKING 
GUATAMURU 
 
 MDR called for a meeting in Prainha, where all partners and advisors (MDR, the 
union, the vice-prefeito, the PT city council members, the CPT, the Fisherpeople’s 
Association, and the Amazon Defense Front (FDA), met to plan the process for the 
creation of the Associação Mãe. They would visit communities on each river (Guajará, 
Tamuataí, and Uruará) to discuss the best models for reserve governance, create the 
necessary infrastructure, and select delegates for a reserve-level Assembly to formalize 
the Association. Ultimately, the meetings were facilitated only by MDR, the CPT, and 
FDA.  
 100 anti-reserve residents interrupted the first meeting on the Uruará River. 
Silently, they entered the barracão as a group and declared, “We are not extractivists. We 
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don’t want this reserve.” The tension was palpable. Judith, a CPT coordinator, diffused 
the situation. “What is your favorite thing to eat?” she asked the man who had spoken for 
the group. Caught off-guard, he responded “Jabuti” (a local turtle). “Do you buy it at the 
supermarket? Or hunt it on the riverbank?” Everyone laughed. “Hunt” he responded. 
“That is extractivism” A long and difficult conversation ensued regarding the concept of 
extractivism (a remnant practice of poor people, or a legitimate future), a reserve 
(destructive or productive for residents), management (could it be internally generated or 
would it be imposed from above), and democracy (rule by majority or participation).  
The question of the reserve had put those “in favor” of its establishment in an 
awkward and at times confusing position of defending, and struggling for, something that 
they did not actually believe was going to solve their problems, but that they saw as a 
necessary, intermediary step. This intermediary step, however, polarized reserve 
communities, precisely because it mandated a subjective identification that was not 
necessarily consistent with the lived experiences and desires of people whose livelihood 
strategies were extremely complex and often a mix of “market-oriented” and “traditional” 
practices. Nonetheless, they saw reserve creation as a necessary step, a tactic, to 
regaining control over self-definition (not to mention to sorting through the complexities 
and impacts of these mixed economic strategies). In order to reach their goal of self-
definition it was necessary to establish control over their own reserve governance.  
The MDR went on to explain, the distinction that we might make between tactics 
and strategies, is the difference between tools and goals.  
A reserve is not a solution for anybody. It is a tool, an instrument that we 
can use in our favor. An instrument that we can use to protect our land, 
our territory so that we can reach our goals, our dreams for our families 
for the future. So the reserve is our tool, but it is also, now, our 
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problem…Chico Mendes (ICMBio) will want to direct (dirigir) with their 
rules, their laws, but that is not what we want. Before our biggest enemy 
was the loggers. Now, our biggest enemy is Chico Mendes. We need to 
organize ourselves to create the reserve that we want.  
 
Another resident added, “The greatest law is an organized community.” 
 After several hours of tense conversation, rooted in years of conflict, the “against” 
communities left promising to look through the materials that MDR would send on to 
them, and to consider participation in the formation of the Associação Mãe. It would be a 
misrepresentation to describe the interaction as “successful,” but it was clear that there 
had been a relational shift, and the intense feelings of antagonism, to a certain extent, 
mitigated. This was confirmed by the fact that the same situation repeated itself the 
following day at the second Uruará meeting, and many “against” participants from the 
first day returned.  
 A few weeks later, the organizers traveled to the Guajará, the part of the reserve 
that is the least accessible to Prainha, Santa Maria. As an effect of geography, the 
communities there had had less involvement both in conflicts and in the creation of the 
reserve. These communities bordered Verde Para Sempre so they had some idea of how 
reserves worked (or “didn’t work” as they frequently joked). Concerned that their remote 
location, political inexperience, and cash poverty (resulting in a lack of funding for 
travel) would result in their marginalization from the reserve governance process, a 
proposal emerged in the workshops. Rather than having a single president of the Mother 
Association, who would be certain to come from the Tamuataí, the most organized part of 
the reserve with the most formalized relationships to the union and the prefeitura, each 
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river would select a coordinator, and the three coordinators serve as a coordinating 
committee. It was decided that they would propose this at the General Assembly. 
 
 The preparatory meeting for the communities of the third river, the Tamuataí, 
took place in the community of Espírito Santo on the eve of the General Assembly. 
Assembled in the community barracão (large, open-sided, roofed structure in community 
center used for meetings) one of the organizers stood and spoke. Their comments are 
worth quoting at length: 
 
This process that we have been completing over the last month of going 
from community to community to discuss the governance of the Resex is 
to ensure that ALL people of the Resex participate in the creation of the 
association of the Resex, because who will create the Resex is the people 
of the Resex. As we have said before, a Resex, it is not a solution for 
anybody’s problems. It is a tool that we can use, but it is the people that 
live here who need to create it…and how do we create this? Do we leave it 
for leaders? No leader is more important than the people that live here. 
Leaders are important workers, they are articulators to help the process, 
but they are not more important than the rest of the people, they simply 
have a different role. They are very important for facilitating the process 
and we need leaders, but leaders are not more important…without people, 
leaders don’t have value...Also all people are of equal importance, whether 
they are for or against the Resex. We can’t take people out of the process 
because we don’t agree with them and we can’t ignore them…We need to 
learn how to communicate, negotiate and understand each other’s point of 
views…The assembly that will happen tomorrow will bring together the 
people and discussions that have happened in all of the Resex...the 
assembly that will happen tomorrow, the assembly is only a result, 
tomorrow will not be anything new, tomorrow is the result of the meetings 
and discussions that have happened in each community. They already 
happened. They have happened since the decision that was made there in 
Prainha [to organize] the process for creating the Associação Mae. Does 
anyone disagree with this? And they have happened over 10 years of 
struggle for this Resex… 
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At that moment, a motorboat arrived carrying Badé, Gatão (National Rubber 
Tappers’ Council), city councilman Delfem, and the presidents of the Prainha Rural 
Workers’ Union and the Colonia de Pescadores (The Fisherperson’s Colony, a sort of 
union for fisherpeople). They entered the ongoing meeting and MDR invited them to 
introduce themselves and say a few words. It is worth quoting Badé at length:  
 
…I just want to say one more thing, we intend to sit down with all of the 
leaders of all of the communities tonight, if you could plan a time, and we 
could have a debate, you know, because our responsibility every day, is to 
improve each leader, especially now that we have our dream of creating a 
Resex, which you know was not easy, this dream. This dream cost much 
struggle, much struggle, so much that we have the sadness that 50% of our 
area was cut...we have to have a lot of care in how we are going to 
guarantee the future of our families, and this is the responsibility of each 
of our leaders. Because, it is like this…each community has its leaders. Its 
leadership is a command, and every community waits for this commander 
and this commander has to have, in fact and by right, the responsibility to 
represent without looking to A or B because it is only with this kind of 
representation that we can guarantee, in the future, all that we have always 
wanted … We had the opportunity to elect Lula, the commander of the 
nation and today Lula is not a reference for Brazil, he is a reference 
worldwide, and we need to see this with clearly and carefully. And so 
these policies of the government, in the moment that we embrace them, we 
don’t have to say anymore that we lost 50% of what we have and that we 
can’t arrive at the conclusion of our project. All of this [the arrival at the 
conclusion of our project] will depend on the discussion among our 
leaders. How are we going to hunt, how are we going to follow our 
dreams?..and so today what we [the Prainha Rural Workers’ Union and 
CNS people with him] want, and this isn’t my demand, but the demand of 
all of the leaders of the municipality of Prainha, we want to decide on a 
time to talk with the leadership. We need to discuss these things among 
the leaders before we hand it over to the masses, because it is like this, the 
masses wait for the leaders, society waits for the leaders, because the 
leaders have a more ample vision, they have a vision that looks outward to 
see and discuss problems and so we want to have a meeting with all of the 
leaders tonight so that we can decide what we want from this project, 
where do we want to go with this project… 
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They then left the meeting to go relax in their hammocks for the rest of the 
morning.  
 The differences and contrast in the two positions almost needs no exposition. 
They appear to almost directly contradict one another. They are not, however, simple 
inversions of a shared logic – say, one that celebrates leaders versus one that celebrates 
the base, or in Badé’s words, “the masses.” In MDR’s statements, they recognize the 
value of and the need for leadership within communities (and by extension within 
movement), but argue that this leadership is one role among many and necessarily 
embedded within a larger group and vision. Thus, rather than seeking to place individuals 
in a position of power, they indicate that their leaders function as a tactic to generalize or 
amplify the claims of the group. 
Given these statements we can conclude that for them, that a leadership integrated 
into the base both expresses and facilitates the community’s desires, project, etc. but 
cannot exist separately from it, neither thought nor action occurs in only one or the other 
position. Secondly, we see decision-making defined explicitly as an organized process, a 
form of decision-making that excludes the possibility for individualized, decision-making 
that would tend to concentrate decision-making in the hands of whoever may be present 
in a given moment (generally leaders). That is, we see the organizational impossibility of 
oligarchical and personalist political action typical of regional institutional politics. 
Finally, we see an inclusiveness, a respect for and acknowledgement of different 
positions and the need to engage them. In other words, in the argument for recognition, 
understanding and negotiation, we can read an argument for co-existence, rather than 
unification of multiple positions.  
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 In the second discourse there is a valorization of leadership, not only above other 
participants, but also to their exclusion. In the world of “leaders” and the “masses” the 
“masses” have no capacity to think, but must be, in Badé’s words, “commanded.” This 
“command – obey” logic is one of the guiding rationalities at the heart of the 
contemporary state (Foucault 2008; Foucault 2009) and the modern project of 
sovereignty (Reyes and Kaufman 2011). It should perhaps not be surprising then that it 
forms the basis here for assumptions about who commands and who obeys within the 
union structure (On this question see French 2006). This is especially true given that the 
unions began as a para-statal institution, and that the Rural Workers’ Unions in rural Pará 
have been so deeply connected to the formation of the Workers’ Party, which itself was a 
(successful) struggle to take state power.  In this discourse, without a capacity to think, 
“the masses” not only lack the ability to make their own decisions (and must be led), but 
they cannot even participate in mainstream conceptions of citizenship – which minimally 
assumes a modern, rational, actor capable of engaging in market, or market-like, 
transactions. The more organic forms of organization that emerge from daily life cannot 
fit within the bureaucratic structure reproduced in state-centric organizations, such as the 
union. The apparent effect of this structure, and this theory of power is that the other 
issues raised in the first discourse – the embedded, organizational forms of decision-
making and the respect for and acknowledgement of difference - become irrelevant 
conversations within the command-obey relation. Thus, the reconciling of these positions 
would not involve simple reforms, but fundamental changes in outlook. 
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The Union/CNS contingent rejoined the meeting that afternoon. The CPT 
coordinator asked to facilitate the meeting began by introducing the proposal, formulated 
on the Guajará, that the Mother Association have three coordinators and three vice 
coordinators as opposed to a single president/vice president. Badé quickly made the 
argument that three coordinators was legally, juridically impossible. The CPT coordinator 
disagreed. Badé insisted. “I am talking about the question of legality.” Four lawyers 
present all confirmed that the association, legally, could be constructed however the 
people cared to construct it – with one leader or with four. Badé continued to say that it 
was illegal, that it was impossible and if it was, in fact legal, as they asserted, “What part 
of the federal constitution says this?” The lawyers affirmed that it was legal, that the 
legality had nothing to do with the federal constitution. “So what part of the civil code 
then, there has to be one.” Despite the testimonies and explanations of the four lawyers 
present as to the legality of the proposition, Badé continued to insist that it was not. This 
accusation of illegality, coming from his respected position as a leader, raised doubts 
among those present.  
When the question of legality was put to rest, Gatão intervened, 
 “They have to be certain about what they want, if it is president or 
coordinator. Have you decided? I can’t tell you what to do...what I can tell 
you is that culturally traditional people have the custom of a president, 
there is no custom of coordinator, I don’t have a custom of coordinator. I 
am part of an organization, for many years, as you know the CNS, that has 
a president, it is obvious like our companheiro said (gesturing to Badé), 
our way of living is with a president. Maybe somewhere there are some 
community associations that have coordinators, but the grand majority [of 
associations] have presidents. You can’t say that one of these is more 
democratic [the CPT coordinator had explained this as the Guajará’s 
motivation], that is not true, what is democratic you can only tell in 
actions. You can have a coordinating group that is totally authoritarian, it 
isn’t the word coordination that makes a community democratic, it is the 
practice of democracy…you have to vote. I can only offer you council, I 
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can’t induce you to do anything. It is you who decide. I can’t show up and 
tell you, no, a coordinator is better, because it is your decision. I can tell 
you that this is not the custom of traditional people. But I cannot decide 
for you because I am here to advise, not to induce.” 
 
 After several hours of debate, the people of the Tamuataí decided to ally 
themselves with the union position, deciding that at the next day’s general assembly, they 
would charge their delegates to vote for a president. They also devised two other 
proposals – that the Tamuataí should have two extra people on the Mother Association 
because they had been more engaged with the Resex struggle, and that the Tamuataí 
should have a right to hold a majority majority of the positions on Mother Association. 
Both of these proposals, suggested by Badé and the Union leaders proposed to 
institutionalize Union control over within the Asssociação Mãe by guaranteeing that the 
communities that the union controlled would themselves control the association. This 
proposal would replicate, in a way, the situation that existed within the representative 
organizations of the Rural Workers’ Union and the Fisherperson’s Colony, where Badé’s 
family controls the leadership within them and therefore controls the organization.   
The regional history of struggle of marginalized people in the Amazon, in which 
not only the rural workers’ union and the CNS, but these particular people, Badé and 
Gatão, were protagonists means that both they and their institutions carry a tremendous 
amount of legitimacy within the communities present and engaged in this debate over 
how to construct their future. Invoking their particular realms of expertise and experience 
(law and tradition) functioned to destabilize the nascent, and precarious, expressions of 
dissent or difference and, in this case and at least on the Tamuataí, reassert and re-
produce their own form of politics.  
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That evening, more people began to arrive from the other rivers and we watched 
politics happen in the plaza. Small groups gathered and discussed and debated and made 
deals. Badé, Gatão and the other elected officials from the Rural Workers’ Union and the 
City Council people met with the leaders at the house of one of the community members 
(who was, incidentally, also in MDR). The rest of the members of MDR retired to a boat 
to plan the assembly. The community quieted down for an unsettled sleep. 
On the morning of the 7th, people arrived from the more distant communities, 
including, to everyone’s surprise, the communities that were “against” the reserve, along 
with the acting mayor (vice-mayor Ademor) and Padre Jorge (the regional Priest and an 
ally of the Resex struggle and the Union). The assembly began with a brief mass 
followed by an introduction. The people from the communities on the Uruará that were 
against the reserve requested space to speak and read a letter:  
We the residents of communities of São Raimundo, Terra Preta, and 
Cipriano along with some residents of Mato Grosso we would like to 
communicate that we do not accept the invitation to participate in the 
formation of the Associaçao Mae, and we do not accept the formation of 
the reserve because we are not accustomed to working with extractivism 
and we do not want to survive from that.  
 
They submitted their letter, wished everyone a good day, and left. This was not, as 
it might appear, a rejection of the process of the formation of the Mother Association, but 
an acknowledgement of it. These families had traveled 6 hours by boat, and would travel 
six hours back, not to disrupt or destabilize the formation of the association, but to 
acknowledge it, to acknowledge the other communities’ right to self-organize, and to opt 
out of the process. To opt out is itself a form of participation that simply ignoring the 
process would not have been. This was further evidence of the shift in relations among 
reserve residents. 
	   238	  
The Tamuataí’s proposal to have two additional people sit on the association, and 
to control the direction of the association was put to the delegates and was immediately 
thrown out by the communities from the other rivers. MDR put forward its proposal to 
have a three-person coordinating committee, rather than a president, at the head of the 
Resex Association. Rather than challenging the proposal, as expected, a resident from the 
Espírito Santo community on the Tamuataí challenged the legitimacy of the voting 
process itself. This process – whereby only delegates from the communities to the 
Mother Association were voting, rather than everyone present in the assembly, had been 
decided in the series of community planning meetings. This model of delegate-only 
voting had been selected because it would have been logistically (and financially) 
challenging to hold an actual RESEX-wide assembly with all RESEX residents present. 
Thus, an assembly-wide vote would favor the community where the meeting was held, 
because their residents would not have to bear the time and financial expense of travel to 
the meeting. Because the meeting was held in Espírito Santo on the Tamuataí, it would 
have favored them. This challenge to the process threatened to destabilize the entire 
assembly process, which MDR had worked for months to establish, and members of 
MDR confessed that they felt that, “all of our work was being undone.” 
This proposal gave rise to hours of debate. City councilperson Delfim (son of 
Badé) proposed that the general assembly (e.g. everyone present) should vote on whether 
or not the delegates should be the only ones to vote on the issues at hand. During the 
debate that ensued, most of the people who stood up to speak were associated with the 
Union, giving the impression that if Delfim’s proposal were put to the assembly, they 
would vote against the delegate’s position as representatives. Finally, after several hours 
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of debate, the exasperated members of MDR decided that they would give in to Delfim’s 
proposal and the entire assembly would vote on the legitimacy of the delegates. They 
called a vote. All of those in favor of leaving the power to decide in the hands of the 
delegates raised their hands. 313 votes. All of those opposed, 3. The acting mayor, city 
councilman Delfen, Gatão from CNS, the president of the Rural Workers’ Union, the 
president of the municipal level PT, Father Jorge, and ex-city councilperson and former 
president of the Union Badé all got to their feet and stormed out in anger, got in their 
speedboat, and sped off.  
	  
Figure	  23:	  Assembly	  on	  the	  Tamuataí	  voting	  in	  favor	  of	  delegates 
The following week, the Rural Workers’ Union wrote a letter to the CPT national 
office, accusing the CPT of manipulating the people of the Resex and the process of 
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creating the Mother Association. The letter was signed by the two PT City Council 
people, the vice-mayor, Padre Jorge and the “social movements of the region,” a signifier 
that they were claiming for themselves. They indicated that they intended to legally 
challenge the association that was created, and to re-initiate the process of creating an 
association, but this time without the CPT or MDR (who were reserve residents). The 
association created that day, dubbed Guatamuru in honor of the three rivers, has been 
legally formalized and to date, no legal challenge has been brought. 
CONCLUSION 
“Yes, there are clearly problems with the union and maybe with various, but it is a 
problem of leadership. We need to change the leadership, not condemn the institution.”  
-- Danicley Saraiva de Aguiar, FETAGRI, Santarém 2010 
 
“Our biggest traitors have not been the environmentalists. We knew they were never us. 
No, our biggest traitors have been the Union of Rural Workers and the National Rubber 
Tappers Council”  
– Osmarino Amâncio, Belém 2011 
 
 Much as been said to both celebrate and oppose the rise of progressive 
government in Brazil. Is it a break with the past, or “a change so that everything stays the 
same?” In Brazil, and particularly in the Amazon, this question has been complex, 
because state intervention has created some stability (e.g. bringing the ‘rule of law’ to 
places where the governing presence was largely absent or corrupt) and created openings 
for progressive, redistributive economic policies. The contradictions of the post-
neoliberal moment, however, have been particularly apparent in the intensification of 
neo-extractivism, which placed the Brazilian government in tension, if not in direct 
conflict, with environmental concerns, but more significantly, with the primarily 
traditional and indigenous people and communities whose territories house these 
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resources. These conflicts demonstrate the impossibility of a simple separation of the 
economic and social policy.  
 This chapter, then, has tried to explore the new tensions and contradictions of this 
moment, by examining the shifting dynamics around the location where movements, civil 
society, and the progressive state intersect: the rural workers union in Pará. In the early 
years of their formation, the union and their leaders, embodied the rejection of a system 
of domination, confronting, in the Amazon, an oligarchy who had trapped them in a 
system of dependence, and nationally a repressive and exclusionary regime. The alliance 
between rural, marginalized communities, these representative organizations and the 
national project of the workers’ party was easier or logical, under military, and then, 
neoliberal rule. The movement of the PT into spaces of institutional government gives 
rise to new tensions and contradictions that this chapter has tried to explore in one 
particular case, but, as tensions between the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union and 
MDVCA discussed in Chapter Four, and the quote from Osmarino Amâncio above 
speaking from his experiences in Acre indicate, are consistent with other cases across the 
region. 
 These tensions and contradictions allow us to identify a series of breaks, or splits. 
On the one hand, there is a split in the workers’ party itself, as politicians that support a 
developmentalist program ally themselves with the industries that oppose the interests of 
their base. The rural workers’ union maintains a key role here, because its historical 
position alongside and within movements means that its presence within communities is 
deeply rooted, as is its support, thus making it a key site for holding together these 
ostensibly opposing interests, itself falling into neither one camp or the other, even as its 
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individual members may enter and leave institutionalized political positions. This leads to 
a second split – in the movement itself – here expressed by the increasing tension 
between MDR and the STR. As we saw, this split is not simply about a political stance – 
either for or against conservation or development – but, a more substantive one regarding 
the very question of the nature of politics itself.  In other words, in this new political 
moment movements and the states and their relationships to one another have changed, 
giving rise to new conflicts that we must endeavor to understand. 
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Chapter Six. Conclusion. Rethinking Amazonian Studies 
 
The	  Green	  Development	  Paradigm	  has	  become	  Hegemonic.	  
 
The paving of the BR-163 and the arrival of soy in the Amazon Biome was 
arguably the first major “environmentalist” controversy – or at least the first to receive 
national and international attention – of the period that I have called, in this dissertation, 
“neo-extractivist.” Since then and equally through other controversial development 
initiatives, such as changes to the Forest Code and the construction of the Belo Monte 
Dam, we have seen the production of a familiar narrative that poses environmentalism 
and developmentalism as two ends of the spectrum in the field of debate over the future 
of Amazônia. While this debate has gone through multiple iterations, its parameters –
since the late 1970s when this polarization first emerged – remain strikingly unchanged.  
As discussed in the introduction, over the past decade under progressive 
government, Brazil has seen its first period of sustained economic growth since the 
“Brazilian Miracle” (1968-72). Rather than replicating that era’s project of modernization 
through violent colonization, today’s growth is happening amidst, and even driving, 
historic records of poverty reduction and is implemented by a Workers’ Party 
government with equally historic records of popular support and a new position of 
leadership in regional and global politics. Thus, today’s package of economic growth and 
poverty reduction take a kinder and gentler form. This new model is marked, in 
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Amazonia, by a neoliberal politics of limited social inclusion, achieved both through 
granting land rights to formerly marginal socio-ecological actors and a move toward 
industry “greening” that has re-territorialized the region, as outlined in Chapter Three. 
This new platform is supported by a civil society apparatus produced through networks 
that move from green corporate initiatives through the World Bank, the Brazilian 
National Development Bank, and foundations like Ford and Moore, to “big 
conservation,” and disperse through a broad complex of local civil society organizations, 
an example of which was discussed in Chapter Two in the Sustainable Soy initiative. The 
coupling of representative organizations of the left in “partnerships” with the 
International Finance Corporation, Vale, Cargill and others, mediated by organizations 
such as the Nature Conservancy, has gone a long way toward positing green development 
as the only alternative. 
 
The Study of Environmental Politics in Amazonia has Reduced Politics to Policy. 
 
 International outcry over ecological devastation brought on by modernization 
gave the entire world a stake in Amazonian politics and effectively transformed 
Amazonian political conflict into “Environmental Politics.” The initiatives described in 
this dissertation taken to respond to and mitigate the destructive effects of development 
for the region – the consolidation of federal agencies and ministries, the creation of 
international and national environmental management supervisory apparatuses (PPG7, 
Sustainable Amazon Plan), and the dramatic increase in the number of NGOs through the 
course of the 1990s – and “re-work” Amazonian civil society into a more conciliatory 
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and participatory apparatus, centered on a program of sustainable development. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, this new, sustainable development paradigm was premised 
on the production of “the environment” as an object of research, and technical and 
scientific knowledge as the form of knowledge necessary to understand and therefore 
manage it. This, in turn, brought forth a new type of knowledge producer – the 
professional social and natural scientist, largely employed in one of the many new 
regional research organizations that have since become world leaders in the production of 
Amazonian data and analysis. These shifts amounted to a re-mapping of the Amazonian 
situation as a symptom of management failure whose ‘solution’ could be achieved by re-
organizing the region to allow for “the rational use of natural resources.”131 
 This re-mapping was premised on the radical separation of “the environment” 
from the political conditions of its production. Environmental problems could be delinked 
from their foundation in inequality and exploitation and re-deployed as technical 
problems of poor (e.g. “not rational”) management. Such issues could be resolved, then, 
by introducing rationality, either through the state, state-like structures of governance, or 
the market. It was precisely this radical separation of nature and politics that would allow 
organizations like the Nature Conservancy to say, as quoted in Chapter Two, that they are 
concerned with “deforestation” and not with politics, as if one might exist separately 
from the other.  
 The final conceptual move within this re-mapping of the Amazonian situation was 
a renewed concern with “local people.” The importance of local people to conservation 
was raised by scholars deeply committed to those people’s struggles and was enacted by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 On the “rational use of natural resources, see, for example, WWF’s website 
http://www.wwf.org.br/natureza_brasileira/reducao_de_impactos2/amazonia/amazonia_acoes/uso_sustenta
vel/ 
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them as a move against former, more clearly colonialist, conservation models that 
excluded “local knowledges” (e.g. the fortress conservation model). The new, people-
focused conservation assessed local people’s practices and conferred rights on them 
according to their potential as “community-based” resource managers - some of the 
contradictions of which were explored in Chapter Five, where local people are not always 
necessarily conservationists, or in Chapter Four, where the environmentalism of 
movements and managers is not the same.  
Following from this, social movements were and are assessed according to their 
potential to contribute to environmental protection – by their capacity to move, from 
“chaos to conservation” (Schwartzman et al. 2010), from uncivil to civil.  
More radical, insurrectional or oppositional forms of resistance in this literature are 
treated as a primitive formation in a trajectory toward “participation” in full 
environmental citizenship (which in the current contexts means joining in round table 
agreements with Agro-industry and public audiences, NGO participatory mapping with 
NGOs and government agents, etc.). Direct oppositionality or a struggle for something 
beyond what is currently permitted within the bounds of the law is portrayed as 
“ideological” (For an emblematic example of this see Scholz 2005), and marginalized 
rural people without an explicitly environmentalist agenda lack access to political space.  
Thus, over the past three decades, and even more so today in this moment of 
global environmental crisis, the Amazon is deeply politicized, but that politicization lies 
within an extremely narrow conception of what constitutes “the political.” Much like the 
neoliberal agenda as a whole, the field of politics in the Amazon has been reduced to 
issues of governance, sustainability, institutional politics, participation, citizenship and 
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public policy (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2011). It is not that one or the other of these is or is not 
political, but that the dominant outlook, be it political or intellectual, strictly 
circumscribes what is or is not acceptable, recognizable political behavior. This reductive 
treatment of politics is not simply an oversight in pursuit of a research agenda more 
concerned with environmental issues. Rather it is deeply invested in a liberal conception 
of the political that locates the site of politics only within the structures of the state or 
para-state institutions such as NGOs. It is a philosophy of politics that understands power 
as held by and emanating from the rulers and exercised on the ruled. In consequence, this 
approach understands social movements only in terms of their effectiveness in 
articulating with and/or influencing those who are already “hold” power. In taking the 
existing structures of power as given, this approach fails to recognize the basis of this 
structure within the production of massive, unequal and hierarchically organized 
exclusion, while it is exactly this foundation that many social movements challenge. Thus 
there is a vast and variegated field of politics rendered illegible within this paradigm. 
Politics in Amazonia must be re-thought. 
This is not to say that environmental research and in fact technical or positivist 
research does not have important applications, because I would argue that environmental 
problems are real and that this type knowledge is important to understanding them. 
However, when this framework is substituted for an analysis of politics, it has the effect 
of neutralizing the possibilities opened up by those engaging in political action – that is, 
engaging in action that challenges the very foundations of the given relations of power. 
That is also not to say that there have not been advances or changes in structures of 
governance that have been responsive to movement demands. This dissertation has tried 
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to argue that these paradigms, of participation, of inclusion, of multiculturalism, of 
progressive government, been the result of struggle, but that within the parameters of the 
new situation, there are, once again, significant contradictions and limitations.  
If as scholars we reduce the new social realities being constructed to the existing 
frames of analysis, we risk limiting these actions to the same paradigms that colonized 
and oppressed their protagonists in the first place. This takes us back, to the proposition 
by Raquel Gutierrez cited in the introduction, to create a practical comprehension of 
events. This means being able to encounter the new strategies and knowledges enunciated 
in these moments of resistance and provide concepts for reflecting on their meanings and 
potentials. This is imperative, lest we risk reducing these actors to “backwards,” “needy,” 
and “uncivilized,” a status to which they have consistently been reduced to since 
colonization, thereby becoming unintentionally complicit in the ongoing re-production of 
the colonial project. From this position, on the simplest and most fundamental level this 
means changing our research questions. The question should not be whether movements 
achieve conservation or chaos, but rather, (following da Paula) how do Amazonians think 
emancipation from and within Amazonia? 
One preliminary answer to this question that I have sketched out in this 
dissertation is that through a territorial strategy movements are seeking to break with 
both the oppressive forms of domination associated with the expansion of industrial 
extractivism and with the more “participatory” and ambiguous forms of politics 
associated with governance under “progressive” government. Some might read this 
strategy as completely within state logic. Territory is a legal category for land that people 
may access through processes of state recognition and it is true that through this legal 
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category, movements continue to struggle for state-based territorial rights, claiming areas 
that are fixed, bounded, calculable, and measurable. On the other hand, this category 
emerged in response to – and as an attempt to incorporate – the territorial strategies 
enacted by Amazonian movements in the 1980s and 90s, as addressed in Chapter Four, 
and the movements discussed here have argued that this form of recognition by the state 
has ultimately proven insufficient to re-produce their ways of living and themselves as 
collective subjects. Thus although they continue to engage state-based territorial struggle 
as a tactic, this tactic forms part of a larger strategy, as articulated in Chapters Four and 
Five respectively, for the reproduction of “life and culture” and for “the creation of the 
Resex by the people of the Resex.” In other words they are explicitly struggles for a 
collective political subject, and thus for a territoriality that is organized around the social 
relations of that subject rather than according to the static, measured, and regulated 
spaces allotted by the state.  Whether this nascent strategic shift succeeds or fails or what 
success or failure might even mean is will only become apparent with more time. The 
lesson that we can take from them, however, is that in a moment of confusion, ambiguity 
and seeming “impasse” it is both possible and necessary (and also extremely difficult) to 
develop an ethic of resistance that is not premised on pre-existing radical exteriority to 
the state, but rather on the production of that exteriority, by using the elements of the 
given situation in order to create the conditions of possibility for transcending it.  
 
 
 
  
	   250	  
Works Cited 	  Ab’Saber,	  A.	  1989.	  “Zoneamento	  Ecológico	  e	  Econômico	  Da	  Amazônia:	  Questões	  De	  Escala	  e	  Método.”	  Estudos	  Avançados	  3	  (5):	  4–20.	  	  Acosta,	  Alberto.	  2008.	  “La	  Compleja	  Tarea	  De	  Construir	  Democráticamente	  Una	  Sociedad	  Democrática.”	  Tendencia	  N	  8.	  	  Acselrad,	  H.	  2000.	  “Zoneamento	  Ecológico-­‐econômico–entre	  Ordem	  Visual	  e	  Mercado-­‐mundo.”	  Anais	  Do	  XII	  Encontro	  Nacional	  Da	  Abep.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  “O	  Zoneamento	  Ecológico-­‐econômico	  Ea	  Multiplicidade	  De	  Ordens	  Socioambientais	  Na	  Amazônia.”	  Novos	  Cadernos	  Naea	  3	  (2).	  	  Adams,	  C.,	  R.	  Murrieta,	  W.	  Neves,	  and	  M.	  Harris.	  2009.	  Amazon	  Peasant	  Societies	  in	  a	  
Changing	  Environment:	  Political	  Ecology,	  Invisibility	  and	  Modernity	  in	  the	  
Rainforest.	  Springer	  Verlag.	  	  Adams,	  W.	  M.	  2001.	  Green	  Development:	  Environment	  and	  Sustainability	  in	  the	  Third	  
World.	  London:Routloudge	  	  Agnew,	  John.	  1994.	  “The	  Territorial	  Trap:	  The	  Geographical	  Assumptions	  of	  International	  Relations	  Theory.”	  Review	  of	  International	  Political	  Economy	  1	  (1):	  53–80.	  	  Agnew,	  John	  A.	  2009.	  Globalization	  and	  Sovereignty.	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.	  	  Agrawal,	  A.	  2005.	  Environmentality:	  Technologies	  of	  Government	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  
Subjects.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  	  Agrawal,	  A.,	  and	  C.	  C.	  Gibson.	  1999.	  “Enchantment	  and	  Disenchantment:	  The	  Role	  of	  Community	  in	  Natural	  Resource	  Conservation.”	  World	  Development	  27	  (4):	  629–649.	  	  Akram-­‐Lodhi,	  A.	  H,	  S.	  M	  Borras,	  and	  C.	  Kay.	  2007.	  Land,	  Poverty	  and	  Livelihoods	  in	  an	  
Era	  of	  Globalization:	  Perspectives	  from	  Developing	  and	  Transition	  Countries.	  London:	  Taylor	  &	  Francis.	  	  Alcoreza,	  R.	  P.	  2012.	  “When	  Communism	  Becomes	  Flesh.”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  65–79.	  	  Alencar,	  Ane.	  2005.	  A	  Pavimentação	  Da	  Br-­‐163	  e	  Os	  Desafios	  a	  Sustentabilidade:	  
Análise	  Economoica,	  Social	  e	  Ambiental.	  Belo	  Horizonte:	  Conservation	  Strategy	  Fund.	  
	   251	  
	  Allegretti,	  Mary.	  1990.	  “Extractive	  Reserves:	  An	  Alternative	  for	  Reconciling	  Development	  and	  Environmental	  Conservation	  in	  Amazonia.”	  In	  Alternatives	  
to	  Deforestaion,	  ed.	  A.B.	  Anderson,.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  	  de	  Almeida,	  A.	  W.	  B.	  2011.	  “Terras	  Tradicionalmente	  Ocupadas:	  Processos	  De	  Territorialização	  e	  Movimentos	  Sociais.”	  Revista	  Brasileira	  De	  Estudos	  
Urbanos	  e	  Regionais	  6	  (1):	  9–32.	  	  de	  Almeida,	  Alfredo	  Wagner	  B.	  2006.	  Terras	  De	  Quilombo,	  Terras	  Indígenas,	  
Babaçuais	  Livres,	  Castanhais	  Do	  Povo,	  Faxinais	  e	  Fundos	  De	  Pasto:	  Terras	  
Tradicionalmente	  Ocupadas.	  Projeto	  Nova	  Cartografia	  Social	  da	  Amazônia	  (PPGSCA-­‐UFAM,	  Fundação	  Ford).	  	  de	  Almeida,	  Alfredo	  Wagner	  Berno.	  1992.	  “O	  Intransitivo	  Da	  Transição:	  o	  Estado,	  Os	  Conflitos	  Agrários	  Ea	  Violência	  Na	  Amazônia	  (1965-­‐1985).”	  Amazônia:	  a	  
Fronteira	  Agrícola	  20.	  	  ———.	  2011.	  “Terras	  Tradicionalmente	  Ocupadas:	  Processos	  De	  Territorialização	  e	  Movimentos	  Sociais.”	  Revista	  Brasileira	  De	  Estudos	  Urbanos	  e	  Regionais	  6	  (1):	  9–32.	  	  de	  Almeida,	  Alfredo	  Walter	  Berno.	  2011.	  “Terras	  Tradicionalmente	  Ocupadas:	  Processos	  De	  Territorialização	  e	  Movimentos	  Sociais.”	  Revista	  Brasileira	  De	  
Estudos	  Urbanos	  e	  Regionais	  6	  (1):	  9–32.	  	  Almeida,	  M.	  B.	  2002.	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Amazonian	  Conservation:	  The	  Struggles	  of	  Rubber	  Tappers.”	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Anthropology	  7	  (1):	  170–219.	  	  Alston,	  L.	  J.,	  G.	  D.	  Libecap,	  and	  B.	  Mueller.	  2000.	  “Land	  Reform	  Policies,	  the	  Sources	  of	  Violent	  Conflict,	  and	  Implications	  for	  Deforestation	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Economics	  and	  Management	  39	  (2):	  162–188.	  	  Alston,	  Lee	  J.,	  Gary	  D.	  Libecap,	  and	  Bernardo	  Mueller.	  1999.	  Titles,	  Conflict,	  and	  Land	  
Use:	  The	  Development	  of	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Land	  Reform	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  
Amazon	  Frontier.	  Univ	  of	  Michigan	  Pr.	  	  Alston,	  Lee	  J.,	  Gary	  D.	  Libecap,	  and	  Robert	  Schneider.	  1996.	  “The	  Determinants	  and	  Impact	  of	  Property	  Rights:	  Land	  Titles	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  Frontier.”	  Journal	  of	  
Law,	  Economics,	  and	  Organization	  12	  (1):	  25–61.	  	  Alvarez,	  Sonya	  E.,	  Evelina	  Dagnino,	  and	  Arturo	  Escobar.	  1998.	  Cultures	  of	  
Politics/politics	  of	  Cultures:	  Re-­‐visioning	  Latin	  American	  Social	  Movements.	  Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press.	  	  
	   252	  
Amann,	  E.,	  and	  W.	  Baer.	  2002.	  “Neoliberalism	  and	  Its	  Consequences	  in	  Brazil.”	  
Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies	  34	  (4):	  945–960.	  	  Asner,	  G.	  P.,	  D.	  E.	  Knapp,	  E.	  N.	  Broadbent,	  P.	  J.	  C.	  Oliveira,	  M.	  Keller,	  and	  J.	  N.	  Silva.	  2005.	  “Selective	  Logging	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Science	  310	  (5747):	  480–482.	  	  Asselin,	  V.	  1982.	  Grilagem:	  Corrupção	  e	  Violência	  Em	  Terras	  Do	  Carajás.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Vozes.	  	  Azevedo,	  D.	  2004.	  “A	  Igreja	  Católica	  e	  Seu	  Papel	  Político	  No	  Brasil.”	  Estudos	  
Avançados	  18	  (52):	  109–120.	  	  Baletti,	  Brenda.	  2012.	  “Ordenamento	  Territorial:	  Neo-­‐developmentalism	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Territory	  in	  the	  Lower	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Journal	  of	  Peasant	  
Studies	  39	  (2):	  573–598.	  	  Barbosa,	  N,	  and	  JAP	  Souza.	  2010.	  “A	  Inflexão	  Do	  Governo	  Lula:	  Política	  Econômica,	  Crescimento	  e	  Distribuição	  De	  Renda.”	  In	  Brasil:	  Entre	  o	  Passado	  e	  o	  Futuro,	  ed.	  Emir	  Sader	  and	  M	  Garcia.	  São	  Paulo:	  Fundação	  Perseu	  Abramo	  and	  Editora	  Boitempo.	  	  Barreto,	  Andréia	  Macedo.	  2009.	  “Posse	  e	  Propriedade	  De	  Terras	  Áreas	  De	  Expansao	  Da	  Soja	  Em	  Santarém	  e	  Municipios	  Do	  Entorno,	  No	  Pará.”	  Revista	  
Interdisciplinar	  Margens	  4	  (6).	  	  Barretto	  Filho,	  H.	  T.,	  and	  F.	  Ricardo.	  2004.	  “Notas	  Para	  Uma	  História	  Social	  Das	  Áreas	  De	  Proteção	  Integral	  No	  Brasil.”	  Terras	  Indígenas	  e	  Unidades	  De	  
Conservação.	  São	  Paulo:	  Instituto	  Sócioambiental:	  53–63.	  	  Bartolomé,	  M.	  A.	  2006.	  “As	  Etnogêneses:	  Velhos	  Atores	  e	  Novos	  Papéis	  No	  Cenário	  Cultural	  e	  Político.”	  Mana	  12	  (1):	  39–68.	  	  Becker,	  B.	  K.	  2005.	  “Geopolítica	  Da	  Amazônia.”	  Estudos	  Avançados	  19	  (53):	  71–86.	  	  Becker,	  B.	  K,	  and	  C.	  A.G	  Egler.	  1993.	  Brasil,	  Uma	  Nova	  Potência	  Regional	  Na	  
Economia-­‐mundo.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Bertrand	  Brasil.	  	  Becker,	  Bertha	  K.	  1997.	  “Tendências	  De	  Transformação	  Do	  Território	  No	  Brasil.	  Vetores	  e	  Circuitos.”	  Revista	  Território	  1	  (2):	  5–17.	  	  Becker,	  Bertha	  K.	  1995.	  “Undoing	  Myths:	  The	  Amazon,	  an	  Urbanized	  Forest.”	  
Brazilian	  Perspectives	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  of	  the	  Amazon	  Region	  15:	  53–89.	  	  
	   253	  
Benatti,	  J.	  H.	  1998.	  “Posse	  Agro-­‐ecologica:	  Um	  Estudo	  Das	  Concepcoes	  Juridicas	  Sobre	  Os	  Apossamentos	  De	  Camponeses	  Agro-­‐extrativistas	  Na	  Amazonia.”	  
AMERICA	  INDIGENA	  58	  (1/2):	  375–398.	  	  Benford,	  R.	  D.,	  and	  D.	  A.	  Snow.	  2000.	  “Framing	  Processes	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  and	  Assessment.”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology:	  611–639.	  	  Bernstein,	  H.,	  and	  T.	  J.	  Byres.	  2001.	  “From	  Peasant	  Studies	  to	  Agrarian	  Change.”	  
Journal	  of	  Agrarian	  Change	  1	  (1):	  1–56.	  	  Betto,	  F.	  2006.	  “A	  Mosca	  Azul:	  Reflexão	  Sobre	  o	  Poder.”	  Rio	  De	  Janeiro:	  Rocco.	  	  Blomley,	  N.	  2003.	  “Law,	  Property,	  and	  the	  Geography	  of	  Violence:	  The	  Frontier,	  the	  Survey,	  and	  the	  Grid.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  93	  (1):	  121–141.	  	  Bolaños,	  O.	  2008.	  “Constructing	  Indigenous	  Ethnicities	  and	  Claming	  Land	  Rights	  in	  the	  Lower	  Tapajós	  and	  Arapiuns	  Region,	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Unpublished	  
Doctoral	  Dissertation).	  University	  of	  Florida,	  Gainesville.	  	  Borras,	  S.	  M.	  2001.	  “State–society	  Relations	  in	  Land	  Reform	  Implementation	  in	  the	  Philippines.”	  Development	  and	  Change	  32	  (3):	  545–575.	  	  Borras,	  S.	  M.,	  and	  J.	  C.	  Franco.	  2010.	  “Contemporary	  Discourses	  and	  Contestations	  Around	  Pro-­‐Poor	  Land	  Policies	  and	  Land	  Governance.”	  Journal	  of	  Agrarian	  
Change	  10	  (1):	  1–32.	  	  Brand,	  Urlich.	  2009.	  “Environmental	  Crises	  and	  the	  Ambiguous	  Postneoliberalising	  of	  Nature.”	  Development	  Dialogue	  51.	  Postneoliberalism–A	  Beginning	  Debate:	  103–118.	  	  Brasil.	  2005.	  Interministerial	  Workgroup	  -­‐	  Plano	  De	  Desenvolvimento	  Regional	  
Sustentável	  Para	  a	  Area	  De	  Influência	  Da	  BR-­‐163	  -­‐	  Cuiabá-­‐Santarém.	  
Background	  Document.	  Brasilia:	  Casa	  Civil.	  	  Brockington,	  D.,	  R.	  Duffy,	  and	  J.	  Igoe.	  2008.	  Nature	  Unbound:	  Conservation,	  
Capitalism	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Protected	  Areas.	  Earthscan/James	  &	  James.	  	  Brondizio,	  E.	  S.,	  E.	  F.	  Moran,	  P.	  Mausel,	  and	  Y.	  Wu.	  1994.	  “Land	  Use	  Change	  in	  the	  Amazon	  Estuary:	  Patterns	  of	  Caboclo	  Settlement	  and	  Landscape	  Management.”	  Human	  Ecology	  22	  (3):	  249–278.	  	  Browder,	  J.	  O.	  1987.	  “Brazil’s	  Export	  Promotion	  Policy	  (1980-­‐1984):	  Impacts	  on	  the	  Amazon’s	  Industrial	  Wood	  Sector.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Developing	  Areas	  21	  (3):	  285–304.	  	  
	   254	  
Browder,	  J.	  O.,	  and	  B.	  J.	  Godfrey.	  1997.	  Rainforest	  Cities:	  Urbanization,	  Development,	  
and	  Globalization	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.	  Columbia	  Univ	  Pr.	  	  Buclet,	  Benjamin,	  and	  John	  Pierre	  Leroy.	  2002.	  “Entre	  Movimento	  Social	  e	  Terceiro	  Setor.	  As	  ONGs	  à	  Busca	  De	  Sua	  Identidade.”	  Boletim	  Do	  Museu	  Paraense	  
Emílio	  Goeldi,	  Série	  Antropologia,	  Volume	  Temático	  Amazônia	  :	  Mercado	  e	  
Globalização	  No	  Terceiro	  Milênio	  18	  (2).	  Antropologia.	  	  Bunker,	  Stephen	  G.	  1985.	  Underdeveloping	  the	  Amazon:	  Extraction,	  Unequal	  
Exchange,	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  the	  Modern	  State.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  Campbell,	  J.	  M.	  2009.	  “‘The	  Development	  We	  Want:’	  Participation	  and	  Neoliberal	  Governance	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Santa	  Cruz:	  University	  of	  California.	  	  Campos,	  M.	  T.,	  and	  D.	  C.	  Nepstad.	  2006.	  “Smallholders,	  the	  Amazon’s	  New	  Conservationists.”	  Conservation	  Biology	  20	  (5):	  1553–1556.	  	  Cardoso,	  Fernando	  Henrique.	  1998.	  Avança	  Brasil:	  Mais	  4	  Anos	  De	  Desenvolvimento	  
Para	  Todos:	  Proposta	  De	  Governo.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Centro	  Edelstein	  de	  Pesquisas	  Sociais.	  	  Castree,	  N.	  2008.	  “Neoliberalising	  Nature:	  The	  Logics	  of	  Deregulation	  and	  Reregulation.”	  Environment	  and	  Planning.	  A	  40	  (1):	  131.	  	  Castro,	  Edna	  V.	  2008.	  Encontros.	  Ed.	  Renato	  Sztutman.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Beco	  do	  Azougue.	  	  de	  Castro,	  Eduardo	  Viveiros.	  2006.	  “No	  Brasil,	  Todo	  Mundo	  é	  Índio,	  Exceto	  Quem	  Não	  é.”	  Entrevista	  à	  Equipe	  De	  Edição	  Do	  Instituto	  Socioambiental).	  In	  B.	  
Ricardo	  &	  F.	  Ricardo	  (orgs).	  Povos	  Indígenas	  No	  Brasil.	  São	  Paulo,	  Instituto	  
Socioambiental:	  41–49.	  	  ———.	  2011.	  “Desenvilvimento	  Econômico	  e	  Reenvolvimento	  Cosmopolítico:	  Da	  Necessidade	  Extensive	  a	  Suficiencia	  Intensiva.”	  Sopro	  51:	  Panfleto	  Político-­‐
Cultural	  (May	  2011).	  http://culturaebarbarie.org/sopro/outros/suficiencia.html#texto1.	  	  Ceceña,	  A.	  E.	  2012.	  “On	  the	  Complex	  Relation	  Between	  Knowledges	  and	  Emancipations.”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  111–132.	  	  Cecena,	  Ana	  Esther.	  2005.	  “Introdução.”	  In	  Hegemonias	  e	  Emancipações	  No	  Século	  
XXI,	  7–12.	  Buenos	  Aires:	  CLASCO.	  	  Cleary,	  D.	  1993.	  “After	  the	  Frontier:	  Problems	  with	  Political	  Economy	  in	  the	  Modern	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies	  25	  (2):	  331–349.	  
	   255	  
	  ———.	  1998.	  “‘Lost	  Altogether	  to	  the	  Civilised	  World’:	  Race	  and	  the	  Cabanagem	  in	  Northern	  Brazil,	  1750	  to	  1850.”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  40	  (1):	  109–135.	  	  Coelho,	  Andréa	  dos	  Santos.	  2009.	  “Modelagem	  de	  Dinamica	  do	  Uso	  da	  Terra	  e	  Cobertura	  Vegetal	  na	  Regiao	  de	  Santarém,	  Oeste	  do	  Pará.”	  Belém,	  Pará:	  Universidade	  Feeral	  do	  Pará,	  Museu	  Paraense	  Emíliao	  Goeldi.	  	  Cohenca,	  Daniel.	  2005.	  “A	  Expansao	  Da	  Fronteira	  Agrícola	  e	  Sua	  Relacao	  Com	  o	  Desmatamento	  Detectado	  Em	  Imagens	  Landsat	  TM	  e	  ETM+	  Na	  Regiao	  Norte	  Da	  BR-­‐163,	  Pará	  Entre	  Os	  Anos	  De	  1999	  a	  2004.”	  Doctoral	  Dissertation,	  Lavras:	  Universidade	  Federal	  de	  Lavras,	  Departamento	  de	  Ciencias	  Florestais.	  	  ———.	  2009.	  “Notas	  Sobre	  o	  ZEE	  Da	  BR-­‐163”.	  Unpublished	  Manuscript.	  Belém.	  	  Collectivo	  Situaciones.	  2009.	  Conversaciones	  En	  El	  Impasse.	  Buenos	  Aires:	  Tinta.	  	  Commissão	  Pastoral	  da	  Terra.	  2007.	  Conflitos	  No	  Campo,	  Brasil.	  Comissão	  Pastoral	  de	  Terra.	  	  Cooke,	  B.,	  and	  U.	  Kothari.	  2001.	  Participation:	  The	  New	  Tyranny?	  London:	  Zed	  Books.	  	  Corson,	  C.	  2010.	  “Shifting	  Environmental	  Governance	  in	  a	  Neoliberal	  World:	  US	  Aid	  for	  Conservation.”	  Antipode	  42	  (3):	  576–602.	  	  Corson,	  Catherine.	  2011.	  “Territorialization,	  Enclosure	  and	  Neoliberalism:	  Non-­‐state	  Influence	  in	  Struggles	  over	  Madagascar’s	  Forests.”	  Journal	  of	  Peasant	  Studies	  38	  (4):	  703–726.	  	  Costa,	  F.	  A.	  2005.	  “Questão	  Agrária	  e	  Macropolíticas	  Para	  a	  Amazônia.”	  Estudos	  
Avançados	  19	  (53):	  131–156.	  	  Crampton,	  Jeremy	  W.,	  and	  Stuart	  Elden.	  2006.	  “Space,	  Politics,	  Calculation:	  An	  Introduction.”	  	  Cronkleton,	  P.,	  P.	  L.	  Taylor,	  D.	  Barry,	  S.	  Stone-­‐Jovicich,	  and	  M.	  Schmink.	  2008.	  
Environmental	  Governance	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Forest-­‐based	  Social	  
Movements.	  Bogor:	  CIFOR.	  	  Da	  Cunha,	  E.,	  and	  D.	  de	  Camargo	  Monfrê.	  1967.	  À	  Margem	  Da	  História.	  Editôra	  Lello	  Brasileira.	  	  Cusicanqui,	  S.	  R.	  2012.	  “Ch’ixinakax	  Utxiwa:	  A	  Reflection	  on	  the	  Practices	  and	  Discourses	  of	  Decolonization.”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  95–109.	  
	   256	  
	  Dean,	  W.	  1971.	  “Latifundia	  and	  Land	  Policy	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Brazil.”	  The	  
Hispanic	  American	  Historical	  Review	  51	  (4):	  606–625.	  	  Elden,	  S.	  2005.	  “Missing	  the	  Point:	  Globalization,	  Deterritorialization	  and	  the	  Space	  of	  the	  World.”	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  30	  (1):	  8–19.	  	  Elden,	  Stuart.	  2007.	  “Governmentality,	  Calculation,	  Territory.”	  Environment	  and	  
Planning	  D	  25	  (3):	  562.	  	  ———.	  2010a.	  “Land,	  Terrain,	  Territory.”	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  34	  (6):	  799–817.	  	  ———.	  2010b.	  “Thinking	  Territory	  Historically.”	  Geopolitics	  15	  (4):	  757–761.	  	  EMBRAPA.	  2008.	  “Agricultura	  Empresarial	  Mecanizada.”	  In	  Diagnostico,	  Zoneamento	  
Ecológico-­‐Economico	  Da	  Rodavia	  BR-­‐163.	  Belém,	  Pará:	  EMBRAPA.	  	  Escobar,	  A.	  1995.	  Encountering	  Development:	  The	  Making	  and	  Unmaking	  of	  the	  Third	  
World.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2001.	  “Culture	  Sits	  in	  Places:	  Reflections	  on	  Globalism	  and	  Subaltern	  Strategies	  of	  Localization.”	  Political	  Geography	  20	  (2):	  139–174.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  Territories	  of	  Difference:	  Place,	  Movements,	  Life,	  Redes.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books.	  	  ———.	  2010.	  “Latin	  America	  at	  a	  Crossroads.”	  Cultural	  Studies	  24	  (1):	  1–65.	  	  Esterci,	  N.	  2002.	  “Ambientalismo	  e	  Conflito	  Social	  Na	  Amazônia	  Brasileira.”	  Boletim	  
Rede	  Amazônia:	  51–62.	  	  Esterci,	  N,	  and	  K.H.S.C.	  Schweickardt.	  2010.	  “Boletim	  Do	  Museu	  Paraense	  Emílio	  Goeldi	  Ciências	  Humanas	  -­‐	  Territórios	  Amazônicos	  De	  Reforma	  Agrária	  e	  De	  Conservação	  Da	  Natureza.”	  Boletim	  Do	  Museu	  Paraense	  Emílio	  Goeldi	  Ciências	  
Humanas	  5	  (1).	  	  Fearnside,	  P.	  M.	  1986.	  Human	  Carrying	  Capacity	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Rainforest.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  Univ	  Press.	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2002.	  “Avanca	  Brasil:	  Environmental	  and	  Social	  Consequences	  of	  Brazil’s	  Planned	  Infrastructure	  in	  Amazonia.”	  Environmental	  Management	  30	  (6):	  735–747.	  	  
	   257	  
	  ———.	  2001a.	  “Land-­‐tenure	  Issues	  as	  Factors	  in	  Environmental	  Destruction	  in	  Brazilian	  Amazonia:	  The	  Case	  of	  Southern	  Pará.”	  World	  Development	  29	  (8):	  1361–1372.	  	  ———.	  2001b.	  “Soybean	  Cultivation	  as	  a	  Threat	  to	  the	  Environment	  in	  Brazil.”	  
Environmental	  Conservation	  28	  (1):	  23–38.	  	  ———.	  2007a.	  “Brazil’s	  Cuiabá-­‐Santarém	  (BR-­‐163)	  Highway:	  The	  Environmental	  Cost	  of	  Paving	  a	  Soybean	  Corridor	  Through	  the	  Amazon.”	  Environmental	  
Management	  39	  (5):	  601–614.	  	  ———.	  2007b.	  “Brazil’s	  Cuiabá-­‐Santarém	  (BR-­‐163)	  Highway:	  The	  Environmental	  Cost	  of	  Paving	  a	  Soybean	  Corridor	  Through	  the	  Amazon.”	  Environmental	  
Management	  39	  (5):	  601–614.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  “The	  Roles	  and	  Movements	  of	  Actors	  in	  the	  Deforestation	  of	  Brazilian	  Amazonia.”	  Ecology	  and	  Society	  13	  (1):	  23.	  	  ———.	  2009.	  “Brazil’s	  Environmental	  Policies	  for	  the	  Amazon:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Last	  20	  Years.”	  In	  	  University	  of	  Chicago.	  	  Ferguson,	  J.	  2005.	  “Seeing	  Like	  an	  Oil	  Company:	  Space,	  Security,	  and	  Global	  Capital	  in	  Neoliberal	  Africa.”	  American	  Anthropologist	  107	  (3):	  377–382.	  	  Fernandes,	  B.	  M.	  1999.	  “Brasil:	  500	  Anos	  De	  Luta	  Pela	  Terra.”	  Revista	  Cultura	  Vozes	  2	  (93).	  	  Fernandes,	  B.M.	  2005.	  “Movimentos	  Socioterritoriais	  e	  Movimentos	  Socioespaciais:	  Contribuição	  Teórica	  Para	  Uma	  Leitura	  Geográfica	  Dos	  Movimentos	  Sociais.”	  
Revista	  Nera	  5.	  	  ———.	  2012.	  “Disputas	  Paradigmáticas	  e	  Territoriais:	  Modelos	  De	  Desenvolvimento	  Para	  o	  Campo	  Brasileiro.	  Paradigmatic	  and	  Territorial	  Disputes:	  Development	  Models	  for	  Brazilian	  Countryside.”	  In	  	  Cornell	  University.	  	  Filgueiras,	  Luis,	  and	  Reinaldo	  Gonçalves.	  2007.	  A	  Economia	  Política	  Do	  Governo	  Lula.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Controponto.	  	  	  Foucault,	  M.	  1982.	  “The	  Subject	  and	  Power.”	  Critical	  Inquiry	  8	  (4):	  777–795.	  	  ———.	  2009.	  Security,	  Territory,	  Population:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  De	  France	  1977–
1978.	  Picador	  USA.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2008.	  The	  Birth	  Of	  Biopolitics:	  Lectures	  At	  The	  College	  De	  France,	  1978–1979.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
	   258	  
Foweraker,	  J.	  1981.	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Land.	  Boston:	  Cambridge	  University.	  Press.	  	  French,	  J.H.	  2009.	  Legalizing	  Identities:	  Becoming	  Black	  or	  Indian	  in	  Brazil’s	  
Northeast.	  Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press.	  	  French,	  J.	  2006.	  “The	  Laboring	  and	  Middle-­‐Class	  Peoples	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean:	  Historical	  Trajectories	  and	  New	  Research	  Directions.”	  In	  Global	  
Labour	  History:	  A	  State	  of	  the	  Art,	  ed.	  Jan	  Lucassen.	  Bern:	  Peter	  Lang.	  	  French,	  J.	  and	  A.	  Fortes.	  2012.	  “Nurturing	  Home,	  Deepening	  Democracy,	  and	  Combating	  Inequalities	  in	  Brazil:	  Lula,	  the	  Workers’	  Party	  and	  Dilma	  Rousseff’s	  2010	  Election	  as	  President.”	  Labor	  9	  (1):	  7–28.	  	  Furtado,	  L.	  G.	  1988.	  “Os	  Caboclos	  Pescadores	  Do	  Baixo	  Rio	  Amazonas	  Eo	  Processo	  De	  Mudança	  Social	  e	  Econômica.”	  Ciências	  Sociais	  Eo	  Mar	  No	  Brasil.	  III	  
Encontro	  Populações,	  Rios	  e	  Mares	  Da	  Amazônia.	  	  Galvão,	  E.	  E.	  1955.	  Santos	  e	  Visagens:	  Um	  Estudo	  Da	  Vida	  Religiosa	  De	  Itá,	  Amazonas.	  Vol.	  284.	  Editora	  Nacional,	  em	  convênio	  o	  Instituto	  Nacional	  do	  Livro.	  	  Gibson-­‐Graham,	  J.	  K.	  2002.	  “Beyond	  Global	  Vs.	  Local:	  Economic	  Politics	  Outside	  the	  Binary	  Frame.”	  Geographies	  of	  Power:	  25–60.	  	  Giddens,	  A.	  1985.	  A	  Contemporary	  Critique	  of	  Historical	  Materialism:	  The	  Nation-­‐
state	  and	  Violence.	  Univ	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  Greenpeace.	  2003.	  State	  of	  Conflict.	  the	  Netherlands:	  Greenpeace	  International.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  “Amazon	  Soya	  Watch.”	  Amazon	  Bulletin	  (3).	  	  Grzybowski,	  C.	  1990.	  “Rural	  Workers’	  Movements	  and	  Democratisation	  in	  Brazil.”	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Studies	  26	  (4):	  19–43.	  	  Guattari,	  F.	  and	  S.	  Rolnik.	  2008.	  Molecular	  Revolution	  in	  Brazil.	  	  Gudynas,	  Eduardo.	  2010.	  “The	  New	  Extractivism	  of	  the	  21st	  Century :	  Ten	  Urgent	  Theses	  About	  Extractivism	  in	  Relation	  to	  Current	  South	  American	  Progressivism.”	  America’s	  Program	  Report.	  	  Guha,	  R.	  1999.	  Elementary	  Aspects	  of	  Peasant	  Insurgency	  in	  Colonial	  India.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books.	  	  Guimarães,	  Juarez.	  2004.	  A	  Esperança	  Equilibrista:	  o	  Governo	  Lula	  Em	  Tempos	  De	  
Transição.	  São	  Paulo:	  Editora	  Fundação	  Perseu	  Abramo.	  	  
	   259	  
Gupta,	  A.,	  and	  J.	  Ferguson.	  1997.	  Culture,	  Power,	  Place:	  Explorations	  in	  Critical	  
Anthropology.	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books.	  	  Guthman,	  J.	  2007.	  “The	  Polanyian	  Way?	  Voluntary	  Food	  Labels	  as	  Neoliberal	  Governance.”	  Antipode	  39	  (3):	  456–478.	  	  Gutiérrez	  Aguilar,	  Raquel.	  2011.	  Epocas	  Históricas	  y	  Tradiciones	  De	  Lucha	  En	  México.	  
Consideraciones	  Generales	  Para	  Dotarnos	  De	  Un	  Esquema	  Que	  Nos	  Alumbre	  y	  
Vuelva	  Inteligibles	  Los	  Flujos	  Del	  Antagonismo	  Social.	  Entender	  La	  Descomposicion,	  Vislumbrar	  Las	  Posibilidades	  2.	  Oaxaca:	  Pez	  el	  el	  Árbol.	  	  Gutiérrez	  Aguilar,	  Racquel.	  2012.	  “The	  Rhythms	  of	  the	  Pachakuti:	  Brief	  Reflections	  Regarding	  How	  We	  Have	  Come	  to	  Know	  Emancipatory	  Struggles	  and	  the	  Significance	  of	  the	  Term	  Social	  Emancipation.”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  51–64.	  	  Haesbaert,	  R.,	  and	  C.W.	  Porto	  Gonçalves.	  2006.	  A	  Nova	  Des-­‐ordem	  Mundial.	  Unesp.	  	  Hale,	  C.	  R.	  2005.	  “Neoliberal	  Multiculturalism.”	  PoLAR:	  Political	  and	  Legal	  
Anthropology	  Review	  28	  (1):	  10–19.	  	  Hall,	  A.	  L.	  1997.	  Sustaining	  Amazonia:	  Grassroots	  Action	  for	  Productive	  Conservation.	  Manchester	  Univ	  Pr.	  	  	  Hardt,	  M.	  and	  A.	  Reyes.	  2012.	  “‘New	  Ways	  of	  Doing’:	  The	  Construction	  of	  Another	  World	  in	  Latin	  America:	  An	  Interview	  with	  Raul	  Zibechi.”	  South	  Atlantic	  
Quarterly	  111	  (1)	  (January	  19):	  165–191.	  doi:10.1215/00382876-­‐1472648.	  	  Harney,	  S.	  2006.	  “Governance,	  State,	  and	  Living	  Labour.”	  Cultural	  Logic.	  	  Harney,	  S.	  2008.	  “Governance	  and	  the	  Undercommons.”	  http://interactivist.autonomedia.org/node/10953.	  	  Harris,	  M.	  1998.	  “‘What	  It	  Means	  to	  Be	  Caboclo’:	  Some	  Critical	  Notes	  on	  the	  Construction	  of	  Amazonian	  Caboclo	  Society	  as	  an	  Anthropological	  Object.”	  
Critique	  of	  Anthropology	  18	  (1):	  83–95.	  	  ———.	  2000.	  Life	  on	  the	  Amazon:	  The	  Anthropology	  of	  a	  Brazilian	  Peasant	  Village.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  ———.	  2010.	  Rebellion	  on	  the	  Amazon:	  The	  Cabanagem,	  Race,	  and	  Popular	  Culture	  in	  
the	  North	  of	  Brazil,	  1798-­‐1840.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  Univ	  Pr.	  	  Hart,	  Gillian.	  2004.	  “Geography	  and	  Development:	  Critical	  Ethnographies.”	  Progress	  
in	  Human	  Geography	  28	  (1):	  91.	  	  
	   260	  
Hecht,	  S.,	  and	  A.	  Cockburn.	  2011.	  The	  Fate	  of	  the	  Forest:	  Developers,	  Destroyers,	  and	  
Defenders	  of	  the	  Amazon.	  Chicago:	  University	  Of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  Heynen,	  N.	  2007.	  Neoliberal	  Environments:	  False	  Promises	  and	  Unnatural	  
Consequences.	  Taylor	  &	  Francis.	  	  Hill,	  J.	  D.	  1996.	  History,	  Power,	  and	  Identity:	  Ethnogenesis	  in	  the	  Americas,	  1492-­‐1992.	  Iowa	  City:	  University	  of	  Iowa	  Press.	  	  Hochstetler,	  K.,	  and	  M.	  E.	  Keck.	  2007.	  Greening	  Brazil:	  Environmental	  Activism	  in	  
State	  and	  Society.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books.	  	  Hochstetler,	  Kathryn,	  and	  Alfred	  Montero.	  May	  23-­‐26.	  “Inertial	  Statism	  and	  the	  New	  Developmentalist	  State	  in	  Brazil.”	  In	  	  San	  Francisco.	  	  Holston,	  J.	  1991.	  The	  Misrule	  of	  Law:	  Land	  and	  Usurpation	  in	  Brazil.	  Cambridge	  Univ	  Press.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  Insurgent	  Citizenship:	  Disjunctions	  of	  Democracy	  and	  Modernity	  in	  
Brazil.	  Princeton	  Univ	  Pr.	  	  Houtzager,	  P.P.	  2001.	  “Collective	  Action	  and	  Political	  Authority:	  Rural	  Workers,	  Church,	  and	  State	  in	  Brazil.”	  Theory	  and	  Society	  30	  (1):	  1–45.	  	  Ianni,	  Octavio.	  1978.	  A	  Luta	  Pela	  Terra:	  História	  Social	  Da	  Terra	  e	  Da	  Luta	  Pela	  Terra	  
Numa	  Área	  Da	  Amazônia.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Vozes	  Petrópolis.	  	  IDEFLOR.	  2008.	  “Governador	  e	  Lula	  Acertam	  Detalhes	  Para	  Criação	  Da	  Resex	  Renascer.”	  http://www.ideflor.pa.gov.br/?q=node/140.	  	  INESC.	  2007.	  “Bancada	  Ruralista:	  o	  Maior	  Grupo	  De	  Interesse	  No	  Congresso	  Nacional”.	  Instituto	  de	  Estudos	  Socioeconômicos,	  Brasília.	  	  Ioris,	  E.	  M.	  2011.	  “Identidades	  Negadas,	  Identidades	  Construídas:	  Processos	  Identitários	  e	  Conflitos	  Territoriais	  Na	  Amazônia.”	  Ilha	  Revista	  De	  
Antropologia	  11	  (1,	  2):	  219–264.	  	  Jacquacu,	  P.	  2001.	  “When	  Forward	  Is	  Backward.”	  Ecologist	  31	  (3):	  58–59.	  	  Jepson,	  W.,	  C.	  Brannstrom,	  and	  A.	  Filippi.	  2010.	  “Access	  Regimes	  and	  Regional	  Land	  Change	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Cerrado,	  1972–2002.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  
American	  Geographers	  100	  (1):	  87–111.	  	  Jepson,	  W.	  E.	  2003.	  A	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  Land-­‐use	  and	  Land-­‐cover	  Change	  in	  the	  
Central	  Brazilian	  Savanna	  Since	  1970.	  University	  of	  California,	  Los	  Angeles.	  	  
	   261	  
Katz,	  Claudio,	  and	  L.	  Haine.	  2006.	  “Socialismo	  o	  Neodesarrollismo.”	  Aporrea.	  Org	  30.	  	  Kautsky,	  Karl.	  1988.	  The	  Agrarian	  Question.	  London:	  Zwan	  Publications.	  	  Keck,	  M.	  E.	  1995.	  “Parks,	  People	  and	  Power:	  The	  Shifting	  Terrain	  of	  Environmentalism.”	  NACLA	  Report	  on	  the	  Americas	  28	  (5):	  36–41.	  	  Keck,	  M.,	  and	  K.	  Sikkink.	  1998.	  Activists	  Without	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  
International	  Politics.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  Klooster,	  Dan.	  2005.	  “Environmental	  Certification	  of	  Forests:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Environmental	  Governance	  in	  a	  Commodity	  Network.”	  Journal	  of	  Rural	  
Studies	  21	  (4)	  (October):	  403–417.	  doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005.08.005.	  	  Kohlhepp,	  G.	  1992.	  “Desenvolvimento	  Regional	  Adaptado:	  o	  Caso	  Da	  Amazônia	  Brasileira.”	  Estudos	  Avançados	  6	  (16):	  81–102.	  	  Kolk,	  A.	  1998.	  “From	  Conflict	  to	  Cooperation:	  International	  Policies	  to	  Protect	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  World	  Development	  26	  (8):	  1481–1493.	  	  Kröger,	  M.,	  and	  J.	  E.	  Nylund.	  2011.	  “The	  Conflict	  over	  Veracel	  Pulpwood	  Plantations	  in	  Brazil–Application	  of	  Ethical	  Analysis.”	  Forest	  Policy	  and	  Economics.	  	  Laclau,	  E.,	  and	  C.	  Mouffe.	  2001.	  Hegemony	  and	  Socialist	  Strategy:	  Towards	  a	  Radical	  
Democratic	  Politics.	  Verso	  Books.	  	  Landim,	  L.	  1998.	  “The	  Nonprofit	  Sector	  in	  Brazil.”	  The	  Nonprofit	  Sector	  in	  the	  
Developing	  World:	  a	  Comparative	  Analysis:	  53–121.	  	  Latour,	  B.	  2005.	  Reassembling	  the	  Social:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Actor-­‐network-­‐theory.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA.	  	  Laurance,	  W.	  F.,	  M.	  A.	  Cochrane,	  S.	  Bergen,	  P.	  M.	  Fearnside,	  P.	  Delamônica,	  C.	  Barber,	  S.	  D’Angelo,	  T.	  Fernandes,	  and	  others.	  2001.	  “Environment:	  The	  Future	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Science	  291	  (5503):	  438–439.	  	  Lefebvre,	  Henry.	  1991.	  The	  Production	  of	  Space.	  London:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell.	  	  Leff,	  E.	  2005.	  Ecología	  y	  Capital:	  Racionalidad	  Ambiental,	  Democracia	  Participativa	  y	  
Desarrollo	  Sustentable.	  Mexico	  CIty:	  Siglo	  XXI.	  	  Leff,	  E.,	  S.	  Valenzuela,	  and	  P.	  F.	  Vieira.	  2001.	  Epistemologia	  Ambiental.	  São	  Paulo:	  Cortez.	  	  Leff,	  E.	  2001.	  Saber	  Ambiental:	  Sustentabilidade,	  Racionalidade,	  Complexidade	  e	  
Poder.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Petropolis.	  
	   262	  
Lemos,	  M.	  C,	  and	  J.	  T	  Roberts.	  2008.	  “Environmental	  Policy-­‐making	  Networks	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Amazon.”	  Philosophical	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society	  B:	  
Biological	  Sciences	  363	  (1498):	  1897.	  	  Lenin,	  V.	  I.,	  and	  J.	  Fineberg.	  1943.	  Selected	  Works:	  Theory	  of	  the	  Agrarian	  Question.	  Vol.	  12.	  International	  Publishers.	  	  Leroy,	  J.P.	  1991.	  Uma	  Chama	  Na	  Amazônia.	  Petrópolis:	  Vozes.	  	  Li,	  T.	  M.	  1996.	  “Images	  of	  Community:	  Discourse	  and	  Strategy	  in	  Property	  Relations.”	  Development	  and	  Change	  27	  (3):	  501–527.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2005.	  “Beyond	  ‘the	  State’	  and	  Failed	  Schemes.”	  American	  Anthropologist	  107	  (3):	  383–394.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2007.	  The	  Will	  to	  Improve:	  Governmentality,	  Development,	  and	  the	  Practice	  of	  
Politics.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  Books.	  	  ———.	  2009.	  “Exit	  from	  Agriculture:	  a	  Step	  Forward	  or	  a	  Step	  Backward	  for	  the	  Rural	  Poor?”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Peasant	  Studies	  36	  (3):	  629–636.	  	  Lima,	  D.,	  E.	  Alencar,	  H.	  Torres,	  and	  H.	  Costa.	  2000.	  “Histórico	  Da	  Ocupação	  Humana	  e	  Mobilidade	  Geográfica	  De	  Assentamentos	  Na	  Várzea	  Do	  Médio	  Solimões.”	  
População	  e	  Meio	  Ambiente:	  Debates	  e	  Desafios.	  São	  Paulo,	  Editora	  Do	  Senac.	  	  Lima,	  D.	  M.	  2009.	  “A	  Construção	  Histórica	  Do	  Termo	  Caboclo:	  Sobre	  Estruturas	  e	  Representações	  Sociais	  No	  Meio	  Rural	  Amazônico.”	  Novos	  Cadernos	  NAEA	  2	  (2).	  	  Little,	  P.	  E.	  2001.	  Amazonia:	  Territorial	  Struggles	  on	  Perennial	  Frontiers.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Univ	  Pr.	  	  Little,	  P.	  E.	  2002.	  Territórios	  Sociasis	  e	  Povos	  Tradicionais	  No	  Brasil:	  Por	  Uma	  
Antropologia	  Da	  Territorialidade.	  322.	  Departamento	  de	  Antropologia,	  Universidade	  de	  Brasília.	  	  Loureiro,	  V.	  R.,	  and	  J.	  N.	  A.	  Pinto.	  2005.	  “A	  Questão	  Fundiária	  Na	  Amazônia.”	  Estudos	  
Avançados	  19	  (54):	  77–98.	  	  Luciana	  de	  Oliveira	  Rosa	  Machado.	  2009.	  “Desflorestamento	  Na	  Amazonia	  Brasileira:ação	  Coletiva,	  Governança	  e	  Governabilitdade	  Em	  Área	  De	  Fronteira.”	  Sociedade	  e	  Estado	  24	  (1):	  115–147.	  	  Luxemburg,	  Rosa.	  1951.	  The	  Accumulation	  of	  Capital.	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  	  
	   263	  
Malhi,	  Y.,	  J.	  T	  Roberts,	  R.	  A	  Betts,	  T.	  J	  Killeen,	  W.	  Li,	  and	  C.	  A	  Nobre.	  2008.	  “Climate	  Change,	  Deforestation,	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  the	  Amazon.”	  Science	  319	  (5860):	  169.	  	  Mallon,	  F.	  E.	  1995.	  Peasant	  and	  Nation:	  The	  Making	  of	  Postcolonial	  Mexico	  and	  Peru.	  Univ	  of	  California	  Pr.	  	  Mansfield,	  B.	  2004.	  “Neoliberalism	  in	  the	  Oceans:‘rationalization,’	  Property	  Rights,	  and	  the	  Commons	  Question.”	  Geoforum	  35	  (3):	  313–326.	  	  Marx,	  Karl.	  1976.	  Capital,	  Volume	  1.	  New	  York:	  Vintage.	  	  Massey,	  D.	  2004.	  “Geographies	  of	  Responsibility.”	  Geografiska	  Annaler:	  Series	  B,	  
Human	  Geography	  86	  (1):	  5–18.	  	  Massey,	  D.	  B.	  2005.	  For	  Space.	  Sage	  Publications	  Ltd.	  	  McCarthy,	  J.	  2004.	  “Privatizing	  Conditions	  of	  Production:	  Trade	  Agreements	  as	  Neoliberal	  Environmental	  Governance.”	  Geoforum	  35	  (3):	  327–341.	  	  McCarthy,	  J.,	  and	  S.	  Prudham.	  2004.	  “Neoliberal	  Nature	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Neoliberalism.”	  Geoforum	  35	  (3):	  275–284.	  	  McGrath,	  D.,	  F.	  Castro,	  E.	  Cámara,	  C.	  Futemma,	  C.	  Padoch,	  J.	  M.	  Ayres,	  M.	  Pinedo-­‐Vasquez,	  A.	  Henderson,	  and	  others.	  1999.	  “Community	  Management	  of	  Floodplain	  Lakes	  and	  the	  Sustainable	  Development	  of	  Amazonian	  Fisheries.”	  
Várzea:	  Diversity,	  Development,	  and	  Conservation	  of	  Amazonia’s	  Whitewater	  
Floodplains.	  59–82.	  	  de	  Medeiros,	  L.	  S.	  2003.	  Reforma	  Agrária	  No	  Brasil:	  História	  e	  Atualidade	  Da	  Luta	  
Pela	  Terra.	  São	  Paulo:	  Editora	  Fundação	  Perseu	  Abramo.	  	  Mello,	  N.	  2005.	  “Between	  Conservation	  and	  Development:	  Innovations	  and	  Paradox	  in	  Amazon	  Environmental	  Policy.”	  In	  Between	  Conservation	  and	  Development:	  
Innovations	  and	  Paradox	  in	  Amazon	  Environmental	  Policy,	  ed.	  Anthony	  Hall,	  74–80.	  London:	  University	  of	  London,	  Institute	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Americas.	  	  Ministério	  da	  Integração	  Nacional.	  2006.	  “Subsídios	  Para	  a	  Definição	  Da	  Política	  Nacional	  De	  Ordenamento	  Territorial	  –	  PNOT”.	  Ministério	  da	  Integração	  Nacional.	  	  Ministério	  do	  Planejamento,	  Orcamento	  e	  Gestao.	  2010.	  “Investimentos	  Em	  Infraestrutura	  Para	  o	  Desenvolvimento	  Economico	  e	  Social”.	  Government	  Website.	  	  Ministério	  do	  Planejamento,	  Orçamento	  e	  Gestao.	  1999.	  Avança	  Brasil.	  Development	  
Structues	  for	  Investment.	  Brasilia:	  MPOG.	  
	   264	  
	  Mitchell,	  T.	  2002.	  Rule	  of	  Experts:	  Egypt,	  Techno-­‐politics,	  Modernity.	  Univ	  of	  California	  Pr.	  	  Moore,	  D.	  S.	  1998.	  “Subaltern	  Struggles	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Place:	  Remapping	  Resistance	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  Eastern	  Highlands.”	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  13	  (3):	  344–381.	  	  ———.	  2005.	  Suffering	  for	  Territory:	  Race,	  Place,	  and	  Power	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  Cambridge	  Univ	  Press.	  	  	  Morais,	  L,	  and	  A	  Saad-­‐Filho.	  2011.	  “Da	  Economia	  Política	  à	  Política	  Econômica:	  o	  Novo-­‐desenvolvimentismo	  Eo	  Governo	  Lula.”	  Revista	  De	  Economia	  Política	  31	  (4):	  507–527.	  	  Morais,	  Lecio,	  and	  Alfredo	  Saad-­‐Filho.	  2011.	  “Brazil	  Beyond	  Lula	  Forging	  Ahead	  or	  Pausing	  for	  Breath?”	  Latin	  American	  Perspectives	  38	  (2):	  31–44.	  	  Moran,	  E.	  1993.	  “Through	  Amazonian	  Eyes.”	  The	  Human	  Ecology	  of	  Amazonian	  
Populations.	  	  Moran,	  Emilio	  F.	  1981.	  Developing	  the	  Amazon.	  Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Mutersbaugh,	  T.	  2005.	  “Fighting	  Standards	  with	  Standards:	  Harmonization,	  Rents,	  and	  Social	  Accountability	  in	  Certified	  Agrofood	  Networks.”	  Environment	  and	  
Planning	  A	  37	  (11):	  2033–2051.	  	  Nepstad,	  D.	  C.,	  C.	  M.	  Stickler,	  and	  O.	  T.	  Almeida.	  2006.	  “Globalization	  of	  the	  Amazon	  Soy	  and	  Beef	  Industries:	  Opportunities	  for	  Conservation.”	  Conservation	  
Biology	  20	  (6):	  1595–1603.	  	  Nepstad,	  D.,	  G.	  Carvalho,	  A.	  Cristina	  Barros,	  A.	  Alencar,	  J.	  Paulo	  Capobianco,	  J.	  Bishop,	  P.	  Moutinho,	  P.	  Lefebvre,	  and	  others.	  2001.	  “Road	  Paving,	  Fire	  Regime	  Feedbacks,	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Amazon	  Forests.”	  Forest	  Ecology	  and	  
Management	  154	  (3):	  395–407.	  	  Nepstad,	  D.,	  D.	  McGrath,	  A.	  Alencar,	  A.	  C.	  Barros,	  G.	  Carvalho,	  M.	  Santilli,	  and	  M.	  C.	  Vera	  Diaz.	  2002.	  “Frontier	  Governance	  in	  Amazonia.”	  Science	  295	  (5555):	  629.	  	  Nitsch,	  M.	  1996.	  “Social	  and	  Economic	  Implications	  of	  Recent	  Strategies	  for	  Amazonia:	  a	  Critical	  Assessment.”	  In	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  
Workshop	  Interdisciplinary	  Research	  on	  the	  Conservation	  and	  Sustainable	  Use	  
of	  the	  Amazonian	  Rainforest	  and	  Its	  Iinformation	  Requirements.	  Brasilia.	  	  
	   265	  
Nugent,	  S.	  1993.	  Amazonian	  Caboclo	  Society:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Invisibility	  and	  Peasant	  
Economy.	  Berg	  Publishers	  Ltd.	  	  ———.	  1997.	  “The	  Coordinates	  of	  Identity	  in	  Amazonia.”	  Critique	  of	  Anthropology	  17	  (1):	  33–51.	  	  Nugent,	  S.,	  M.	  Harris,	  and	  others.	  2004.	  Some	  Other	  Amazonians:	  Perspectives	  on	  
Modern	  Amazonians.	  Institute	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Americas/Brookings	  Institute.	  	  Oliveira,	  Ariovaldo	  Umbelino.	  2009.	  “A	  Raposa	  e	  o	  Galinheiro.”	  Le	  Monde	  
Diplomatique.	  	  de	  Oliveira,	  F.	  2006.	  “Lula	  in	  the	  Labyrinth.”	  New	  Left	  Review	  42:	  5.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  2007.	  “Hegemonia	  Às	  Avessas.”	  Revista	  Piauí	  (6).	  	  	  Oliveira,	  J.	  P.	  1998.	  “Uma	  Etnologia	  Dos‘	  Índios	  Misturados’?	  Situação	  Colonial,	  Territorialização	  e	  Fluxos	  Culturais.”	  Mana	  4	  (1):	  47–77.	  	  de	  Oliveira,	  J.	  P.,	  A.	  W.	  B.	  de	  Almeida,	  A.	  L.	  L.	  de	  Azevedo,	  A.	  C.	  de	  Souza	  Lima,	  and	  L.	  P.	  Linhares.	  1998.	  Indigenismo	  e	  Territorialização:	  Poderes,	  Rotinas	  e	  Saberes	  
Coloniais	  No	  Brasil	  Contemporâneo.	  Contra	  Capa	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro..	  	  Ornelas,	  R.	  2012.	  “Counterhegemonies	  and	  Emancipations:	  Notes	  for	  a	  Debate.”	  
South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  145–164.	  	  Di	  Paolo,	  P.	  1986.	  Cabanagem:	  a	  Revolução	  Popular	  Da	  Amazônia.	  Edicoes	  Cejup.	  	  de	  Paula,	  E.	  A.	  2004.	  “O	  Movimento	  Sindical	  Dos	  Trabalhadores	  Rurais	  Ea	  Luta	  Pela	  Terra	  No	  Acre:	  Conquistas	  e	  Retrocessos.”	  Revista	  NERA	  Pres.	  Prudente	  Ano	  7	  (5):	  86–101.	  	  de	  Paula,	  E.A.,	  and	  S.S.	  da	  Silva.	  2008.	  “Movimentos	  Sociais	  Na	  Amazônia	  Brasileira:	  Vinte	  Anos	  Sem	  Chico	  Mendes.”	  Revista	  NERA	  Presidente	  Prudente	  Ano	  11	  (13):	  102–117.	  	  Pereira,	  D,	  D	  Santos,	  A	  Veríssimo,	  and	  R	  Salomão.	  2011.	  Oferta	  e	  Demanda	  De	  Áreas	  
Para	  Manejo	  Florestal	  No	  Estado	  Do	  Pará	  —	  Imazon.	  O	  Estado	  Da	  Amazonia.	  Belém:	  Imazon.	  	  Perz,	  S.	  G.	  2002.	  “The	  Changing	  Social	  Contexts	  of	  Deforestation	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Social	  Science	  Quarterly	  83	  (1):	  35–52.	  	  
	   266	  
Perz,	  S.	  G.,	  R.	  T.	  Walker,	  and	  M.	  M.	  Caldas.	  2006.	  “Beyond	  Population	  and	  Environment:	  Household	  Demographic	  Life	  Cycles	  and	  Land	  Use	  Allocation	  Among	  Small	  Farms	  in	  the	  Amazon.”	  Human	  Ecology	  34	  (6):	  829–849.	  	  Perz,	  Steven,	  S.	  Brilhante,	  F.	  Brown,	  M.	  Caldas,	  S.	  Ikeda,	  E.	  Mendoza,	  C.	  Overdevest,	  et	  al.	  2008.	  “Road	  Building,	  Land	  Use	  and	  Climate	  Change:	  Prospects	  for	  Environmental	  Governance	  in	  the	  Amazon.”	  Philosophical	  Transactions	  of	  the	  
Royal	  Society	  B:	  Biological	  Sciences	  363	  (1498):	  1889–1895.	  	  Petit,	  P.	  1996.	  A	  Esperança	  Equilibrista:	  a	  Trajetória	  Do	  PT	  No	  Pará.	  São	  Paulo:	  Boitempo	  Editorial.	  	  Pickles,	  J.	  2004.	  A	  History	  of	  Spaces.	  Oxford:	  Routledge.	  	  Pinton,	  F.	  1997.	  Faces	  Do	  Trópico	  Úmido:	  Conceitos	  e	  Questões	  Sobre	  Desenvolvimento	  
e	  Meio	  Ambiente.	  Belém:	  Editoria	  Cejup.	  	  Porto	  Gonçalves,	  Carlos	  Walter.	  1989.	  Os	  (des)caminhos	  Do	  Meio	  Ambiente.	  Editora	  Contexto.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2001.	  Geo-­‐grafias:	  Movimientos	  Sociales,	  Nuevas	  Territorialidades	  y	  
Sustentabilidad.	  Mexico	  City:	  Siglo	  XXI.	  	  ———.	  2001.	  Amazônia,	  Amazônias.	  Editora	  Contexto.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  2006.	  A	  Globalização	  Da	  Natureza	  Ea	  Natureza	  Da	  Globalização.	  Editora	  Record.	  	  ———.	  2003.	  Geografando:	  Nos	  Varadouros	  Do	  Mundo;	  Da	  Territorialidade	  
Seringalista	  (o	  Seringal)	  à	  Territorialidade	  Seringueira	  (a	  Reserva	  
Extrativista).	  Brasilia:	  Ibama.	  	  ———.	  2006.	  “A	  Reinvenção	  Dos	  Territórios:	  a	  Experiência	  Latino-­‐americana	  e	  Caribenha.”	  In	  Los	  Desafíos	  De	  Las	  Emancipaciones	  En	  Un	  Contexto	  
Militarizado.,	  ed.	  Ana	  Esther	  Ceceña,	  151–197.	  Buenos	  Aires:	  CLACSO,	  Consejo	  Latinoamericano	  de	  Ciencias	  Sociales.	  	  	  ———.	  2009.	  “Geo-­‐grafías-­‐movimientos	  Sociales,	  Nuevas	  Territorialidades	  y	  Sustentabilidad.”	  GEOgraphia	  5	  (9).	  	  	  ———.	  2010a.	  “Amazônia	  –	  Violência	  e	  Devastação.”	  	  	  ———.	  2010b.	  “Chico	  Mendes,	  Un	  Ecosocialista.”	  Cultura	  y	  Representaciones	  Sociales	  3	  (6).	  	  	  
	   267	  
	  Povenelli,	  E.	  A.	  2011.	  Economies	  of	  Abandonment:	  Social	  Belonging	  and	  Endurance	  in	  
Late	  Liberalism.	  Durham:	  	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  	  Projeto	  Saude	  &	  Alegria.	  2008.	  “Mapeamento	  Comunitario	  Dos	  Impactos	  Da	  Soja	  Em	  Santarém	  e	  Belterra”.	  Santarém:	  Projeto	  Saude	  &	  Alegria.	  	  Raffles,	  H.	  1999.	  “‘Local	  Theory’:	  Nature	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  an	  Amazonian	  Place.”	  
Cultural	  Anthropology	  14	  (3):	  323–360.	  	  ———.	  2002.	  In	  Amazonia:	  a	  Natural	  History.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Ramirez,	  P.	  Mamani.	  2006.	  “Territorio	  y	  Estructuras	  De	  Acción	  Colectiva:	  Microgobiernos	  Barriales.”	  Ephemera	  6	  (3):	  276.	  	  Ramos,	  A.R.	  2003.	  “The	  Special	  (or	  Specious?)	  Status	  of	  Brazilian	  Indians.”	  
Citizenship	  Studies	  7	  (4):	  401–420.	  	  Reyes,	  Alvaro.	  2012.	  “Revolutions	  in	  the	  Revolutions:	  A	  Post-­‐counterhegemonic	  Moment	  for	  Latin	  America?”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111	  (1):	  1–27.	  	  Reyes,	  A.,	  and	  M.	  Kaufman.	  2011.	  “Sovereignty,	  Indigeneity,	  Territory:	  Zapatista	  Autonomy	  and	  the	  New	  Practices	  of	  Decolonization.”	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  110	  (2):	  505–525.	  	  Ribot,	  Jesse	  C.,	  and	  Nancy	  C.	  Peluso.	  2003.	  “A	  Theory	  of	  Access*.”	  Rural	  Sociology	  68	  (2):	  153–181.	  	  Ricci,	  Ruda.	  2010a.	  Lulismo-­‐Da	  Era	  Dos	  Movimentos	  Sociais	  à	  Ascensção	  Da	  Nova	  
Classe	  Média	  Brasileira.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Contraponto.	  	  ———.	  2010b.	  “Balanço	  Inicial	  Da	  Literatura	  Sobre	  a	  Gestao	  Lula.”	  Revista	  Espaço	  
Acadêmico	  9	  (104):	  07.	  	  Rose,	  N.	  S.	  1999.	  Powers	  of	  Freedom:	  Reframing	  Political	  Thought.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Ross,	  E.	  B.	  1978.	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Amazon	  Peasantry.”	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  
Studies	  10	  (02):	  193–218.	  	  Santos,	  Milton.	  2006.	  Território,	  Territórios:	  Ensaios	  Sobre	  o	  Ordenamento	  
Territorial.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Lamparina	  Editora.	  	  Sassen,	  Saskia.	  2006.	  Territory,	  Authority,	  Rights:	  From	  Medieval	  to	  Global	  
Assemblages.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  
	   268	  
Sauer,	  S.	  2005.	  “Human	  Rights	  Violations	  in	  the	  Amazon:	  Conflict	  and	  Violence	  in	  the	  State	  of	  Pará.”	  Goiânia:	  CPT.	  	  Sayer,	  A.	  2004.	  “Moral	  Economy.”	  Review	  of	  Social	  Economy	  57	  (1).	  Schmink,	  M.	  1982.	  “Land	  Conflicts	  in	  Amazonia.”	  American	  Ethnologist	  9	  (2):	  341–357.	  	  Schmink,	  M.,	  and	  C.	  H.	  Wood.	  1992.	  Contested	  Frontiers	  in	  Amazonia.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  	  Scholz,	  I.	  2005.	  “Environmental	  Policy	  Cooperation	  Among	  Organised	  Civil	  Society,	  National	  Public	  Actors	  and	  International	  Actors	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  The	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Research	  17	  (4):	  681–705.	  	  Schroeder,	  R.	  A.	  1999.	  “Community,	  Forestry	  and	  Conditionality	  in	  the	  Gambia.”	  
Africa	  69	  (01):	  1–22.	  	  Schwartzman,	  S.,	  A.	  Alencar,	  H.	  Zarin,	  and	  A.	  P.S	  Souza.	  2010.	  “Social	  Movements	  and	  Large-­‐scale	  Tropical	  Forest	  Protection	  on	  the	  Amazon	  Frontier:	  Conservation	  from	  Chaos.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Environment	  &	  Development	  19	  (3):	  274–299.	  	  Scott,	  J.	  C.	  1976.	  The	  Moral	  Economy	  of	  the	  Peasant:	  Rebellion	  and	  Subsistence	  in	  
Southeast	  Asia.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  ———.	  1985.	  Weapons	  of	  the	  Weak:	  Everyday	  Forms	  of	  Peasant	  Resistance.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  Scott,	  James	  C.	  1998.	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State:	  How	  Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  Human	  
Condition	  Have	  Failed.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  Shanley,	  P.,	  F.	  C.	  Da	  Silva,	  and	  T.	  MacDonald.	  2011.	  “Brazil’s	  Social	  Movement,	  Women	  and	  Forests:	  A	  Case	  Study	  from	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Rubber	  Tappers.”	  International	  Forestry	  Review	  13	  (2):	  233–244.	  	  Sikkink,	  K.	  1991.	  Ideas	  and	  Institutions:	  Developmentalism	  in	  Argentina	  and	  Brazil.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  Sikor,	  Thomas,	  and	  Christian	  Lund.	  2009.	  “Access	  and	  Property:	  a	  Question	  of	  Power	  and	  Authority.”	  Development	  and	  Change	  40	  (1):	  1–22.	  	  Simmons,	  C.	  S.	  2002.	  “The	  Local	  Articulation	  of	  Policy	  Conflict:	  Land	  Use,	  Environment,	  and	  Amerindian	  Rights	  in	  Eastern	  Amazonia.”	  The	  Professional	  
Geographer	  54	  (2):	  241–258.	  	  ———.	  2004.	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Land	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  94	  (1):	  183–206.	  
	   269	  
	  ———.	  2005.	  “Territorializing	  Land	  Conflict:	  Space,	  Place,	  and	  Contentious	  Politics	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  GeoJournal	  64	  (4):	  307–317.	  	  Simmons,	  C.S.,	  R.T.	  Walker,	  E.Y.	  Arima,	  S.P.	  Aldrich,	  and	  M.M.	  Caldas.	  2007.	  “The	  Amazon	  Land	  War	  in	  the	  South	  of	  Pará.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  
Geographers	  97	  (3):	  567–592.	  	  Singer,	  A.	  2005.	  “Raízes	  Sociais	  e	  Ideológicas	  Do	  Lulismo.”	  Veja	  (1936):	  55.	  	  Singer,	  Andres.	  2010a.	  “A	  Segunda	  Alma	  Do	  Partido	  Dos	  Trabalhadores.”	  Novos	  
Estudos-­‐CEBRAP:	  89–111.	  	  ———.	  2010b.	  “O	  Lulismo	  e	  Seu	  Futuro.”	  Revista	  Piauí	  (49)	  (October).	  	  Slater,	  Candice.	  2002.	  Entangled	  Edens:	  Visions	  of	  the	  Amazon.	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  Smith,	  N.	  1984.	  Uneven	  Development.	  Blackwell	  Oxford.	  	  Soares-­‐Filho,	  B.	  S,	  D.	  C	  Nepstad,	  L.	  M	  Curran,	  G.	  C	  Cerqueira,	  R.	  A	  Garcia,	  C.	  A	  Ramos,	  E.	  Voll,	  A.	  McDonald,	  P.	  Lefebvre,	  and	  P.	  Schlesinger.	  2006.	  “Modelling	  Conservation	  in	  the	  Amazon	  Basin.”	  Nature	  440	  (7083):	  520–523.	  	  de	  Souza,	  Marcelo	  Lopes.	  2006.	  “Social	  Movements	  as	  ‘critical	  Urban	  Planning’agents.”	  City	  10	  (3):	  327–342.	  	  de	  Souza	  Martins,	  J.	  1981.	  Os	  Camponeses	  e	  a	  Politicq	  No	  Brasil:	  as	  lutas	  sociais	  no	  
campo	  e	  seu	  lugar	  no	  processo	  política.	  	  Petrópolis:	  Vozes.	  	  	  Stedile,	  J.P.,	  and	  B.M.	  Fernandes.	  1999.	  Brava	  Gente:	  a	  Trajetória	  Do	  MST	  Ea	  Luta	  
Pela	  Terra	  No	  Brasil.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  Editora	  Fundação	  Perseu	  Abramo.	  	  Stepan,	  N.	  2001.	  Picturing	  Tropical	  Nature.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  Steward,	  C.	  2007.	  “From	  Colonization	  to	  ‘Environmental	  Soy’:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Environmental	  and	  Socio-­‐economic	  Valuation	  in	  the	  Amazon	  Soy	  Frontier.”	  
Agriculture	  and	  Human	  Values	  24	  (1):	  107–122.	  	  Thompson,	  E.	  P.	  1971.	  “The	  Moral	  Economy	  of	  the	  English	  Crowd	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century.”	  Past	  &	  Present	  (50):	  76–136.	  	  Thompson,	  E.P.	  1978.	  “Eighteenth-­‐century	  English	  Society:	  Class	  Struggle	  Without	  Class?”	  Social	  History	  3	  (2):	  133–165.	  	  
	   270	  
Tilly,	  C.,	  D.	  McAdam,	  and	  S.	  Tarrow.	  2001.	  Dynamics	  of	  Contention.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Tsing,	  Anna.	  2005.	  Friction:	  An	  Ethnography	  of	  Global	  Connection.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Vandergeest,	  P.,	  and	  NL	  Peluso.	  1995.	  “Territorialization	  and	  State	  Power	  in	  Thailand.”	  Theory	  and	  Society	  24	  (3):	  385–426.	  	  Vaz,	  F.	  A.	  1996.	  “Ribeirinhos	  Da	  Amazônia:	  Identidade	  e	  Magia	  Na	  Floresta.”	  Revista	  
De	  Cultura	  Vozes,	  Petrópolis.	  	  Vaz,	  Floêncio	  Almeido.	  2004.	  “As	  Comunidades	  Munduruku	  Na	  Flona	  Do	  Tapajós.”	  In	  
Terras	  Indígenas	  e	  Unidades	  De	  Conservação	  Da	  Natureza:	  o	  Desafio	  Das	  
Sobreposições,	  ed.	  Ricardo	  Fany.	  São	  Paulo:	  Instituto	  Socioambiental.	  	  Vaz,	  Florencia.	  2008.	  “De	  Caboclos	  a	  Indigenas.	  Uma	  Cronologia	  Da	  Etnogenesis	  No	  Baixo	  Rio	  Tapajós.”	  Unpublished	  Dissertation.	  Federal	  University	  of	  Bahia.	  	  Velho,	  Otavio	  G.	  2009	  (1976).	  “Capitalismo	  Autoritario	  e	  Campesinato:	  Um	  Estudo	  Comparativo	  a	  Partir	  Dafronteira	  Em	  Movimento.” Rio de Janeiro: Centro 
Edelstein de Pesquisas Sociais	  	  Venturieri,	  A.,	  A.	  S.	  Coelho,	  M.	  C.	  Thales,	  M.	  D.	  R.	  Bacelar,	  J.	  C.	  N.	  Epiphanio,	  L.	  S.	  Galvão,	  and	  L.	  M.	  G.	  Fonseca.	  2007.	  “Análise	  Da	  Expansão	  Da	  Agricultura	  De	  Grãos	  Na	  Região	  De	  Santarém	  e	  Belterra,	  Oeste	  Do	  Estado	  Do	  Pará.”	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  XIII	  Simpósio	  Brasileiro	  De	  Sensoriamento	  Remoto:	  7003–7010.	  	  Verweij,	  M.,	  and	  T.	  E	  Josling.	  2003.	  “Special	  Issue:	  Deliberately	  Democratizing	  Multilateral	  Organization.”	  Governance	  16	  (1):	  1–21.	  	  Wagley,	  C.	  1988.	  Uma	  Comunidade	  Amazônica:	  Estudo	  Do	  Homem	  Nos	  Trópicos.	  Belo	  Horizonte:	  Editora	  Itatiaia.	  	  Watts,	  M.	  1984.	  “The	  Demise	  of	  the	  Moral	  Economy:	  Food	  and	  Famine	  in	  a	  Sudano-­‐Sahelian	  Region	  in	  Historical	  Perspective.”	  Life	  Before	  the	  Drought.	  London:	  
George	  Allen	  and	  Unwin.	  	  Watts,	  M.	  J.	  2004.	  “Antinomies	  of	  Community:	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  Geography,	  Resources	  and	  Empire.”	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  29	  (2):	  195–216.	  	  Weinhold,	  D.,	  E.	  Killick,	  and	  E.	  Reis.	  2010.	  “Soybeans,	  Poverty	  and	  Inequality	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon.”	  MPRA	  unpublished	  paper.	  London	  School	  of	  Economics.	  	  
	   271	  
Weinstein,	  B.	  1983.	  The	  Amazon	  Rubber	  Boom,	  1850-­‐1920.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  WinklerPrins,	  A.	  2001.	  “Why	  Context	  Matters:	  Local	  Soil	  Knowledge	  and	  Management	  Among	  an	  Indigenous	  Peasantry	  on	  the	  Lower	  Amazon	  Floodplain,	  Brazil.”	  Etnoecol	  Ogica	  5:	  6–20.	  Wolford,	  W.	  2004a.	  “This	  Land	  Is	  Ours	  Now:	  Spatial	  Imaginaries	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Land	  in	  Brazil.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  94	  (2):	  409–424.	  	  ———.	  2004b.	  “Of	  Land	  and	  Labor.”	  Latin	  American	  Perspectives	  31	  (2):	  147–170.	  	  ———.	  2004c.	  “This	  Land	  Is	  Ours	  Now:	  Spatial	  Imaginaries	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Land	  in	  Brazil.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  94	  (2):	  409–424.	  	  ———.	  2005.	  “Agrarian	  Moral	  Economies	  and	  Neoliberalism	  in	  Brazil:	  Competing	  Worldviews	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Land.”	  Environment	  and	  
Planning	  A	  37	  (2):	  241–261.	  	  ———.	  2007.	  “Land	  Reform	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  Neoliberalism:	  A	  Many-­‐Splendored	  Thing.”	  Antipode	  39	  (3):	  550–570.	  	  ———.	  2008.	  “Environmental	  Justice	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Scale	  in	  Brazilian	  Agriculture.”	  Society	  &	  Natural	  Resources	  21	  (7):	  641–655.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  2010.	  This	  Land	  Is	  Ours	  Now:	  Social	  Mobilization	  and	  the	  Meanings	  of	  Land	  in	  
Brazil.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  	  Zhouri,	  A.	  2010.	  “‘Adverse	  Forces’	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon:	  Developmentalism	  Versus	  Environmentalism	  and	  Indigenous	  Rights.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Environment	  &	  Development	  19	  (3):	  252–273.	  	  Zibechi,	  R.	  2008.	  Territorios	  En	  Resistencia:	  Cartografía	  Política	  De	  Las	  Periferias	  
Urbanas	  Latinoamericanas.	  Lavaca.	  	  Zibechi,	  R.	  2010.	  Dispersing	  Power:	  Social	  Movements	  as	  Anti-­‐State	  Forces.	  Oakland:	  AK	  Press.	  	  
  
 
